

# **THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW**

Continuing

**The Review of Historical Publications  
Relating to Canada**

Founded at the University of Toronto in 1896

**Edited by John T. Saywell**

**VOLUME XLI, 1960**

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Edited by John T. Saywell

VOLUME XLI, NO. 1

MARCH, 1960

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## The Social Credit Back-benchers' Revolt, 1937

HAROLD J. SCHULTZ

IN THE "hungry thirties" voters across Canada toppled incumbent governments in province after province in an angry bid to stem the depression. The Farmers' government of Alberta had no reason to prove the exception. Subdued by time and success, the United Farmers of Alberta (U.F.A.) disappeared from the provincial legislature as abruptly as they had appeared fourteen years before. Once again, as in 1921, the people of Alberta took "direct action" to combat their economic ills.

The beneficiary of this prairie protest was the Social Credit party led by William Aberhart. To depression-ridden Albertans, harassed by drought and debt, Aberhart's promise of "\$25 a month" was an inducement that no other party could match and on August 22, 1935, Aberhart was ushered into office pledged to fulfil his campaign promise of a monthly dividend within eighteen months. The new Premier had provided both the leadership and the organization for the new party. He formed the Social Credit League, popularized Social Credit theories, hand-picked the candidates, and swept into office holding fifty-six of the sixty-three seats in the legislature.

The *Hanna Herald* observed before the election that Aberhart had "issued a lot of promissory notes" which were "recorded in such a fashion that they will undoubtedly be brought up to plague him should he succeed in gaining power."<sup>1</sup> After the election the "astonished" *Winnipeg Free Press* admitted that "the outcome is in every sense a personal victory for him."<sup>2</sup> It followed that it was Aberhart who would be held personally accountable for the fulfillment of his political promises. Aberhart did not appear too concerned over his campaign pledges. The week after the election he remarked that "75 per cent of those who voted for me don't expect any dividend, but hope for a just

<sup>1</sup>July 18, 1935.

<sup>2</sup>Aug. 24, 1935.

and honest government."<sup>3</sup> The Premier immediately embarked on a programme based on this assumption. He had no assurance that Social Crediters would be content to support such a programme, but his followers had always accepted his plans before and he counted on their continued support. After all, had he not been responsible for their success at the polls?

Organization had always appealed to Aberhart and now he was given an opportunity to reorganize the provincial administration and to promote efficiency in government. He had achieved a sound administration in his high school and Bible school and he saw no reason for not producing an equally sound provincial administration. Besides, he knew more about administration than he did about implementing Social Credit theories. After a trip east Aberhart hired Robert Magor of Montreal as his financial adviser and began a governmental house cleaning. With his characteristic zest and thoroughness, Aberhart merged departments and eliminated waste in a determined effort to promote efficiency and a balanced budget. "Orthodox retrenchment and departmental reform were not even mentioned in the Social Credit platform,"<sup>4</sup> however, and could hardly satisfy ardent Social Crediters. By the end of 1935 Aberhart had done much to reorganize the government and little to implement Social Credit schemes. He simply explained that he had "not yet had time to think about Social Credit." Indeed, if "Aberhart had never spawned Social Credit, had he been elected on a conventional platform he would have been credited with making a 'good sound beginning'. . . . But it was Social Credit that put him in. He cannot escape the consequences of his promises."<sup>5</sup>

In 1936 Aberhart continued to preach Social Credit and practice "good government." The July issue of the *Douglas Social Credit Advocate* chided: "Back East they thought the Social Credit gun was loaded. It now turns out to be a pop gun with a cork in it. Every now and again the Premier shoots it off, and his followers, hearing the noise, still believe he is a very bold man." Aberhart explained that he was preparing the way for Social Credit by establishing a sound foundation and that therefore he continually found it necessary to reset the date on which the first dividend would be paid.<sup>6</sup> The Premier had won the election with farm-labour votes and he rewarded these supporters in 1936 with industrial and labour legislation and measures for debt relief. But in this, as in his administrative reorganization, he acted more the role of a reformer than a follower of Major Douglas.

<sup>3</sup>New York Times, Sept. 1, 1935.

<sup>4</sup>C. H. Douglas, *The Alberta Experiment* (London, 1937), 61.

<sup>5</sup>H. Napier Moore, "What of Social Credit?" *Maclean's*, XLIX (Jan. 15, 1936), 40.

<sup>6</sup>Edmonton Bulletin, June 7, 1937; *Calgary Daily Herald*, May 29, 1939.

Meanwhile, Social Crediters were getting restive. One M.L.A. (S. A. G. Barnes, Edmonton), and one M.P. (P. J. Rowse, Athabaska), had already been read out of the party for their criticisms of Aberhart and his programme. Throughout the year the people of Alberta continued to suffer from a pre-Social Credit malady—lack of purchasing power—as economic conditions failed to improve. Hail and grasshoppers added additional plagues to the crops, while debt, drought, and depression continued to stalk the province. By the end of 1936, sixteen months had elapsed since Aberhart assumed office and the dividend had been promised within eighteen months; but so far, beyond a few legislative acts that were more form than substance, the government was no more prepared to distribute the dividend than it had been in 1935. Aberhart was finding out that it was much easier to make an election promise than to fulfil it.

Before leaving to spend the Christmas holidays in Vancouver with his daughters, Aberhart appointed a special cabinet committee to frame a Social Credit bill, a step precipitated by the uninvited arrival of John Hargrave, leader of the Greenshirts in England.<sup>7</sup> Hargrave, along with Earl Ansley (S.C., Leduc), acted in an advisory capacity to the committee of three (W. W. Cross, Lucien Maynard, and William Fallow) from the cabinet. Ansley informed a divisional party conference that "drastic legislation is necessary" to bring in Social Credit,<sup>8</sup> but Aberhart told the press in Vancouver the next day that he did not know of any radical measures being prepared.<sup>9</sup> As the new year opened, Aberhart announced on his Sunday radio broadcast that he would continue to act "sanely and fairly." And he had not forgotten the eighteen-month time limit, he added, although he suggested that "the vigorous holdups we have had should bring us at least six months extension if necessary."<sup>10</sup>

A few days later Hargrave informed the public that he was convinced that Social Credit would work in Alberta. All it would take was "technical knowledge plus courage."<sup>11</sup> The special committee came out with a ten-point plan providing for a price discount, the circulation of debt-free money, a dividend of five dollars a month in Alberta credit, and government control of all exports from the province.<sup>12</sup> The following Sunday Aberhart announced that he was now ready to take

<sup>7</sup>*Albertan Social Credit Supplement*, Dec. 26, 1936. Hargrave was the fourth "expert" on Social Credit to arrive in Edmonton and offer his services.

<sup>8</sup>*Edmonton Journal*, Dec. 30, 1936.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, Dec. 31, 1936.

<sup>10</sup>*Winnipeg Free Press*, Jan. 4, 1937.

<sup>11</sup>*Today and Tomorrow*, Jan. 7, 1937.

<sup>12</sup>*Calgary Albertan*, Jan. 9, 1937. Major Douglas observed that the plan was a "delusion" because the government had to get hold of the existing financial system, not create a parallel one (*Edmonton Journal*, Jan. 13, 1937).

the first definite step toward the establishment of the dividend and requested the citizens to stand together "patiently and solidly" until they received it.<sup>13</sup>

A week later Social Credit delegates met in Edmonton for their annual convention. This was the first province-wide conference under a new constitution and Aberhart exhorted the delegates to "keep close record of our business and resolutions—so that we may have same in books to show other countries how we did it." He urged that "party politics . . . be kept out of this convention" and asked the delegates for patience since "there is no elevator in economic progress—we must climb the stairs." Before the convention adjourned, the delegates carried a resolution indicating "the imperative necessity" of putting Social Credit into effect as rapidly as possible because the continued suffering and depression in the province reflected adversely on the government.<sup>14</sup>

Meanwhile Hargrave had been talking to the M.L.A.'s, who had convinced him that Aberhart and his cabinet were doing nothing to promote Social Credit.<sup>15</sup> His earlier exuberance changed to exasperation. Disillusioned, he packed his bags, gave the following statement to the press, and returned to England.

I still feel that the first Social Credit Government in the world is not yet publicly committed to the principles of Social Credit . . . that it lacks technical knowledge and as a consequence has, over the past sixteen months, groped its way like a man stumbling along on a pitch black night.

Not only was it necessary to deal with a preacher-school-master personality, abnormally resentful of criticism, but one that could not accept and act upon any proposition without taking it to pieces and putting it together wrongly.

Having done my utmost to help, I am leaving Alberta because I find it impossible to co-operate with a Government which I consider a mere vacillating machine which operates in starts, stops and reversals.<sup>16</sup>

Aberhart was unprepared for Hargrave's attack and could only tell the press that he was "greatly surprised" by the action. Again, as in 1936, he blamed "mysterious forces" for the criticism levelled at him. "I fear that this is but another attempt by some unknown person or persons, through the instrumentality of some undisclosed medium, to make our task all the more difficult."<sup>17</sup> This reply failed to satisfy a growing number of restive M.L.A.'s who were finding it increasingly difficult to face their constituencies. If neither Douglas, Hargrave, nor any of the other "experts" could work out a Social Credit plan with Aberhart, how would Social Credit be introduced?

<sup>13</sup>Ottawa Citizen, Jan. 11, 1937.

<sup>14</sup>Alberta Social Credit League, *Report of the First Annual Provincial Convention* (Edmonton, 1937), 1, 2, 18.

<sup>16</sup>Edmonton Bulletin, Jan. 25, 1937.

<sup>15</sup>The Times, Aug. 25, 1937.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., Jan. 26, 1937.

On February 25 the third session of the Eighth Legislature opened and members and spectators alike awaited the Social Credit proposals which surely would be forthcoming. The speech from the throne noted the "influenza epidemic that has distressed a number of our citizens," lamented the continued drought, and thanked the Dominion government for its relief to the stricken areas. Only one vague and timid paragraph referred to possible Social Credit legislation,<sup>18</sup> and the last opportunity to implement the election promise within eighteen months slipped away. The next day J. L. Robinson (S.C., Medicine Hat) bravely moved the reply to the speech from the throne by praising the Premier and informing the House that "M.L.A. now meant 'men like Aberhart.'"<sup>19</sup>

Two days later Aberhart, without caucus discussion, admitted his failure to establish Social Credit within the time period that he had allotted himself and asked the constituency organizations to judge whether he should carry on or resign. In a June vote, "when the roads and weather conditions are improved," the president of each constituency association was to call a zone meeting of all party members and "have them express by resolution their decision in this matter. I am not asking our opponents what they think, for they had nothing to do with our election and had nothing to do with my promises." Meanwhile the government would continue to prepare the way for Social Credit.<sup>20</sup> In this appeal to the local constituencies, where his personal following was still strong, Aberhart went over the heads of the caucus—the logical group to determine the leadership of the party. Perhaps by such a move the murmurs of the back-benchers could be stilled.

The M.L.A.'s were not to be put off so easily, however. During the first weeks of the legislative session an organized protest against Aberhart's programme began in the basement of the Corona Hotel. Here some twenty to thirty disgruntled back-benchers, annoyed by Aberhart's tendency "to continue to teach school,"<sup>21</sup> but more by the failure of the government to implement Social Credit, met regularly to share their grievances and to plot their strategy.<sup>22</sup> The group was led by Dr. Harry Brown, Albert Bourcier, G. L. MacLachlan, Alfred Hooke, Earl Ansley, and W. E. Cain.<sup>23</sup> Several urged the ousting of the cautious Aberhart. All wanted to approach the author of Social Credit again and follow any advice that Douglas might give. The private

<sup>18</sup>*Legislative Journals*, XXXV, 10–11.

<sup>19</sup>*Calgary Albertan*, Feb. 27, 1937.

<sup>20</sup>*Ottawa Citizen*, March 1, 1937.

<sup>21</sup>*Ponoko Herald*, April 8, 1937.

<sup>22</sup>*Edmonton Journal*, March 4, 1937.

<sup>23</sup>The six listed by all eleven Social Credit M.L.A.'s interviewed by the author. Others mentioned prominently: Mrs. Edith Rogers, A. L. Blue, and S. A. Berg.

members were constantly being prodded by their constituents to provide the dividend, even though it was Aberhart, not they, who had set the eighteen-month limit and had claimed to have a plan for implementing it. Frank S. James, president of the Ponoko constituency executive, expressed the sentiments of the constituents in a message to their representative: "Our instructions to Mrs. Rogers, MLA, are that a Social Credit budget must be introduced at this Session, that an economic council of technical experts must be employed and a social credit plan implemented before the Session adjourns."<sup>24</sup> The instructions were certainly explicit enough.

In the legislature D. M. Duggan, the Conservative leader, moved a vote of non-confidence in the government since Aberhart had failed to keep his promise. The vote went fifty to seven against the motion since the Social Credit contingent remained united. Encouraged, the government embarked on a programme concerned with "farms, farmers, and farm problems" and introduced a pleasant innovation—a "daily tea party"—in the House by providing for an afternoon recess during which tea and sandwiches were to be served the members.<sup>25</sup> Aberhart announced his intentions of going to the coronation in London and made no secret of his plans to rush the business of the session so he could get away in good time.<sup>26</sup>

The debate on the address in reply to the speech from the throne had not even ended, however, before the first public sign of dissatisfaction among the back-benchers was noted. Blue (S.C., Ribstone), an infrequent speaker, began a conventional defence of the government's position, but later bluntly rapped the caucus form of government as undemocratic and criticized the speech from the throne for making more of the coronation festivities than of Social Credit.<sup>27</sup> Six days later, Barnes continued the criticism of the caucus form of government, and urged a new government chosen by the entire legislature. Both the executive council and the back-benchers had failed, he said, and the blame rested on all of them. "We cannot expect the same tolerance as to former government's broken promises, for the reason that we promised more and therefore more is required."<sup>28</sup>

The strategy of the dissident Social Credit members at this time was to refuse support of the budget until Social Credit measures were specifically included in the appropriations.<sup>29</sup> In the caucus the "insurgents"<sup>30</sup> made their demands and urged no increase in taxation, only

<sup>24</sup>March 6, 1937. Private files of Mrs. Rogers.

<sup>25</sup>Calgary *Albertan*, March 4, 1937; Feb. 27, 1937.

<sup>26</sup>Wetaskiwin *Times*, March 4, 1937.

<sup>27</sup>Edmonton *Bulletin*, March 11, 1937.

<sup>28</sup>Calgary *Albertan*, March 5, 1937.

<sup>29</sup>Edmonton *Journal*, May 13, 1937.

<sup>30</sup>The terms "insurgents" and "loyalist" were derived from the Spanish Civil War then in process.



to have Aberhart and the cabinet ignore their requests. The new Provincial Treasurer, Solon Low, protested that "it was not possible to include estimates for Social Credit in the budget as the government had no plan"<sup>31</sup> and appropriations in the budget must deal with specific items, not with general measures.

On March 12, Low brought down his first budget. The press gallery was crammed with news-men anticipating a radical monetary programme. Before the day was over, 35,000 words were telegraphed by the reporters to newspapers ranging from *Hush* to the *New York Times*.<sup>32</sup> The budget made news, not for its radicalism, but because it turned out to be more "orthodox" than the previous one. Low declared that the estimates "reflected the determination of the Government to adhere to the policy of keeping expenditures in balance with receipts."<sup>33</sup> Three days later the budget debate opened in the House. The Opposition leader, J. J. Bowlen, attacked the budget, only to have the new Minister of Lands and Mines, Nathan Tanner, rise and defend his southern colleague's estimates. Duggan, considered the ablest financial critic in the House, expected more government supporters to speak on the budget. Instead there was only silence from the back-benches. Low then moved adjournment, thereby giving him the right to conclude the debate the next day. Immediately Duggan was on his feet to ask permission to speak.

Permission granted, Duggan analysed the budget for more than an hour the next afternoon (March 16). Not wishing to attack Low's "first-born" too harshly since the budget had been dropped on his doorstep after the resignation of Charles Cockroft, Duggan argued that he could identify neither the present nor the former treasurer as the father of the infant. This brought the Minister of Health, Dr. Cross, to his feet: "I object, Mr. Speaker. The honourable member is accusing our treasurer of having an illegitimate child." "Well," retorted Duggan, "probably the minister knows more about it because in his medical capacity, he was there at the birth."<sup>34</sup> Duggan was followed by four more Opposition members and Blue in protesting the budget. Only one Social Credit member, Mrs. Edith Gostick (Calgary), rose to defend it.

The next day the debate was interrupted by the death of Lieutenant-Governor Philip Primrose. Because of the constitutional question involved as to the legality of business transacted while the office was

<sup>31</sup>Bourcier's address of June 5, *Edmonton Bulletin*, June 7, 1937. According to Dr. Cross, Hargrave's ten-point plan was unanimously rejected by the legal advisers of the government since the province could not interfere with exports. Therefore the plan was dropped (*Today and Tomorrow*, April 1, 1937).

<sup>32</sup>Calgary *Albertan*, March 1, 1937; *Edmonton Bulletin*, May 24, 1943.

<sup>33</sup>*Canadian Annual Review*, 1937-8, 480.

<sup>34</sup>Calgary *Albertan*, March 17, 1937.

vacant, the Attorney General adjourned the House until a new appointment could be made by Ottawa.

Meanwhile, a private members' committee, appointed by the caucus, had been working on a Social Credit bill to replace the ten-point plan. This time J. Harold Crawford of Regina, a former insurance man, advised the committee.<sup>35</sup> The insurgent "committee men" talked freely of their plans to force this bill on Aberhart and to prevent the ejection of members for voicing their criticisms in the caucus.<sup>36</sup> The bill was virtually completed when the six-day adjournment ended and the insurgents agreed to filibuster until it was accepted.<sup>37</sup> After a four-minute ceremony of swearing in the new Lieutenant-Governor, John C. Bowen, proceedings once more got under way. Ansley admitted that the party made a mistake in bringing Magor rather than Douglas to Alberta. Aberhart rose to correct the statement, arguing that the one was never considered a substitute for the other. Undeterred, Ansley continued to explain that he had reluctantly allowed last year's budget to pass, although it was "the opposite" of Social Credit, to enable the government to get organized. But the new budget was no improvement and the licensing bills introduced by Cross were the very reverse of Social Credit.<sup>38</sup>

That night the caucus met in an attempt to work out the differences that divided them. In a lengthy session the cabinet agreed to withdraw two bills—one giving power to the government to license every person engaged in a trade or business, the other a price-fixing bill. It also agreed to call in Major Douglas or some other expert to assist in mapping out a Social Credit scheme.<sup>39</sup> Aberhart stated flatly, however, that neither he nor any cabinet member would introduce the second of the two insurgent bills which proposed a tax on securities and a capital levy.<sup>40</sup>

With no satisfactory compromise reached, the insurgents continued their filibuster even though Aberhart announced the dropping of the licensing bills. Bourcier (S.C., Lac Ste. Anne), in the longest speech of the day, labelled the budget "a complete denial of Social Credit." He allowed that he was always "opposed to the hush-hush policies and secret caucus methods of the government," but "there is nothing secret about what has been done in the last 18 months. . . . The government has done nothing."<sup>41</sup> Three colleagues continued the attack, claiming that no Social Crediter could support the budget without violating his principles. Cain concluded the indictment by explaining that he would

<sup>35</sup>*Edmonton Journal*, March 3, 1937; *Hanna Herald*, April 1, 1937.

<sup>36</sup>C. H. Stout dispatch, *Hanna Herald*, March 25, 1937.

<sup>37</sup>*Edmonton Journal*, March 23, 1937.

<sup>38</sup>*Calgary Albertan*, March 24, 1937.

<sup>40</sup>*Hanna Herald*, April 1, 1937.

<sup>39</sup>*The Times*, March 25, 1937.

<sup>41</sup>*Ottawa Citizen*, March 25, 1937.



not dare face his constituency or his conscience without promoting a Social Credit plan, even though his attacks on the government caused him much regret.<sup>42</sup>

Aberhart, sitting stolidly through it all, "doodling abstractedly, was shocked, bewildered and grievously wounded" by the attack from his own followers<sup>43</sup>—followers whom he and an advisory committee had selected personally. His sequestered career as a teacher and preacher had not prepared him for such treatment and neither he nor his cabinet answered the charges. The *Pincher Creek Echo* of April 1 commented: "Premier Aberhart must have some pleasant thoughts when he says to himself, 'well—I picked that bunch myself.'"

The Premier still was determined to see his budget through. To this end he seconded a motion by Low that the Speaker leave the chair and that the Assembly immediately resolve itself into a Committee of Supply. When the motion failed, Brown made a motion to adjourn the debate. Aberhart protested, pointing out the shortage of time, "We must close the debate as quickly as possible and get on with the estimates."<sup>44</sup> A division was called and Brown's motion was sustained by a vote of twenty-seven to twenty-five. Twenty-one Social Crediters and six Opposition members had combined to defeat the government on the vote. Only the cabinet had sided unanimously with Aberhart.

Aberhart then gave notice that he would move closure of the budget debate on Monday, March 29, thereby forcing a vote on the budget by Tuesday morning. For the first time in Canadian history, a premier had invoked the closure rule against members of his own party. Aberhart explained that he did not object to members expressing their opinion on the budget, but that it must be passed by the end of the month so that "there will be no delay in issuing seed grain and so forth to farmers, and that there be no delay in the issuance of relief to people who are suffering."<sup>45</sup>

Although Aberhart's defeat was only on a procedural motion, it provided the insurgents with an opportunity to display their strength. Again the party met in caucus and again no compromise was reached. The defeat of the government was "now confidently expected" and Dr. Brown was slated to become the new premier.<sup>46</sup> Brown denied any

<sup>42</sup>*Brooks Bulletin*, April 1, 1937.

<sup>43</sup>Barbara Moon, "Aberhart: The Man and the Shadow," *Maclean's*, LXVI (March 15, 1953), 55.

<sup>44</sup>*Lethbridge Herald*, March 25, 1937.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup>*The Times*, March 27, 1937. Dr. Brown was considered the leader of the insurgent faction by all M.L.A.'s interviewed. *The Times* puts the insurgent strength at thirty-three, while T. L. Bain claims the insurgents numbered thirty-five out of the fifty-six Social Credit members (*Canadian Forum*, XVI (July, 1937), 120). Both figures seem to be excessive as only twenty-four insurgents can be identified.

such designs and declared that he had no ambition to be premier "if and when the Aberhart government resigned."<sup>47</sup> The next day Brown began the debate by thanking the House for giving him permission to speak even though Aberhart had tried to deny him that right. "I cannot understand the honorable premier's sudden interest in time. It's rather unfortunate that he did not realize the important relationship between time and governmental progress eighteen months ago. I am quite sure it could not have been his intention to exclude from the debate one of my kindly and tolerant disposition."<sup>48</sup>

Brown argued that it was difficult to ride two horses at once and that to try and reconcile "two such incompatible elements" as a Social Credit philosophy and an orthodox budget in "the body politic" could only result in "a bad political stomach-ache."<sup>49</sup> Before concluding, he accused Aberhart of being an obstinate leader. When the caucus had recently urged him to bring Douglas to Alberta, Aberhart's reply to the proposal, said Brown, had been that "he would play second fiddle to no man." Aberhart rose and challenged the statement, declaring that he had even invited the insurgent leaders to bring a committee of their group to discuss privately the question of his own resignation. Their reply, Aberhart claimed, was that the issue would be decided on the floor of the legislature, just as Brown was now trying to do.<sup>50</sup> Fred Anderson (S.C., Calgary) and Cain continued the insurgent attack, but made no attempt to demand a vote on the straight issue of the budget, although both Aberhart and the insurgent leaders conferred with the Lieutenant-Governor in the event that a vote was called and the government defeated.<sup>51</sup>

In his regular Sunday broadcast before his Calgary Prophetic Bible Institute audience, Aberhart denounced as confiscatory the insurgents' demand for a securities tax of twenty million dollars. "I have done everything in my power to heal the breach" he exclaimed, but "the prophesied break in our ranks has come." He added that he was still of the opinion that Social Credit principles could be established in Alberta, if given time to build carefully, but he had no intention of "running blindly down some alleyway" to placate his critics. Since the fiscal year ended in three days and no supply had been passed, Aberhart announced he would withdraw his closure motion and ask for a temporary money vote instead.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>47</sup>Edmonton Bulletin, March 26, 1937.

<sup>48</sup>Calgary Albertan, March 27, 1937.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>New York Times, March 26, 1937. Such an insurgent reply seems highly improbable as it would have been to the insurgents' advantage to take over the government privately and thereby avoid an open breach in the party. Insurgent leaders intimated as much by hoping that Aberhart would retire quietly (C. H. Stout, *Lethbridge Herald*, March 27, 1937).

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Montreal Gazette, March 29, 1937.

The next day Aberhart sought the unanimous consent of the House to withdraw his closure motion in order to proceed with an interim money vote. When the consent was not forthcoming, the motion was put and defeated by the chorus of "Noes." Aberhart hastily indicated that he had "no desire whatever to shut off discussion of the Budget," but merely wished to expedite business.<sup>53</sup> Brown immediately attacked the Premier's Sunday broadcast as misleading, because no confiscation was ever proposed. Cross then rose to defend the record of the government in his maiden speech in the House and promised a Social Credit plan if the insurgents would back the government.<sup>54</sup>

The insurgents were not to be put off so lightly, however, and they announced their determination to defeat any motion for an interim supply bill "whenever it was made." In view of the deadlock, Gerald O'Connor (Liberal, Edmonton) asked, "Isn't it obviously the duty of the government to resign?" "That question is too complicated for me to answer," replied Cross. In such a confused situation, with the chamber filled with charges and countercharges, Reverend Roy Taylor's (S.C., Pincher Creek) final plea appealed to both factions when he suggested, "Why not declare an armistice and let us meet in caucus. The right spirit is needed."<sup>55</sup>

Time was at a premium for Aberhart when the caucus—the first full caucus since the revolt—met that night. If the party rebels refused to pass the provisional supply the next day, the Lieutenant-Governor would be forced either "to call on Dr. H. K. Brown, the insurgent's leader"<sup>56</sup> or to grant a dissolution and neither alternative appealed to Aberhart. In the four-and-a-half-hour caucus which ensued, an agreement was reached. The main budget would be withdrawn and an interim supply granted, provided unanimous consent could be obtained to suspend the House rules. The insurgents agreed. In return the government would amend the Social Credit Measures Act to provide for a commission of five members to implement a Social Credit programme in Alberta.<sup>57</sup>

The next afternoon Aberhart entered the chamber and immediately proposed that the main budget be withdrawn. Only one government supporter, Dr. J. L. Robinson, stood in the way of the unanimous consent necessary for withdrawal.<sup>58</sup> The insurgents were nonplussed,

<sup>53</sup>Ottawa Citizen, March 30, 1937.

<sup>54</sup>Hanna Herald, April 8, 1937.

<sup>55</sup>Ottawa Citizen, March 30, 1937.

<sup>56</sup>Toronto Globe and Mail, March 30, 1937.

<sup>57</sup>Edmonton Journal, March 30, 1937. Several insurgents also claimed that Aberhart promised to offer his resignation to the caucus if they would agree to support the interim supply (C. H. Stout, Hanna Herald, April 8, 1937).

<sup>58</sup>Edmonton Journal, May 13, 1937. The Liberals and Conservatives had agreed to the motion in advance.

disappearing to the lobbies to confer among themselves and to charge a "double-cross."<sup>59</sup> Hooke wrote a note to Low, asking "why the hoak?"<sup>60</sup> The insurgent reaction reached Aberhart and after the front bench exchanged confidences, Robinson asked leave to withdraw his objection.<sup>61</sup> The Conservative leader, Duggan, called the sudden reversal a farce. "The member voted against the motion, then comes along with some sort of childish apology and asks that his objection be withdrawn."<sup>62</sup>

On the next vote the interim supply (for one-fourth of the year) was passed and the government indicated that the House would be expected to adjourn for a period not to exceed ninety days, in order for the government to complete its plans for a Social Credit programme. Before adjourning for the day Aberhart introduced the first reading of an act to amend the Social Credit Measures Act. The rebel members were half mollified by the gains they had made. "We are preserving an air of armed neutrality," one member commented.<sup>63</sup>

The constituencies were also split on the insurgent-loyalist issue. Some supported Aberhart throughout; others attacked his "retrograde policy" and urged their insurgent M.L.A.'s to "make it plain to Mr. Aberhart that you are in reality the loyalists."<sup>64</sup> On the thirty-first the insurgents suggested opposing the interim bill and forcing a non-confidence vote, but, after having supported its first and second reading, they feared such a move would cause public disfavour and dropped the notion.<sup>65</sup> That night the insurgents gathered in caucus with the loyalists in the hope that Aberhart would offer his resignation. All the members were present except Aberhart and the cabinet. Aberhart entered the room alone and announced that he apparently did not have the confidence of the members. Therefore he would return to his office and with his cabinet await the decision of the caucus. "He did not tender his resignation."<sup>66</sup>

For the next four hours a noisy battle occurred. The insurgents expected Aberhart to resign voluntarily, but Aberhart had refused to oblige and they were not anxious to split the Social Credit League or

<sup>59</sup>*Hanna Herald*, April 8, 1937.

<sup>60</sup>A. J. Hooke, *Edmonton Journal*, May 13, 1937. According to Hooke, Maynard and Low, with the Premier's knowledge, approached Robinson (after another M.L.A. turned them down), urging him to vote against the resolution and thereby force Social Crediters either to vote the budget and another year in office for the government, or to face an election which the insurgents did not want (*ibid.*).

<sup>61</sup>*Hanna Herald*, April 8, 1937.

<sup>62</sup>*Edmonton Journal*, March 31, 1937.

<sup>63</sup>*Edmonton Bulletin*, March 31, 1937.

<sup>64</sup>H. H. Diconson to Mrs. Edith Rogers, April 1, 1937. Private files of Mrs. Rogers.

<sup>65</sup>*Calgary Albertan*, April 1, 1937.

<sup>66</sup>*Calgary Herald*, April 24, 1937.

face an election without Aberhart and his radio following. If they ousted him, they faced the danger of "virtually martyring him."<sup>67</sup> The insurgents finally posed two questions: "1. Do you want William Aberhart? 2. Whom do you want for your new leader?" but the caucus only continued to argue. The loyalists refused to sanction any move that would oust the Premier and neither faction wanted an election. At 1:10 A.M. Thursday the Premier was notified that no decision had been reached.<sup>68</sup> Aberhart was heartened by the caucus' inaction and informed the press later that morning that only defeat in the legislature would bring his resignation. A week earlier Aberhart had charged that it was the insurgents' plan to fight it out on the floor of the House; now the Premier himself was forcing the feud into the chamber.

Again the next night (April 1) the whole caucus met, this time in a much more subdued session. The question of Aberhart's abdication never arose. At the beginning of the meeting the cabinet asked the caucus if they would like their sessional indemnity increased by two hundred dollars. A few insurgents protested, but the majority quickly approved the suggestion. The next morning the insurgents admitted that "they had been outguessed by the government."<sup>69</sup> A. E. Fee (S.C., Sedgewick), a loyalist, circulated a petition of non-confidence in the Premier, only to find the members suspicious of its authorship.<sup>70</sup> The breach still was not healed.

On his Sunday afternoon broadcast the Premier announced that he would not be going to the coronation, but that he would continue in office. "At times I have wondered if my resignation would help the movement. But so many people came insisting on my staying as leader I have taken no definite action one way or another" and as long as the majority of the citizens and members of the House "ask for my leadership, I feel in duty bound to remain."<sup>71</sup>

On April 8 the inadequate Social Credit Measures Amendment Act was withdrawn and the Provincial Treasurer introduced a new omnibus bill entitled the Alberta Social Credit Act. A "committee of ten," including four insurgents (MacLachlan, Berg, Brown, and Ansley), helped draft the bill<sup>72</sup> which provided for the creation of "Alberta Credit," the establishment of provincial credit houses to distribute the

<sup>67</sup>*Lethbridge Herald*, April 1, 1937.

<sup>68</sup>*Edmonton Journal*, April 1, 1937; *Lethbridge Herald*, April 1, 1937.

<sup>69</sup>*Lethbridge Herald*, April 2, 1937. The two hundred dollars would end the economy cut instituted by the U.F.A. government and restore the sessional indemnity to two thousand dollars.

<sup>70</sup>*Calgary Albertan*, April 5, 1937. In May, Fee admitted that the petition had been drafted in the Premier's office, in the presence of the Premier, and typed by his stenographer (*Edmonton Journal*, May 26, 1937).

<sup>71</sup>*Ottawa Citizen*, April 5, 1937.

<sup>72</sup>*Hanna Herald*, April 15, 1937.

credit, and the payment of subsidies to producers and distributors. More significantly, the bill set up a Social Credit Board of five private members, headed by MacLachlan, which enjoyed sweeping powers under the Act to plan a Social Credit programme and appoint a commission of experts to operate the system.<sup>73</sup>

The feature of the bill which attracted most attention was the apparent abdication of the cabinet in favour of two appointive boards. *The Times* (April 15), claimed that responsibility would now be divided among three bodies—the cabinet, a board of five back-benchers, and a commission of from three to five experts. The cabinet did its best to encourage this impression. Aberhart broadcast over C.F.C.N. that it was thought wise “to remove the direction of Social Credit as far as possible from the realm of political influence.”<sup>74</sup> When the measure came up for debate on April 13, the cabinet clearly wished to wash its hands publicly of the bill, although it had shared, along with the private members, in framing it. Low introduced the bill, but hastily added that he was not responsible for it. The measure, he said, “was drawn up by a committee without interference of the cabinet.” Dr. Cross substantiated the statement by explaining that since the earlier government bill had not proved satisfactory to the back-benchers, these members were asked to go ahead and prepare their own bill.<sup>75</sup> Indeed, to get the bill through the House the cabinet argued that the measure was truly a back-benchers’ bill. No wonder observers jumped to the conclusion that Aberhart had capitulated and “put himself and his government’s policies in Douglas’ hands.”<sup>76</sup>

Actually the cabinet members were not as free of responsibility for the act as they let on. Insurgents charged that the bill was emasculated and Brown claimed that he could not recognize the bill as the same one considered in the committee of which he was a member.<sup>77</sup> Brown’s former colleague in the insurgency and now the chairman of the new Board, MacLachlan, denied the allegation and accused Brown of an about face. Thus Aberhart was able to divide the insurgents by the astute use of “their own” bill. Nor did the cabinet wish for more control of the Board. An amendment to the bill by Hooke recommended that the tenure of the Board be only until the prorogation of the present session and Mrs. Rogers’ amendment provided for the duties of the Board to be transferred to the cabinet.<sup>78</sup> These motions could

<sup>73</sup>*Statutes of Alberta*, 1937, Third Session, c. 10. The other board members were: S. A. Berg, Floyd Baker, James McPherson, and William Hayes.

<sup>74</sup>*Today and Tomorrow*, April 8, 1937.

<sup>75</sup>*Edmonton Journal*, April 14, 1937.

<sup>76</sup>Moon, “Aberhart,” 56.

<sup>77</sup>*Lethbridge Herald*, April 14, 1937.

<sup>78</sup>*Calgary Albertan*, April 15, 1937.



have restored any powers that the cabinet had lost by the act, but both amendments were defeated by the cabinet wing of the party.

The cabinet did not actually abdicate as much power as the newspapers intimated. The Social Credit Act prescribed much of the machinery of the Board and thereby did not leave the programme solely up to the experts. Nor was the commission given a free hand; they shared their power with the government-appointed board of back-benchers. The government itself still had a considerable role to play. Only it could validate the Social Credit deposits that were to be brought into existence, and the right to alter or supplement the provisions of the bill was left entirely with the cabinet.

The insurgents' bitter attack continued in the House but it now lacked the organized resistance of earlier days. Many gave up the fight and left the chamber. Probably the most dramatic exit was made by the French-Canadian Bourcier on the night of the thirteenth when he "rose, white faced, to slam his chair against a nearby desk and stride dramatically from the room like a French deputy leaving the Parisian legislative battleground."<sup>79</sup> The next day the legislature, after passing a moratorium on all debts, was adjourned to reassemble not later than June 7 to vote on the budget and to receive the report of the Social Credit Board. In the meanwhile the newly created Board was "to search the world" for expert Social Credit advisers that could chart the course of Social Credit in Alberta.<sup>80</sup>

Although a truce was declared between the two Social Credit factions, the seven-week adjournment worked to Aberhart's advantage. It dispersed the remaining insurgents to their homes where they were unable to offer any concerted opposition and left Aberhart with his most effective weapon—the airwaves. He took immediate advantage of the opportunity; on two successive Sundays (April 18 and 25) he told his followers to instruct their representatives either to support him or cross the floor and force an election which "would cost you a lot of money."<sup>81</sup>

His followers complied with alacrity. "They almost tore the hide off of me when I took the stump against him," admitted one insurgent. "So far as the House was concerned we could have shoved him out, but his personal following was still too strong to be ignored."<sup>82</sup> Actually, the insurgents, once they had voted for the Social Credit Act, were shorn of their cause of complaint. They were committed by their own actions to withhold judgment on the government until experts could be

<sup>79</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup>*The Times*, April 15, 1937.

<sup>81</sup>*Montreal Gazette*, April 26, 1937.

<sup>82</sup>W. A. Irvin, "Crisis in Alberta," *Maclean's*, L (Dec. 15, 1937), 47.

found and given a reasonable time to implement their bill. The Act relieved the government of the responsibility of working out a Social Credit scheme. "The government is no longer responsible for Social Credit," declared Mrs. Gostick, "the government does not need a plan. We appointed a committee to be responsible for that."<sup>83</sup> Meanwhile, Aberhart reiterated his stand on surrendering the premiership. Speaking in his home constituency he declared, "I am not going to tender my resignation to any little group in any hotel room. . . . I am going to stay with it until I am kicked out." This did not mean that he would resort to drastic action to maintain his position. "Surely you don't want me to become a Red—a Communist?"<sup>84</sup>

The insurgents began retaliating in self-defence. Ansley explained that when they were called, among other things, "unscrupulous, scheming groups, enemies from behind, critics not of high order, deceivers . . . un-Christian, double-crossers, traitors," it was time to speak up. "Imagine this so-called leader throwing such brickbats at those whom he himself selected with the secretive advisory council method" just because we refused to be "'yes' men." "It is to Social Credit, not a man, to whom we owe our loyalty."<sup>85</sup> Mass meetings were soon held by both sides and debates took place in the large towns between insurgents and loyalists. The insurgents claimed that their only interest was the promotion of Social Credit and not any desire for office. Loyalists replied that the rebels were seeking cabinet positions and were disgruntled because they had failed to enjoy the spoils of office.<sup>86</sup> Behind the whole insurgency, declared Mrs. Gostick, was the sinister "hand of finance."<sup>87</sup>

The feud warmed with the summer months. Supporters of the Premier declared that his government was "a thousand times better than we have had in the past" and Aberhart's programme was compared with the freeing of the slaves by Abraham Lincoln.<sup>88</sup> Insurgents condemned the use of the sabbath as a political weapon, arguing that the government should work six days a week and rest on the seventh rather than "do nothing for six days and on Sundays use the Bible and religion to pretend it is fighting for Social Credit."<sup>89</sup> The *Rebel* of June 11 editorialized in the same vein: "Mr. Aberhart may not be a

<sup>83</sup>Edmonton Journal, May 15, 1937.

<sup>84</sup>Edmonton Bulletin, April 23, 1937.

<sup>85</sup>Commonsense Social Credit (Calgary), May 21, 1937.

<sup>86</sup>Edmonton Journal, May 13, 1937; Three Hills Capital, April 22, 1937.

<sup>87</sup>Edmonton Bulletin, May 1, 1937.

<sup>88</sup>Mirror Landing Social Credit group, Alberta Social Credit Chronicle, May 15, 1937; Floyd Baker, Edmonton Journal, May 13, 1937.

<sup>89</sup>Edmonton Journal, May 1, 1937.



seducer of innocent girls, such as a former premier is alleged to have been. No: but unblushingly and brazenly he openly prostitutes the Word of God for political purposes." Aberhart retorted that religion was not a cloak. "All I can say is that I have faithfully preached the Word of God and the salvation of Jesus Christ for over 27 years, and that was long before I thought of entering any parliament."<sup>90</sup>

The party feud was centering on the person of the Premier and across the province study groups were finding an amazing variety of terms to describe their leader. In his home constituency, James Hartley (S.C., Macleod) remarked that in former days when "one man double-crossed another, a piece of rope was used. It is too bad the same piece of rope is not in use today."<sup>91</sup> N. B. James (S. C., Acadia), on the contrary, argued, "Leave Mr. Aberhart out of the picture and you can say goodbye to Social Credit,"<sup>92</sup> and this is what many Social Crediters feared. Two weeks before the legislature reconvened Aberhart threatened that he would ask for a general election if "insurgent" Social Crediters gained control of the House. Rather than recommending that an insurgent be called upon to form a government, he would prefer a dissolution<sup>93</sup> and the possible defeat of the Social Credit movement at the polls. Unlike Ansley, it was not to Social Credit that Aberhart owed his loyalty. Meanwhile, the publication of the personnel of a "shadow cabinet" had shown many insurgents, hopeful of posts, that they were not included. Their enthusiasm, along with the insurgency, began to wane.<sup>94</sup>

The House reassembled on June 7 as planned, but MacLachlan and his experts had not arrived from England so for five days the legislature did little but go through the motions of meeting. On the eleventh MacLachlan and an expert recommended by Douglas, George Powell, met with the caucus. MacLachlan said that Powell wanted tangible proof of the party's unity and invited all members to sign pledges in order that Powell and Major Douglas might know that the members were solidly for Social Credit.<sup>95</sup> The insurgent leaders agreed to the request on the condition that the cabinet would sign and promise no reprisals. Brown signed and urged others to follow. Hooke said the insurgency had achieved its purpose since Douglas' technicians were now actually in Edmonton. Therefore the fight was not in vain.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>90</sup>*Today and Tomorrow*, June 10, 1937.

<sup>91</sup>*Edmonton Journal*, May 20, 1937.

<sup>92</sup>*Ibid.*, April 27, 1937.

<sup>93</sup>*New York Times*, May 23, 1937.

<sup>94</sup>*Edmonton Bulletin*, May 24, 1943.

<sup>95</sup>*Today and Tomorrow*, June 17, 1937.

<sup>96</sup>*Edmonton Bulletin*, June 12, 1937; June 14, 1937.

Forty-nine members signed the pledge. Only Cockcroft, Chant, Ross (former cabinet members), Blue, Barnes, Hansen, and MacLellan refused, along with the Opposition. The pledge read:

I agree as follows, a) To regard it as my first and foremost duty to the people of Alberta and my electors in particular to uphold the board and its technicians whilst means are devised by the latter whereby the will of the people of Alberta shall prevail throughout its institutions of production and distribution;

b) And I will do this by all helpful means in my power. By avoiding, for the duration of the agreement, recrimination of the past and provocative utterances in the future, regarding all those who associate themselves with me to achieve this, our single, mutual, immediate objective; and who sign an exactly similar undertaking to this.<sup>97</sup>

Not one insurgent crossed the floor in the legislative session that ensued. The insurgency was broken and Aberhart was still premier. Only a bold decision to force a vote in the House could have toppled the government, and this Brown and his colleagues hesitated to do, preferring to negotiate in the secrecy of the caucus in order to avoid an open split in the ranks. If the insurgents had forced a vote in the House, they would have had to rely on Opposition support to defeat the government, but the Opposition could not be counted on to back an insurgent administration. In the end both Social Credit factions might have been discredited and defeated.

The insurgents had hoped that Aberhart would bow out gracefully as Greenfield of the U.F.A. had in 1925 in favour of Brownlee. This Aberhart had refused to do, and the insurgents had not known quite how to go about forcing the issue. In the jockeying for position that ensued, the insurgents were no match for the more politically astute Premier. Aberhart had to win over some insurgent votes if he was to stay in power. The Social Credit Act served this purpose nicely. It won for Aberhart several members that were previously lined against him and at the same time put the onus for any failures of the bill on the shoulders of the insurgents. Aberhart was helped by the fact that many of the insurgents were better Social Crediters than politicians and more interested in seeing Social Credit technicians in Edmonton than one of their own number as premier. By June the Social Crediters finally had English technicians in Alberta. They also continued to have Aberhart as their premier.

<sup>97</sup>As cited in *Today and Tomorrow*, June 17, 1937. The pledge was valid only if 60 per cent of the House membership signed; 78 per cent signed.

## J. W. Dafoe at the Imperial Conference, 1923\*

RAMSAY COOK

DURING THE SUMMER of 1923 when Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King was preparing to attend the forthcoming Imperial Conference in London he decided that it would be necessary to include in his delegation members of the Canadian press who would be sympathetic to his policies. Otherwise he feared that Canadian newspapers would be choked with "despatches from Tory Imperialist sources. . . ."<sup>1</sup> Among those whom he was satisfied would give him a good press was the editor of the *Manitoba Free Press*, John W. Dafoe. Dafoe was already well known for his conviction that Canada should immediately acquire all the trappings of independent nationhood within the British association of nations. About the same time, Dafoe's employer, Sir Clifford Sifton, was giving some thought to the most effective means of ensuring that the fledgling Liberal Premier would be kept on the autonomist track at the Conference. He hit upon the idea that Dafoe might become part of the Canadian delegation. "You could undoubtedly have great influence with King," he told Dafoe, "and might conceivably exert a determining influence on vital matters. It is most important that no principle should be compromised, and equally important that no rupture of friendly relations should take place."<sup>2</sup>

Dafoe, too, had considered the possibility of journeying to London with King, as he had done with Sir Robert Borden in 1919, but the fact that his relations with the Liberal leader were somewhat cool had

\*The author would like to express his appreciation to the Dafoe family for their permission to make use of the Dafoe Papers on microfilm at the Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa.

<sup>1</sup>R. MacGregor Dawson, *William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, 1874-1923*, I (Toronto, 1958), 453.

<sup>2</sup>Public Archives of Canada, Dafoe Papers, Sir Clifford Sifton to J. W. Dafoe, Aug. (no day), 1923.

discouraged him.<sup>3</sup> But when the invitation came from King, through Sifton, he readily accepted. He thought that if he were offered the same confidence as had been allowed him by Borden he might be able to give some valuable assistance. At the same time he wanted to maintain independence from responsibilities which "I should not care to assume either personally or on behalf of the *Free Press*."<sup>4</sup> When Sifton informed the Prime Minister of the editor's acceptance of the offer, King replied that, "I confess that this has given me a feeling of security with respect to a fair and just representation of Canada's position, which I have not thus far wholly enjoyed."<sup>5</sup>

Before Dafoe embarked on the trip, his newspaper set out the position which he thought the Conference should strive to achieve. Of fundamental importance was the need to clarify, once and for all, the position of the Dominions in relation to imperial foreign policy. The shibboleth of a common imperial policy in foreign affairs should finally be laid to rest. It was obvious, the *Free Press* asserted: "... the only system that will work is one by which each British nation will attend to its own foreign affairs and accept the responsibility therefor; reserving for a common policy only those questions—relatively few—in which we are all interested. When these questions arise, there will be no difficulty about securing common action, as in the war."<sup>6</sup>

Dafoe was by no means certain that King was capable of acting with the fortitude necessary to win this objective. The Liberal leader's abilities had never won any plaudits from him, and on this occasion he wrote: "I must say I have little confidence in King. I am afraid his conceit in his ability to take care of himself is equalled only by his ignorance and I should not be surprised if he should find himself trapped."<sup>7</sup> The best tactic for the Prime Minister to adopt, he held, would be to "take the position stoutly that he is not prepared to discuss policies or machinery till the question of our constitutional position is definitely cleared up." This stand would be a difficult one, Dafoe realized. Undoubtedly the British government would have a carefully devised scheme to stall the question of "status" while straining every effort to commit the Dominions to a common responsibility for foreign policy.<sup>8</sup> This suspicion, which was given some support by the events of the 1923 Conference, was the major premise of Dafoe's thought on imperial questions throughout his life.

<sup>3</sup>Dafoe at this time was severely critical of King's refusal to meet the demands of the more moderate Progressives.

<sup>4</sup>P.A.C., Sifton Papers, Dafoe to Sifton, Aug. 28, 1923.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, W. L. M. King to Sifton, Aug. 30, 1923.

<sup>6</sup>*Manitoba Free Press*, Sept. 10, 1923.

<sup>7</sup>Dafoe Papers, Dafoe to Sifton, Sept. 12, 1923.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*

Despite Dafoe's repeated reluctance to become an "unofficial member of the board of strategy,"<sup>9</sup> it is quite clear from his record of the Conference that he found himself in exactly that position almost as soon as he boarded the ship which carried the Canadians to London. The salty ocean air seems to have quickly dispelled his reluctance. Dafoe's private record of the Conference throws a bright searchlight on this important event in imperial history. Though it agrees substantially with the account recently given by R. MacGregor Dawson in his biography of Prime Minister King,<sup>10</sup> it seems worthy of publication, not only because it is more extensive, but also because the future of King's own diaries is still in some doubt. Dafoe's copy of the record which he kept is not included in the microfilm of his papers on deposit at the Public Archives in Ottawa. However, he sent a copy of it to several people, including his friend T. A. Crerar. Some of Senator Crerar's papers are available at the Public Archives of Manitoba, Winnipeg. Included in that collection is a transcript of Dafoe's record of the 1923 Imperial Conference.<sup>11</sup>

In later years Dafoe came to look upon the Imperial Conference of 1923 as one of the crucial events in the development of Dominion autonomy, far more significant than the much discussed Conference held in 1926. His record would seem to support this judgment. At the same time Dafoe's regard for King rose for the first time to a high level as a result of the Canadian Liberal leader's opening performance on the London stage. In 1935 he remarked:

My regard for King, which is quite considerable, dates largely from 1923. He stood right up to the job and secured the decision he desired with no help except from his own competent staff. . . . The struggle in the end was quite intense. I can recall my interest and even excitement as it developed. If King had not stood up against the pressures of the British Government, aided and abetted by Smuts, 1923 would have gone on the record as a meeting not of the Imperial Conference, but of the Imperial Cabinet. I am pretty clear in my own mind that 1923 was the decisive moment and that in 1926 it was simply a case of mopping up the situation.<sup>12</sup>

Privately, Dafoe was willing to take some small credit for the result of the Conference. A few months before he died, he observed to Prime Minister King, "on the occasion of the Imperial Conference of 1923 I went to London as the representative of the Free Press and this gave me opportunities, both on the way to London and in London itself, to

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup>Dawson, *Mackenzie King*, 434-80.

<sup>11</sup>The author would like to express his thanks to Mr. Hartwell Bowsfield who provided him with the copy included in the unorganized Crerar Papers deposited at the Public Archives of Manitoba.

<sup>12</sup>Dafoe Papers, Dafoe to R. MacGregor Dawson, May 23, 1935.

exchange views with you and to make suggestions for what they were worth."<sup>13</sup> The record indicates that King did not always accept Dafoe's suggestions, though in the end he came very close to following the tactics urged on him by the "unofficial member of the board of strategy." Nor was Dafoe's influence on Canadian imperial policy completely overlooked by those who disagreed with his views. Geoffrey Dawson of the *London Times* told Sir John Willison that he had taken it upon himself, on November 11, 1924, to write an editorial "addressed (though not by name) partly to Mackenzie King and partly to Dafoe, who is really quite obsessed with the importance of getting a formal 'declaration' of Dominion status."<sup>14</sup>

As to the "diary" itself, Dafoe thought it to be of sufficient importance to be given a wider audience, though as late as 1941, he felt it should still remain confidential. He wrote: "It is of course possible that I shall myself make provision for the publication of this document at some time, but I should say at a venture that 1950 would be the earliest date at which it would be advisable to make it public. It ought not to make its appearance while Mr. King remains in public life because from my point of view, though everything I say about him is to his credit, his course in 1923 would lay him open to attack from people who violently disagree with the position he then took."<sup>15</sup> Since John Dafoe unfortunately was never able to write his "memoirs" which likely would have included this document, and as the other condition he noted has long been fulfilled, it seems desirable that the record now be made available to those interested in Canadian and Commonwealth history.

### 1923

Sept. 22:—Had talk with King. Said he quite realized what the division of the Conference into two bodies—one called the Economic—meant. The Imperial Conference being limited to Prime Ministers an attempt would be made to represent it as an Imperial Cabinet competent to deal with foreign affairs. Attempt would be made to have this interpretation put on gathering at start.

Agreed with me that best counter tactics would be to give them something to think about from the outset.

K. said he would be glad to talk over various phases of the question before we reached the other side.

John Bassett of Montreal Gazette told me of the feelings of Senator White and other Montreal Tories over the matter of Meighen's leadership. But the problem is: What to do? Said Meighen had upon occasion reproached him for the Gazette's expressed approval of Sir Lomer Gouin.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, Dafoe to King, Nov. 10, 1943.

<sup>14</sup>P.A.C., Willison Papers, Geoffrey Dawson to Sir John Willison, Nov. 12, 1924.

<sup>15</sup>Dafoe Papers, Dafoe to T. S. Ewart, Oct. 10, 1941.

<sup>16</sup>Sir Lomer Gouin, Canadian Minister of Justice and former Premier of Quebec.



Sept. 29:—During the voyage had several talks with King and Skelton.<sup>17</sup> S. showed me the memos and briefs which he had prepared on constitutional position, naval defence, etc.—soundly Canadian in every respect and advanced. Practically identical F.P.<sup>18</sup> position.

King said Skelton's memos had been read to cabinet and had been unanimously approved. (Fielding<sup>19</sup> absent, however.)

It appears Canadian Government received about fortnight ago two memoranda from Admiralty.

One identical with memo sent to other Dominions, was intended to be released for publication upon assembling Conference. It was a general boost for naval expansion in interests of Empire defence.

King much annoyed about this and said he would not give his consent to its publication. It was part of the old business of making appeal to Dominion sentiments over heads Dominion Government.

Other memo, confidential, asks Canada to embark on naval building programme by which three large cruisers with accompanying smaller craft will be built next twelve years at cost of some \$31,000,000.

Memo explains that Canada will not be expected to take part in building Singapore defences.

Showed King draft by Sifton of proposed definition of equality which might be submitted to Conference by resolution, but he fought shy of it.<sup>20</sup>

Said he had to consider effect on politics and thought it better to ignore obvious technical limitations Canada's freedom and assume they had full powers nationhood.

Left Sifton's suggested resolution with him.

Oct. 1:—King tells me he has seen both Baldwin<sup>21</sup> and Amery.<sup>22</sup>

Called formally on Baldwin. B. said European situation could not be much worse but there was some disposition on part of Poincaré and French to consider their policy with view to its modification and that they were basing their hopes on this.

K. had lunch with Amery and long talks. Told him of his emphatic objection to publication in Canada of memorandum prepared by Admiralty urging increased expenditures on Canadian navy. Said it was an obvious attempt to influence Canadian opinion over heads government and Canadian govt. resented this. This procedure must stop.

Amery seemed quite taken aback by King's declaration.

King also told Amery that in present state of public opinion about expenditures in Canada no additional outlay on navy was possible and that he

<sup>17</sup>O. D. Skelton, Professor at Queen's University and biographer of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. Skelton acted as special adviser to the Canadian government at the Imperial Conference of 1923 and was later appointed Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

<sup>18</sup>*Manitoba Free Press*.

<sup>19</sup>W. S. Fielding, Canadian Minister of Finance.

<sup>20</sup>Sifton's resolution read: "The governing power of Canada as constituted by the British North America Act as amended and altered from time to time hereafter by the people of Canada, ought to possess under the British Crown, the same powers with regard to Canada, its affairs and its people, as the Parliament of Great Britain possesses in regard to Great Britain, its affairs and its people." Address by Sir Clifford Sifton to the Canada First Club, Jan. 9, 1923.

<sup>21</sup>Stanley Baldwin, Prime Minister of Great Britain.

<sup>22</sup>L. S. Amery, British First Lord of the Admiralty.

need not expect he would consent to commitments suggested by admiralty, to extent of ten cent piece. Told Amery it would be useless for him to make promises which he could not fulfill upon his return and that conditions forbade anything in the nature of a policy naval expansion.

#### NOTES RE STATEMENTS FOREIGN POLICY

Curzon<sup>23</sup>—Thursday, Oct. 4:

Strong references to France in unpublished parts of address. There had been distinct agreement they (France and Great Britain) should supply arms neither to Turkey nor Greece in Near Eastern war but France furnished supplies Kemal Pasha and made her [sic] victory possible. She had been "faithless ally" at Lausanne letting British down at critical points. Said French delegate at one time threatened to resign in preference to carrying out instructions French government so objectionable were they. France's European policy dictated by ambition to dominate Europe which had been partly achieved. Poincaré man of rigid ideas and confident in his policy—at moment—had French people solidly behind him. Said the last three governments of France had broken faith with Great Britain—Millerand by occupying Frankfort, Briand by making the Angora agreement and Poincaré by his Ruhr policy.

In published reports Curzon said France no doubt had future plans in detail to meet developments in Germany; but in an aside he remarked that he was certain that they had nothing of the sort.

*Egypt*—Situation painted in gloomy terms. Egypt was now independent country subject to four stipulations protecting British interests, as to which it was agreed negotiations would be carried on leading to definite agreement. King Fuad had absolutist tendencies; certain to have struggle with Parliament; danger they will both make British policy towards Egypt object attack. Expects Zaghul Pasha to control new Parliament. He will denounce independence status as sham in view of British reservations and demand removal. Regard it as certain that British troubles Egypt not over. Incidentally said other countries are recognizing sovereignty Egypt by giving their agents status ministers.

*Afghanistan*—British control (indirect) there had ceased—complications feared—Afghanistan regarded as likely to instigate unrest among Afridis [sic].

*The Hedjaz*—British had not found possible to arrange treaty with this state in terms of wartime understanding, protecting British subjects travelling Mecca, recognizing British interests in Palestine, etc. King Hassein [sic] very difficult to deal with. Col. Laurence [sic] had undertaken mission to him some time ago but had not been successful.

*Japan*—Evidence that Japan's external policy was less adventurous than formerly. Said no objection on part of Japanese authorities to fortification Singapore. Any popular feeling in Japan result of objections offered in British parliament and press.

*China*—Hopeless confusion and impossible to say what would happen.

*Morocco*—Strong language about French attitude toward Tangier. Their determined efforts since war to have port placed under control Sultan who is in turn subject to French control had been resisted as it would seriously affect Imperial interests in Mediterranean. Latterly an improvement in French attitude.

<sup>23</sup>Lord Curzon, British Foreign Secretary.



In introduction Curzon said in all these matters he had acted on behalf not of U.K. alone but of whole Empire and that he now submitted his report to conference of proceedings since previous conference.

Curzon also spoke about U.S. in not very cordial tones. They had claimed rights under Versailles treaty which they would not ratify.

Their withdrawal from Reparations commission and absence from League had greatly complicated European difficulties. U.S. representative at Lausanne had not been very helpful to him. He had no hopes that U.S. would abandon isolationist attitude—there might be sentiment for this along Atlantic seaboard, but West was determined not to be involved in European entanglements.

*Monday, Oct. 7*—Mackenzie King first of Dominion Prime Minister's [sic] to speak. Began by dealing with Canada's outside activities in past two years. Work of the International Joint Commission, dwelling especially upon clause 10 which gives Commission authority, upon request both parties, to adjust any question between the two countries. Re-casting Rush-Bagot convention which would be accomplished shortly. Postal conventions with U.S. and Ireland. Trade treaties with France and Italy. Said Halibut treaty dealt with matter in which only Canada and the United States were interested. Said he had been informed that the U.S. Government would re-introduce treaty minus the Senate's reservation, thus meeting Canadian views.

Passing to foreign policy he said that Canada must look after her own external affairs where they affected purely Canadian interests. Especially true of questions between Canada and the U.S. which were continually arising. Re Canadian Minister to Washington, Canadian Government wanted arrangement by which Canadian minister replaced British minister in his absence changed. Position had been offered Sir Arthur Currie who had declined.

Dealt quite frankly with new idea of uniform Imperial policy. Quoted Lloyd George<sup>24</sup> and said they in Canada had never been informed of such change and had never confirmed it. Was regarded there as break with Canadian policy and tradition. Quoted as expressing Canadian opinion from speech by Sir Clifford Sifton at Ottawa Canadian Club. Curzon intervened to say that though Sir C.S. was able and influential public man his view was unofficial. King replied that his statement had been considered in Cabinet Council and had been accepted as accurate expression of Canadian opinion.

Also discussed Chanak episode explaining how news was in the papers before despatch from Colonial Office was decoded.

Spoke vigorously about manifesto saying that the practise of British Government making appeals to Dominions [sic] opinion over heads of Dominion Governments dangerous and should cease.

Curzon interrupted to say that this manifesto had not been issued with knowledge of government.

King went on to expound view that Canada should, as matter of course, attend to her own affairs. Had no desire to be consulted about British foreign affairs upon which Canada not competent to express opinion. Agreed that

<sup>24</sup>The statement by Lloyd George which upset Canadian Liberal nationalists was made in the British House of Commons, Dec. 14, 1921. The offensive sentences read: "The instrument of the foreign policy of the Empire is the British Foreign Office. This has been accepted by all the British Dominions as inevitable. But they claim a voice in determining the lines of our future policy." See A. B. Keith, *Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions, 1913-1931* (London, 1948), 86.

if each country looked after its own affairs there would be times when their policies would touch and so would be occasion for common action. Illustrated this by saying that while many U.S. matters should be dealt with by Canada alone it would not be in order for Canada to make a treaty with U.S. conceding latter country's claim to exercise jurisdiction 12 miles from shore—all the British nations were interested in this question and should consult to-gether about it.

All this part of the address was taken from Skelton's memo; well thought out and admirably stated.

Said that Curzon's statement about opinion in Western States largely applied to Canada. Canadians did not like to feel that they might be involved European wars; and if a constitutional system developed which rendered them liable it would aggravate the problem which Canada was facing of keeping the people from emigrating to States by increasing tax burdens, etc.

Spoke judiciously and strongly about unwisdom of public men making engagements not warranted by public opinion. Complaint of British Government was that Wilson had misled them at Paris to their great injury by making engagements and pledges which the people of the United States would not ratify. No sense in him saying that Canada would do this or that, or making engagements on their behalf if he knew that it was problematical whether people would support him.

On Ruhr question he said he understood British policy was to mark time and not seek to commit conference to any definite declarations of policy. Thought this wise. People of Canada not informed but it was fact much sympathy for France. During war they had been educated to believe French 100% perfect and Germany 100% criminals and it was impossible to "depropagandize" them rapidly; curve too sharp.

He said in course of speech that Canada claimed right of self-government in external affairs for herself only. It was for the other Dominions to say whether their circumstances required that they also should exercise this power.

In subsequent discussions, King's statement was attacked both by Bruce<sup>25</sup> and Massey.<sup>26</sup> They both interpreted it as meaning that Canada did not propose to hereafter have anything to do with Empire foreign policy. King intervened on both occasions saying this interpretation was at variance with his speech. Canada was prepared to co-operate when in judgment of its government and parliament an issue calling for common action arose. King's position was supported emphatically by Irish delegation and in more general terms by Smuts<sup>27</sup> of South Africa and Warren<sup>28</sup> of Newfoundland.

*Thursday, Oct. 11*—Had talk with King to-day; asked him if he had noticed any effect in Conference of his speech on Monday and the accompanying discussion. Said effect had been noticeable in that there had been for the time being at least a complete cessation in the Conference of references to it as an Empire Cabinet charged with responsibility for administering Empire. Previously such references were frequent. Said his remarks had not been taken in good part by Bruce and Massey; and that he had been obliged, in the subsequent discussion to challenge interpretations of his policy which both had put forward. Irish delegates had backed his views unreservedly—Smuts evidently sympathetic but more guarded.

<sup>25</sup>S. M. Bruce, Prime Minister of Australia.

<sup>26</sup>W. F. Massey, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

<sup>27</sup>J. C. Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa.

<sup>28</sup>W. R. Warren, Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

With respect to discussion to-day League of Nations, said view of more than one Dominion premier as expressed was that British nations could do more to further future peace of world through League than by formulating vigorous policies on international issues in Downing Street.

Am told that Gouin became quite enamoured of Bruce's tactics and wanted to draw up a list of articles, mostly food products, upon which a preference should be demanded. When this was discussed in Canadian delegation someone said that he was satisfied that if Great Britain put tariff on food stuffs Canada would have to buy preference by further concessions and Gouin was asked what duty on manufactured articles he was prepared to lower to secure this benefit. Gouin replied they could not afford to lessen protection in least degree.

Coates<sup>29</sup> [*sic*], Dominion statistician, said he had been having stiff fight in sub-committee of Economic Conference and that he thought he was getting himself disliked by his refusal to be misled by camouflage. Three years ago a basis for joint publication of Empire trade statistics was worked out in a special conference of statisticians. Never put into effect because the British authorities have not been able to consolidate all its [*sic*] statistical work into a single bureau as Canada has done. Reasons: departmental jealousies which are notoriously rampant here. Board of Trade officials have turned up at Conference here with proposal that they issue official Empire statistics under authority of an Imperial advisory committee upon which the High Commissioners are to serve. Coates [*sic*] said all the other Dominion officials have fallen for it but that he had fought it outright to the manifest anger of the British officials. They argue that with an advisory Imperial committee to supervise them there can be no objection to them doing this work, but Coates' [*sic*] answer is that the committee will be incompetent to exercise supervision and that its control will be purely nominal. He stands for original scheme. Has prepared a brief for Graham<sup>30</sup> and Gouin and expresses hope that they will not be wheedled in the Conference into falling in with the Board of Trade's scheme.

*Monday, Oct. 15*—In anticipation of an important meeting of the Imperial Conference to-day I went to the Ritz at noon, hoping to see King. Found he had not yet returned from Chatsworth where Devonshire<sup>31</sup> entertained some forty guests over the week-end, including all the Dominion premiers—he came in later and went direct to the Conference.

Skelton showed me a most interesting document—the draft of a proposed despatch from the Colonial Secretary to the various Governors-General, summarizing the deliberations of the Conference for the previous week. It closed with instructions to transmit this information to the Acting Premier. I had not realized until I saw this document that officially the Canadian Government learns of the proceedings of a conference in which the Canadian Prime Minister takes part from the Colonial Office of the British Government transmitted through the Governor-General, a Colonial Office Official!

The despatch consisted of about 700 words. The first part was a slick piece of misrepresentation. It was very interesting and very enlightening. It said that the discussions on foreign policy had been directed towards determining what questions were to be left to the Dominions to deal with and what were to be regarded as calling for joint action; and suggested that lists of the two sets of questions might be drawn up. Here, in the first place, was recognition that the

<sup>29</sup>R. H. Coats, Dominion Statistician, Government of Canada.

<sup>30</sup>George P. Graham, Canadian Minister of National Defence.

<sup>31</sup>Duke of Devonshire, British Secretary of State for Colonies.

scheme put over in 1921, for a single foreign policy with the Foreign Office doing all the work was no longer tenable. So they waive the point, concede the right of the Dominions to look after their own external affairs and in the very act of conceding this filch most of the concession by the device of ear-marking for "common action"—which means in practise, action by the British Foreign Office—a list of questions which—it is a safe assumption—would be so extensive as to reduce the Dominions' right to a mere shadow. Skelton and I talked the matter over and agreed that Canada could not agree to any such arrangement—that it was impossible to make any such delimitation without destroying the policy set out by King last week.

When I saw Skelton again at six o'clock he told me that King, when shown the despatch, went up in the air over it. When Harding,<sup>32</sup> the Colonial Office Official, who was responsible for the draft, came to him for his approval he declared that it would have to be written in conformity with the facts. Harding resisted but King insisted and the despatch was re-written, though Harding was quite sulky about it. I have not seen the revised draft but if King did not scan it closely there is probably a joker in it somewhere. It appears there was an earlier despatch to the Governor-General which was not submitted but, for some reason, this was shown to King; perhaps they thought he would pass it and then he could be committed.

Skelton said the afternoon discussion on defence did not amount to much; but he said there was a great line-up of British Ministers and officials—showing their deep interest in the question. He remarked that Smuts was revealing a disposition to propound solutions to all kinds of international problems; and that this propensity might turn him into an imperialist.

*Oct. 17.* Coates [*sic*] told me that he had knocked out the proposals of the British Board of Trade officials.

*Wednesday, Oct. 17*—Amery spoke at length on matter naval defence. Empire must control sea routes or cease to exist. Navy must be mobile able to go wherever Empire interests attacked. Mere accident that before war navy was massed in home waters because it happened menace was there; in future Empire might be saved by navy in distant sea. Made long technical defence capital ships. Safe from torpedo by device of the "bulge"; from air craft by nets. Severely criticized Admiral Scott for his opposition to capital ships—called him a slap-dash critic. Natural route navy for protection Empire was Mediterranean, Red Sea, Indian Seas, Singapore, Malacca Straits; strategic centre of this was Mediterranean. Defended Singapore scheme; not new; dated from 1912; merely enlargement to meet existing conditions, especially added size ships due to bulge. No objection to it by Japan. U.S. should not object especially as they had themselves no naval base in those waters. Re admiralty and dominion navies said opposition of Admiralty to scheme of 1909 and its continued expression of disagreement had been a mistake. Admiralty had changed its viewpoint and now accepted unreservedly principle Dominion navies; wanted this known for information of those in Dominions who had fought Dominion navies because they thought Admiralty wished opposition to be offered. Then went on to urge that these national navies should be merged into general defence scheme. Quoted alleged statistics as to present per capita outlay Empire Defence; Great Britain 25 shillings annually; Australia 8; Canada and South Africa 1s. Said Singapore scheme could not affect world naval situation before 1931.

<sup>32</sup>E. J. Harding, member of the British Secretariat.

King spoke next. Began by making lively reply to a remark made by Massey at an earlier meeting that the Dominions were "sponging" on Great Britain, which was so worded as to appear to reflect especially upon Canada. Canada had not given and would not give Empire any problems of defence or obligations; her policies would not involve Empire in trouble. She had made immense contribution, men, money for defence of Great Britain when attacked. Naval policy for Canada must take cognizance of geographical considerations; this was equally true of Great Britain and Australia. If Canada were similarly situated Canadian feeling would be different. Among Canada's many problems one of the most serious was to compete with the U.S. in attracting and holding money and people. Difficulties would be accentuated if impression was created that people of Canada were much more likely than people of U.S. to be involved in war. Those at Conference were only representatives of governments and parliaments from whom they derived their authority and to whom they were answerable. They must not regard themselves as an Empire Cabinet competent to determine Empire policies. It was necessary that he should deal with facts. He had to consider opinion at home which would not support him if he made engagements beyond his authority. The Empire in one sense was indivisible; in another it was very divisible owing to diversity of problems, interests and opinions; and it was necessary to take note of these diversities. Intimated in conclusion he would enter into no engagements.

Bruce agreed in principle that parliament must approve all engagements before they became binding but Australian parliament had virtually done this in advance. It knew where he stood yet had sent him. Australia: there might be later Labor Government in Great Britain which might be less inclined to policy of naval defence desired by Australia.

Massey spoke along much same lines as Bruce. Disclaimed any special reference to Canada in remarks about "sponging".

*Thursday, Oct. 18*—At the technical discussion at the Admiralty this afternoon Beatty<sup>23</sup> in reply to question by King said in event of war with Japan Canada would be well outside range active hostilities.

Bruce asked if Canadian coast would be free from raids.

Beatty replied that there might be occasional attempt at a raid but no sustained attack.

*Friday, Oct. 19*—Curzon told Conference to-day that, encouraged by press reports President Coolidge still adhered to suggestion re reparations made by Hughes last December, he had in name of Imperial Conference wired British chargé at Washington to submit three questions to U.S. Government were they favorable:

1. To an international commission representing governments concerned including U.S. to report on Germany's capacity to pay; or
2. A committee under the Reparations commission to include an American expert.
3. Would a request to the U.S. to serve on either of these bodies need to be unanimous.

Curzon said he had received replies. To No. 1.—Yes; to No. 2.—Yes; to No. 3.—U.S. would deal with this question when it arose.

Curzon then reported on the previous evening (Thursday) he had—again in the name of the whole Empire—sent despatches to French, Belgian and Italian governments transmitting this information and asking their views.

<sup>23</sup>Lord Beatty, First Sea Lord, Royal Navy.

Smuts questioned the wisdom of the policy. Alternative No. 2 might just suit the French who by availing themselves of it might indefinitely prolong the situation.

Bruce objected strongly to Curzon's action in sending the telegrams to Washington and European capitals in the name of the Empire without coming before Conference and getting express authorization. *Memo*: If Curzon can thus ignore Dominions when their premiers are in Conference in London, what is their chance for controlling foreign policy in any measure under normal conditions?

After statements by Derby<sup>34</sup> and Hoare,<sup>35</sup> Smuts spoke. Most of his speech was about the danger London was in from air-raids in the event of hostilities. He dealt with South Africa in a single sentence saying its geographical position made it safe both from land and sea. Skelton described the speech as highly jingoistic.

*Sunday, Oct. 21*—Skelton showed me proposed draft re treaties made by sub-committee Conference which really embodies suggestion Foreign Office. Appears to concede rights each Dominion to make its own foreign treaties and agrees that where any British country desires to make such treaty King shall grant full powers to plenipotentiary that country; and it shall be made clear in preamble and text that the treaty is made by this "part of Empire" and that this "part" assumes the obligations. Laid down as policy that where treaty is being made by one country which may affect another British country it should be advised; and there is recognition of right of two or more Dominions to make joint treaties limited to them. When all British nations represented in an International Conference procedure Paris and Washington to be followed. Ratification to take place in accordance with "existing procedure". Right of Government each country to enter into conventions recognized but it is again set forth that other parts of Empire are to be advised if there is possibility of their interests being affected.

I pointed out to Skelton that memo. was vague on three important points:—

1. The machinery by which "Full powers" are conferred upon a Dominion plenipotentiary. Upon whose advice does the King act? If on the advice of his Dominion ministers how is the device tendered?

2. What, in fact, was procedure at Washington and Paris? I reminded him of Sir John Salmond's official report to N.Z. government that the Dominion representatives at Washington were subordinate members of the British Delegation not capable of affecting decisions by British representative whose decision would bind whole Empire.<sup>36</sup> Washington and Paris representatives signed for "The British Empire". What was significance of this? Skelton recalled Fielding's argument in 1919 that the British signature bound us and the Canadian signature was mere surplusage.

3. What is existing procedure of ratification? Skelton said they told him they used this form of words because it was difficult to say what the existing procedure was. I said it was important to confirm precedent of 1919 that no ratification by King could bind Canada in matter of engagement without prior approval Canadian Parliament.

<sup>34</sup>Lord Derby, British Secretary of State for War.

<sup>35</sup>Sir Samuel Hoare, British Secretary of State for Air.

<sup>36</sup>See W. K. Hancock, *Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Nationality, 1918-36* (London, 1937), 89.



Skelton agreed with me that the points I raised would require discussion. He thought the memo. showed a marked advance by Foreign Office. The implications of the new procedure are extensive and must affect our constitutional relations. It also raised the question of how the various British governments are to advise one another. The present machinery is hopelessly obsolete and defective.

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There has been some disagreement between King and Graham over the Imperial shipping committee. This had hitherto been a voluntary body made up of Chairman and vice-chairman, both British, 3 members British government, 5 representatives British shipping, and the Dominion High Commissioners. Now suggested to make it permanent with statutory powers—means a permanent staff (salary for Sir H. McKinder, chairman, £3000) and an allocation of expenses. Graham favorable; King not.

*Tuesday, Oct. 23*—Saw King to-day. He looked tired and is finding the pace trying. He told me something of the discussions on Empire Defence and foreign policy which are continuing. Derby last Friday urged that each D. should give assurances as to extent of military help it could give Empire in time of war. No support for this from any Dominion.

On Monday said that of course it was understood that if one part of the Empire was invaded the whole Empire would go to war in its defence.

King intervened to say that he did not subscribe to that view.

Derby, professing great astonishment, asked if it was possible that the Empire would not rise as one man in such an event.

King answered that in the event of an unwarranted invasion the moral appeal would no doubt be irresistible but he did not want the doctrine formally defined that all the British nations were automatically committed to war under these conditions.

Massey intervened with the sapient remark that there could not be an invasion of the Empire which could not be unwarranted.

They were now reaching in the Conference, King said, the stage where they were beginning to talk about resolutions. He admitted that he was nervous at the prospect and intended to enter a disclaimer against practice. He intended to illustrate his point by referring to the serious results which have followed the passing in 1921 of a resolution about the franchise for Indians in the Dominions. If they persisted in submitting resolutions he would submit the resolution defining equality of status (drafted by C.S.).

He said Smuts and the Irish were against resolutions. Smuts had been following a curious course. His speeches were pretty jingoistic and Imperialistic but when there was approach to making a record of policy or opinion he took the other tack. He had submitted a memo—against the Indian claim for the franchise in which he took advanced nationalist position. K. thinks he may be looking forward to a political career in this country—his government is not likely to survive the next election.

Skelton tells me that Baldwin told King that, last year, [Lloyd] George, Churchill & Birkenhead were determined to have war with Turkey for electioneering purposes and that it was Canada's refusal to play up to the lead that spoiled their plans. He (B.) had intended to resign if they went to war.

Had talk yesterday with John McNeill and Desmond Fitzgerald, the Irish representatives at the Conference.<sup>87</sup> McNeill said they were taking but little part but they were very anxious that nothing should be done that would put weapons into the hands of the enemies of the Free State. He said King had been fighting their battle for them. Spoke very warmly of King. Said he had the best constructive mind in the conference. Expressed disappointment with Smuts. Irish were prepared to back up King but felt that it might not be judicious to be too emphatic. Dead against resolutions and said that they would record their dissent from any expressing policy.

Fitzgerald and McNeill both said Irish position which had been defined by Cosgrave and which they would uphold in Conference if question arose was that Ireland was an independent sovereign state within the Commonwealth. I outlined the resolution which King might submit and they said it expressed their views precisely.

*Saturday, Oct. 27*—Had hour's talk with King. He did not tell me anything precisely new but amplified what I had heard from other sources. With reference to cablegram from C.S. which I showed him he said he had on several occasions and in the most emphatic manner declared that he regarded the conference as a conference between governments for their mutual information and not as anything in the nature of an Empire cabinet or Council charged with mapping out policies for the Empire. From the discussions of the Conference and the information thus obtained he might carry back ideas or suggestions which might be the basis for consideration by the Government; but in London, at this Conference, he would enter into no engagements whatever. He made his views known with special plainness on matters of defence and foreign policy.

I asked him how these views were received by the Conference.

Not very well by some of them he said—particularly when he broke in on a speech by Lord Derby to say that the latter's assumption that it would be a cause of war with all the British nations if one of them was invaded. He said that he could not admit that any circumstances could commit Canada to war; the only power that could do that was the Parliament of Canada.

Apparently some of them quizzed King as to whether he proposed to make such a matter as a declaration of war an open question for Parliament for he said he found it necessary to explain that, when grave questions like those of war arose, the government of course would be expected to submit a definite policy to it for consideration. But the final responsibility must be parliament's.

King said that apparently there had been an intention to submit a whole grist of resolutions embodying various proposed policies for the Empire.

Bruce had suggested a resolution about a common navy but Salisbury<sup>88</sup> had discouraged this saying that they should be careful about any resolutions they passed. (Skelton's explanation to me of Salisbury's objection was that it was not to the principle embodied in the resolution but to the wording of it which seemed to limit British cruiser strength to a common standard with the U.S. The British naval authorities are keen to have more cruisers than the U.S. and it is cruisers they are trying to get the Dominion to build. Skelton is evidently a little quicker on the uptake than King.)

<sup>87</sup>Representatives of the Irish Free State.

<sup>88</sup>Lord Salisbury, Lord President of the Council, Great Britain.



King said the trouble they had got in through accepting Sastri's<sup>39</sup> resolution about equality of citizenship for Indians in the British Dominions and colonies had been an eye-opener to them as to the dangers of this procedure. The Indian resentment is directed chiefly against Great Britain over the Kenya action. Smuts, King said, had taken very pronounced stand against the Indian contention; said that the character of the citizenship was a matter within the control of each nation; and that there was no basis for the theory that there was a prescriptive right for the citizens of one Dominion to citizenship rights in another. Smuts can still be strongly nationalistic when this serves his interests. King seems particularly well pleased over the labors of the sub-committee on treaty-making which has been sitting during the past week at the Foreign Office with most of the Dominion Prime Ministers in attendance. He said that the memo—drafted in the first place by the Foreign Office officials practically accepted the procedure which Canada had followed in the case of the halibut treaty.

The question arose as to who advised the King when a Dominion wanted to appoint a plenipotentiary to negotiate a treaty on its behalf or when ratification of a treaty then made was desired. Hurst<sup>40</sup> of the Foreign Office said the view was now being taken that the advice was that of the Dominion Ministry though it might be transmitted to the King by the British Ministry.

Massey took strong objection to this. He understood that the only Ministers who could advise the King were the British Ministers.

Hurst said that some time the King might be tendered advice of a character to lead subsequently to impeachment. The British government in such a case could hardly be held responsible for advice coming from the Dominions with which they might personally be in complete disagreement. In the development that had taken place it was now necessary to recognize the right of the Dominions to tender advice to the sovereign on their own affairs and to put the accompanying responsibility on them.

Harding (of the F.O.) [*sic*] told King that this was not originally the F.O. idea at all but they recognized now that this development was inevitable.

Massey was quite put out, insisting that the only safe policy was one that left treaty-making for the whole Empire to the King and his British ministers.

Smuts was in entire agreement with the procedure suggested by the memo. Said they would have constant occasion to carry on diplomatic negotiations with Portugal (re P. East Africa) and it was absurd that the British F.O. should have anything to do with these negotiations.

Bruce was quite agreeable to the new principle.

King told me that he had spoken at some length dwelling upon the necessity of Canada having full national powers to look after her external affairs. He produced a chart which had been specially prepared showing the variety, extent and distribution of the questions which the Canadian American International Joint Commission has dealt, or is dealing with. This made a decided impression.

On the point of ratification King indicated that he understood that the principle was to be accepted that the King could ratify a treaty on behalf of a Dominion upon the advice of his ministers from that Dominion—in which case the ratification did not in any degree affect the other parts of the Commonwealth.

<sup>39</sup>Srinvasa-Sastri, Indian Representative at the Imperial Conference of 1921.

<sup>40</sup>Sir Cecil Hurst, legal adviser to the British Foreign Office.

Said that Baldwin had been primed to outline a scheme of protection at Plymouth including duties on certain food products including flour. Said that he and his colleagues had made the strongest possible protest against a duty on flour; and had he thought been instrumental in staving it off for the time being.

But the British protectionists in the government (Amery especially) are dead set on a duty on flour and cheese; they think that if they do this they can bargain with Canada for a 50 percent preference on these flour and cheese duties. This particular information is from Skelton and Coates [*sic*]*—not* King. "If they could do this", said Coates [*sic*] "they would certainly be *some* bargainers."

*Tuesday, Oct. 30*—Skelton showed me his notes of meeting of Committee on treaties held last Friday in Foreign Office—all Dominion premiers present.

Curzon said it was necessary to regularize procedure resulting from Dominion representation at Versailles and Washington, and the signing by Canada of the halibut treaty.

Massey said Versailles representation was innovation; he was more in favor of procedure at Washington where Dominion representatives were merely minor members Empire Delegation without power to do more than advise British Commissioners. This was N.Z.'s view. Quoted Salmond.

King said no difference between Versailles and Washington after appointment delegates had been brought into conformity with Versailles precedent. Quoted Borden.

Curzon said it was recognized that it was necessary to take note of new conditions.

Massey protested that course proposed was derogatory to King's prerogative. He could only be advised by the British ministers and must make treaties on their advice. Sir Cecil Hurst (F.O.) said that, forgetting the legalistic aspect of the matter, the existing practise was for Dominion Ministers to advise the King by transmitting advice which reached him through the channel of the British ministers. But the responsibility rested on the Dominions.

Massey quoted Keith<sup>41</sup> in support of his views.

Sir C. said he would take the responsibility of differing with

Prof. Keith.

Bruce: Of course, we can advise the King.

Massey predicted that Dominions would enlarge their powers by dealing with questions in which other British nations were interested and result would be to disrupt the Empire.

Mr. Bruce said there might be dangers but there would be greater danger not to accept new practice.

Smuts strongly supported. Report sub-committee accepted. Massey asking that N.Z.'s objection to it be noted.

*Re Three Mile Limit*: Notes of a Committee of the Conference

Curzon said shipping interests were in favor of accepting U.S. 12 mile proposal; naval men oppose but would not press their opposition. He thought they would have to fall in with U.S. proposal.

King and Bruce both spoke in same general terms and Curzon then practically indicated that after fencing with the question he would yield on

<sup>41</sup>Arthur Berriedale Keith.

terms—among them modification in present law affecting liquor on board British ships.

Curzon said it would be difficult to put the agreement in treaty form—though same ends could be better served by an exchange of notes.

Skelton says that Dominion opposition has knocked out these propositions in Economic Conference:

1. Proposal to establish shipping committee as permanent institution involving grants from Dominions.
2. Proposal to have British Board of Trade issue what would purport to be Empire statistics. Coates [*sic*] slaughtered this.
3. Proposal to have patents issued by British Patent Office valid over Empire upon registering in Dominions. Canadian patent office by cable filed a peremptory refusal to entertain this.

Proposal for a permanent secretariat the Economic Conference still to be considered. Will not be approved.

*Tuesday, November 6*—Returned from Paris last night. Early this morning Skelton telephoned me to go over as important matters had developed.

When I got over he told me that a Prime Ministers' conference had been called for the previous afternoon. This is an ingenious device adopted during the Conference to keep India and Ireland out of confidential confabs—they have no Prime Ministers, therefore are not eligible. The theory was that only Prime Ministers can attend these gatherings, but when Mr. King arrived he found Mr. Baldwin there supported by three colleagues—Lord Curzon, the Duke of Devonshire and, I think, Amery.

The business before the Conference was to agree to a statement about the Conference and Empire Foreign policy which Curzon had prepared. Skelton showed me this report. It was a remarkable document. Not only did it represent the Conference as giving its general approval to the conduct of joint common affairs since the last Conference, but it announced that the Conference had laid down policies for the future which the foreign office would be authorized to carry out. It meant the acceptance in its most unqualified form of the doctrine of the joint foreign policy with joint responsibility. Its general purport is indicated by the statement in it that "The British Government is not merely anxious to proceed upon the principles of mutual co-operation and responsibility laid down at the last meeting in 1921, but it is also conscious that in all international affairs where G.B. was conducting negotiations affecting the British Empire she would speak with more powerful effect if it were known that her voice was not that of herself alone but of the entire body of states affecting the Empire. This principle does not contravene but is on the contrary in strict harmony with the practise by which individual Dominions negotiate directly with foreign governments in matters especially affecting their responsibilities." There was a Near East section in it committing all the Dominions to the Lausanne settlement and another on Egypt which was an instruction to the Foreign Office to insist upon the four reservations which limit the sovereignty of the Kingdom and a special instruction beyond that to take any further steps that may be necessary to ensure beyond all question the control by the British of the Suez canal.

According to Skelton King rather went up into the air upon the conclusion of this statement and gave Curzon a piece of his mind. He

said that he thought that he had made it quite clear that Canada did not subscribe to the theory of joint policy and joint responsibility in foreign affairs and would take no part except in matters of direct concern to her. He also insisted upon the conference being regarded as a conference between governments not having power to bind governments and commit them even to moral obligations. Yet at the close of the Conference he was asked to agree to a statement which ignored these Canadian declarations of Canadian policy and committed Canada definitely to courses which she objected. He intimated that this was an illustration of tactics which made these conferences not very pleasant prospects for Canadian governments. The repeated attempts by resolutions or statements to commit them to policies to which they had expressed disagreement. He said flatly that unless there was an acceptance of the fact that these Conferences were only conferences Canada would in future decline to take part in them.

King's speech was something of a bombshell. Curzon undertook that a modification of the report should be made and submitted. Sir Maurice Hankey,<sup>42</sup> had brought this report around and King, Skelton and I had a conference about it. Even in its amended form it looked pretty objectionable to me. The Near East paragraph and that about Egypt were still retained but the formal declaration about joint policy had been deleted. The statements in the report were with respect to everything touched upon, incorrect. It reported the Conference as having variously, upon matters of international importance, "recognized" or "felt" or "believed" or "recorded" its views, all words suggesting formal decisions whereas I am assured upon most of these points there was nothing but general discussion with no attempt to reach a definite finding. The exception to this was, I inferred, the matter of the 12 mile shore limit where there was a general understanding that it would be desirable to meet the U.S. desires.

I suggested the right place for this report was the waste paper basket or the fire place because it did not seem to me that it could be amended and that another attempt at a report be made. But King was opposed to this. He said that it was plain to him that Curzon and the other Prime Ministers were set on having a report of some kind; the wisest course for him, he said, was to make it as unobjectionable as possible and then to insist upon the incorporation in it of what he called a "caveat" which would reserve to the various countries freedom to dissent. He was obviously alarmed at the possibility that it might go on record that on this matter he was in formal disagreement with all the other parties to the agreement. Skelton and he had been working over the suggested "caveat". Though this was the most critical moment of the Conference for him, King was obliged at this moment to go off to Oxford to get an honorary degree.

I stayed around for another hour working with Skelton over the reservation to be suggested. As drafted it consisted of four paragraphs—the first two by Skelton, the others by King. Skelton's contribution was a perfectly clear declaration that it was desirable and necessary that the Dominions should attend to their own foreign affairs recognizing their powers to confer together for the formulation of common policies where this was in their interests. King's paragraph was a jumble of words from which it was hard to derive any clear meaning. They seemed to suggest that the report of the Imperial Conference was an attempt only to indicate what it was thought might prove to be a consensus of opinion among the various peoples upon certain large matters of general interest; and affirming that this was only a conference of governments.

<sup>42</sup>Sir Maurice Hankey, member of the British Secretariat.

Skelton had to go at 11 o'clock to Hankey to show him the proposed additions to the report. He finally decided to drop the King paragraphs and substitute for them a single paragraph, the effect of which was that this present conference was not a conference for the fixing of policies but for an interchange of information and views and that no expression of opinions and views could be regarded as imposing any obligation upon any of the Dominions. Skelton then went away to see Hankey.

I spent the afternoon at the Ritz. Skelton reported that Hankey after some discussion had said that he thought the caveat would be accepted. He took it to Curzon; was about an hour; came back and said that Curzon would not hear of the addition. He said that Curzon had said that the formal declaration of the right and propriety of the Dominions looking after their own foreign affairs might have unfortunate results with respect to Ireland and India. He did not question Canada's power in this respect but said that a formal statement of it was unnecessary, since this was clearly implied in the new procedure as to Treaty-making about which they were all in agreement.

Skelton said he had quite a talk with Hankey and Hankey said they could not find out where Canada stood. Borden some years ago had asked for a share in foreign policy and last Conference Canada had agreed to uniform policy and common responsibility. Now Canada repudiated this policy.

Skelton said the position of the present Government was that the decision of two years ago was a reversal of the policy which had been developing for fifty years and its intention was to see that the effects of this aberration were removed. The futility of any system of consultation involving a measure of control was stressed by Skelton. He pointed out that Curzon while the Conference was sitting had sent a communication to the United States in the name of the Conference, and had later sent further communications, again in the name of the Conference, to France, Belgium and Italy—without the knowledge, consent or authority of the Conference—only reporting to it after the thing was done.

Hankey admitted that Curzon had taken a very improper course. He said he had told Baldwin before Curzon had made his statement to the Conference that it would be surprising if the Conference did not resent the course Curzon had taken. (In fact Bruce alone took Curzon to task.)

Graham came into the afternoon consultation. When he read the papers he saw the situation at once and clearly. He agreed with me that the report as modified was not acceptable and that it was questionable whether it could be made acceptable by amendment and additions.

I suggested that the best way to clear up the situation would be for King to say to Curzon et al: "I am not going to fight with you over the wording of this report; but I am going to add a reservation to it in which I shall make the Canadian position quite clear."

Graham and Skelton recalled King's timidity at the possibility of being put in a position where he would be in open disagreement with the other Dominions. He feared the effect on Ontario public opinion, wondered what the Globe would say, etc., etc.

I said that if the choice was between disagreement and the surrender of his position, King had really no alternative; moreover in my judgment a reservation along the lines of the drafted memorandum would be so strongly supported in Canada that it would be attacked only by the Imperialists who were against King anyway.

But I ventured the prediction that the other members of the Conference, particularly the Dominion Prime Ministers, would be more alarmed than King was at the possibility of a Canadian reservation, and sooner than face it would accept the Canadian position.

Graham agreed with me and when I left it was understood that Skelton and he would advise King to take the position that he would prefer to add a Canadian reservation.

Later in the evening I saw Skelton again and he said King was reluctant to take this course—still thought it better to secure a modification of the report and the inclusion in it of some phrase or paragraph which would protect his position. He said that King and Hankey had had a session that evening and that there was to be another "Prime Ministers' Conference" in the morning.

Nov. 7.—I did not see any of the Canadian delegation until tonight at Sir Campbell Stuart's<sup>48</sup> dinner to Mr. King. Had a brief talk with King who seemed in good spirits; said he had a good day.

Later Skelton gave me an outline of what had occurred. At the morning meeting of the Prime Ministers there was a dead set made on King to accept the report as amended. Particular objection was taken to the inclusion of a paragraph declaiming that the Conference being only a conference of Governments could not finally determine policies for the Empire. Bruce and Smuts were very active in urging the point that this was not necessary as the right of each Dominion to dissent from policies determined upon was implied. King proving recalcitrant a disposition developed to pass the matter over his head; whereupon he played his card. He told them they could fix up the report to suit themselves, but that he would make the Canadian position plain by means of a formal reservation which he would insist upon them publishing with the report. The effect was immediate. Smuts in particular got off the high horse. He no doubt foresaw in a glance what use could be made by his enemies in South Africa of his failure to agree to the Canadian point of view which is what he has always professed himself in S. Africa. There was a chorus that unanimity must at all cost be achieved and King was asked what his irreducible minimum was. He said the portions in the report dealing with the Near East and Egypt must be made harmless and there must be a paragraph limiting the power of the Conference to fix policies. The expression of opinion in the report about the desirability of U.S. co-operation in Europe, the propriety of an investigation into German capacity to pay, the desirability of meeting the U.S. request re the 12 mile limit, he would stand for as he believed Canadian public opinion would approve them. Some of the others, not being able to agree to these terms the conference broke up without anything definite being decided upon. In the afternoon Smuts came around to the Ritz and spent an hour trying to cajole King into falling in with the general view amplifying the arguments employed in the morning. King remained obdurate, Smuts finally said, "Well, Mackenzie, you are a very obstinate man; we'll have to see if we cannot meet your views."

Smuts then went to Hankey and told him to see Curzon and tell him that King's demand would have to be met. Hankey declined on the ground that he had already had one row today with Curzon and did not want another.

Smuts then said that he would have to attend to it himself and went to see Curzon. Later King was advised that the report would be further modified in conformity with his desires.

<sup>48</sup>Sir Campbell Stuart, Managing Director of *The Times*.



Nov. 8—Went to Ritz to say good-bye to the Canadian delegation. I had a chance to run through the report of the proceedings of the Imperial Conference which is to be made public on Saturday. The "caveat" in the foreign policy section put in to satisfy King struck me as rather thin—much less pronounced than the drafts I had seen. But perhaps it will do; it expressly asserts that the Conference is merely a conference of governments.<sup>44</sup>

I stayed in the hope of seeing King who was out, until I had perforce to leave in view of preparations I had to make for my departure, but I met him on the stairs and we had a few minutes talk. He professed himself satisfied. Referred to various battles which he had had in conference with Imperialists. Said that once when they were urging the importance of passing some suggested resolution he said that if they were in the resolution business he had one to submit himself—whereupon he read the definition of equality drafted by C.S. He said he was asked if that represented his own views and he said it did; but he was not sure he told them it was yet an opportune time to make this a matter of record. He said there did not seem any sentiment in the gathering (this was a secret Conference of Prime Ministers) in favor of such a declaration.

#### GENERAL NOTES ON THE CONFERENCE

Canada was, I think, extraordinarily well served by both Skelton and Coates [*sic*], the Dominion statistician. They are both men of wide knowledge and very alert minds.

Coates [*sic*] has been present at previous Conferences. He says that it is always a case of watch-your-step as the English officials always have a number of plausible schemes ready which it is necessary to fight. Told me that Meighen was fed up at the end of the last Conference and expressed the opinion that taking part in a Conference was always a danger to a Dominion Prime Minister.

Coates [*sic*] cited the attempt to give control of patents throughout the Empire to the British patent office as typical of the game the British officials are up to. The proposal was that patents granted by the British patent office would be good for the Empire subject to formal registration in the various Dominions. The Canadians blandly enquired whether as between Great Britain and Canada the arrangement would be reciprocal—that patents granted in Canada would hold in G.B., subject to registration. No this was not the idea at all. Only the British patent office had the necessary technical equipment to issue Empire patents, etc. The Canadians said the Canadian patent office was as good as the British; and issued 11,000 patents a year as against 19,000 by the British office. The Canadians rejected the proposition *nolus volus* and it was dropped—the other Dominions would probably have allowed themselves to be wangled into agreeing.

The refusal of Canada to agree to the permanent Economic Committee was a sore point with Amery and his lieutenant, Lloyd-Graeme,<sup>45</sup> chairman of the Board of Trade, who were the "steerers" of the Conference. They evidently had some very definite plan behind the proposition. Bruce made the proposal and Amery and Graeme made almost pleading speeches in its favor. Both the Times and the

<sup>44</sup>The "caveat" read: "This Conference is a Conference of the several Governments of the Empire; its views and conclusions on Foreign Policy, as recorded above, are necessarily subject to the action of the Governments and Parliaments of the various portions of the Empire, and it trusts that the result of its deliberations will meet with their approval." Maurice Ollivier, *The Colonial and Imperial Conferences, 1887-1937* (Ottawa, 1954), 111, 9.

<sup>45</sup>Sir P. Lloyd-Graeme, President of the Board of Trade, Great Britain.

Morning Post criticized Canada for refusing. All the propositions for paid secretaries went by the board. The proposition mooted at the outset for a Dominion Secretariat in the Foreign Office, was not even brought up, mostly because it was known that Canada would not consent.

I asked both Skelton and King to what they attributed Smuts' change of front. They both agreed that he is obsessed with an ambition to play a part in the settlement of Europe and that he thinks he has a better chance of doing this if the programme of a joint foreign policy for the Empire is carried out for the time being. Smuts' somewhat pro-German attitude is good business for him in S. Africa as the Boer sympathies lie that way. Skelton said it was very noticeable that while Smuts talked Imperialism he usually developed Nationalist traits when it was a question of passing a resolution and putting himself on record. Skelton thought his mind very subtle—could understand, he said, why they called him "slim Jannie" in South Africa. Amery struck Skelton as extraordinarily naive in some respects. He and Graeme were out to make the Conference an adjunct to the Conservative party in carrying out its plans. For instance Amery tried to get the Conference to pass a resolution committing all the countries represented to the Singapore enterprise. Someone having said that such a resolution would be of no service, Amery replied, "On the contrary it would be of great service to me in getting the British House of Commons to support the scheme."

## New Evidence on the Mackenzie-McTavish Break

ELAINE ALLAN MITCHELL

IN HIS ESSAY on the break in 1799 between Alexander Mackenzie and Simon McTavish<sup>1</sup> Dr. Stewart Wallace has pointed out the lack of evidence which has so far prevented any final solution of the puzzle. On the basis of the known documents he came to the conclusion that the quarrel "was at bottom financial," and the bitterness between Mackenzie and McTavish could be explained as "a conflict of personalities, or perhaps of youth and age."<sup>2</sup> Simon McTavish's equal bitterness against the Nor'Westers who supported Mackenzie, evident in his refusal afterwards to resume his personal correspondence with them, has been attributed by Masson<sup>3</sup> to the fact that they had, temporarily at least, deserted him, and that he was a very proud man. Yet for one of his experience in business and knowledge of human nature his rancour seems excessive, especially since it was he who was victorious over Mackenzie. More information concerning the circumstances of the quarrel at Grand Portage in the summer of 1799 and the quitting of the North West Company by Alexander Mackenzie has now come to light in letters in the possession of Colonel Angus Cameron of Firhall, Nairn, Scotland, and a short memorandum discovered among the Strathcona Papers in the Hudson's Bay Archives suggests that the wound to McTavish may have been much deeper than has been supposed. These documents are printed with the kind permission of Colonel Cameron and the Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company.

The principal letters are two from William McGillivray and one from Duncan McGillivray, all three written to Aeneas Cameron at

<sup>1</sup>In W. Stewart Wallace, *The Pedlars from Quebec* (Toronto, 1954), 37-43.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>3</sup>L. F. R. Masson, *Les Bourgeois de la Compagnie du Nord-Ouest* (Quebec, 1889), 75.

Timiskaming. William McGillivray has generally been looked upon as the personification of the ideas of his uncle, Simon McTavish, and the opponent of Mackenzie while his brother Duncan has been represented as a disciple of Mackenzie's.<sup>4</sup> The evidence does not support this view. In the letters to Cameron William testifies to the existence of a close friendship between himself and Mackenzie until the events of 1799 and his later policies for the fur trade suggest that during the period of their association as joint agents for McTavish, Frobisher & Company he may well have been fired by the grand scope of Mackenzie's ideas. On the other hand Duncan, franker and less discreet perhaps, displays active hostility to Mackenzie.

During the nineties the exigencies of war and the surrender of the north-west posts imposed a general unrest on the fur trade, with a constant jockeying for position both in and outside the North West Company and a growing opposition to the power and influence of Simon McTavish. From 1794 Mackenzie's position with respect to the Company was equivocal. He was not only unhappy in the upper country which he left forever that year but he seems to have looked upon the trade itself as "indifferent,"<sup>5</sup> and though he entered the house of McTavish, Frobisher as a partner some days after the conclusion of the Agreement of 1795 he apparently engaged himself only for the three concluding years of the Agreement of 1792. Many of the wintering partners disliked him and denigrated his achievements, but his influence over others, especially the younger men, was considerable and he was their spokesman in the negotiations which led to the Agreement of 1795. In this Agreement, which was essentially Mackenzie's, McTavish, Frobisher gave up still more share in the trade to secure unity in the north-west. As it proved, this step was dangerous for their control of the business. At the first summer meeting under the new Agreement a combination of the wintering partners, championing Mackenzie, came near to defeating the policies of the agents. Indeed, as William McGillivray's first letter indicates, the agents seem only to have been saved by the fact that sufficient proxies had not been sent to the meeting to record a decisive vote.

The letters to Cameron elucidate the circumstances of the quarrel at Grand Portage and its contributory causes but they do not reveal the reason for the break between McTavish and Mackenzie. The memorandum in the Hudson's Bay Archives provides a possible clue. It is inscribed on the back "Memorandum given Mr. Frobisher on new arrangement"<sup>6</sup> and the handwriting resembles Mackenzie's. The docu-

<sup>4</sup>A. S. Morton, *A History of the Canadian West to 1870-1* (Toronto, 1939), 464-5.

<sup>5</sup>Hudson's Bay Archives, F.3/1, fo. 203, Frobisher to McTavish, Nov. 8, 1794.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, F.3/2, fo. 103.

ment is not signed and it bears no date or watermark. All that can be said is that it must belong to a period before the new Agreement for McTavish, Frobisher & Company was concluded on November 30, 1799, and after Frobisher's decision to retire had been made on May 1, 1798. The proposals appear to be an attempt to remove McTavish also from the management and to share the business between the three remaining partners, Gregory, Mackenzie, and William McGillivray. So bold a step, if not actually inspired, must certainly have been encouraged by the gathering opposition to McTavish. In addition to the evidence of the handwriting<sup>7</sup> and the known facts of Mackenzie's ambitions for himself and the trade, the proposals are unlikely to have originated with Gregory or William McGillivray, both of whom supported McTavish against Mackenzie at the time of the break. If they are indeed Mackenzie's they provide ample reason for any fury of McTavish against him and indirectly, against anyone who supported him. Rightly or wrongly, McTavish must have assumed that they all had the same desire to oust him.

The memorandum provokes a number of speculations which cannot now be answered. Its fate is not known although it is perhaps permissible to assume that its rejection induced Mackenzie to go ahead with his plans to leave the Company. We do not know whether William McGillivray or John Gregory knew of its existence, either before or after its submission. Perhaps it was kept so secret that only Frobisher and McTavish knew of it. Certainly neither William McGillivray's letters to Cameron, nor John Fraser's to McTavish,<sup>8</sup> refer to it and the only hint of anything approaching an attempt by Mackenzie to increase his power at the expense of his partners is to be found in the later letter of John George McTavish<sup>9</sup> which bears little resemblance to the ambitions outlined in the memorandum.

Although the wintering partners supported Mackenzie against McTavish at Grand Portage in 1799 it is evident from the letters to Cameron that they did so from a variety of motives. This fact, as well as sober reflection, was no doubt responsible for their about face during the months which followed. Even Mackenzie appears to have regretted his action in quitting the Company<sup>10</sup> although with the memorandum in mind it is hard to see what other course lay open to him. One cannot help but agree with John Fraser's estimate of him as "unsteady." His youth, pride, and comparative inexperience in business led him to place himself in an untenable position which McTavish soon

<sup>7</sup>If we cannot say with certainty that it is Mackenzie's it is certainly not John Gregory's or William McGillivray's.

<sup>8</sup>Wallace, *Pedlars from Quebec*, 40-2.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, 39-40.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 41.

turned to his own advantage. Mackenzie found that he was no longer essential to the Company and it may have been from disappointment and chagrin that he made difficulties over the financial details of the settlement. He probably weakened his position with the winterers by going off to England.

If these conclusions concerning the memorandum are correct the responsibility for precipitating the final break between the two men lies mainly with Mackenzie. The generosity of McTavish's character which Dr. Wallace revealed is confirmed in the letters to Cameron while the only reference to Mackenzie is a comment of Richard Dobie's that "he is a very tight hand."<sup>11</sup> But McTavish was not without fault in his treatment of Mackenzie and jealousy unquestionably had a part in it. Had he recognized the young man's achievements as they deserved and shown an interest in his ideas, even if he could not subscribe to them, perhaps the misunderstanding need never have arisen and the whole future of the North West Company might have been very different.

WILLIAM MCGILLIVRAY TO AENEAS CAMERON, MONTREAL, SEPTEMBER 1, 1799

I have been down here since the 22d. Ulto. & Mr. McKenzie & my Brother arrived last night - . . .

We have given a Copy of the NW Agreement to Mr McDougald<sup>12</sup> it is the only one that has been taken from the Original - you will have to take a Copy for yourself. - You will observe one of the Articles which specifies the mode of transacting the Business of the Concern at the G. Portage by Majorities when a disagreement of Opinion happens - for this purpose those not present commonly send their Powers of Attorney to others who represent them: for was this neglected it is possible there might not be a sufficient Number of Votes to constitute a majority - some Questions Essential to the Interests of the Concern were left undetermined this Summer from not having a sufficiency of Votes - & its an inconvenience we wish to avoid - as we have ourselves the greatest Stake in the Company, it also follows we are most interested in its Welfare, consequently can never bring forward measures tending to its disadvantage - of this most men must be convinced. - if you are therefore of this opinion you will send us your Power to Vote for you, on any question, that may come before the Concern, when you are not present. - I have mentiond the circumstance to Mr McDougald - but I suppose he has Letters from Mr Shaw<sup>13</sup> advising him to beware of us, & accusing us of Arbitrary conduct &c. - at the same time asking him for his Power of Attorney - This I found out from his conversation. however after explaining to him the Game Mr Shaw was pursuing, he'll not trust him with his Power of Attorney but he says will Keep it himself - to avoid having any quarrel with Shaw, with whom he has

<sup>11</sup>Dobie was a prominent merchant in Montreal, long engaged in the Timiskaming business.

<sup>12</sup>Alexander McDougall was in charge at Abitibi and had been made a partner in the North West Company that year.

<sup>13</sup>Angus Shaw.



some matters to settle relative to their nieces – Mr Shaw's Conduct to us is too long a Story to tell you on paper – On coming down from the NW. he took it into his Head that we were to admit him a Partner into our Firm, to be one of their representatives at the CP- annually. – A thing we never thought of, conceiving him a very unfit person for any steady employ & a man that the People in the NW. had no opinion of even as a wintering partner: for his Extravagance has become Proverbial – for this suppos'd neglect, & because he could not afford so much money in the necessary Expenses of his Establishment here as Mr McTavish. – he has thought proper to give us all the trouble in His Power – while he remained here we put up with it, but at the Portage we jarr'd & from his Conduct all ways will while he remains in the Country, but this will not be long for he talks of coming down next year –

You will probably be surpris'd to learn that our A McKenzie is determin'd to leave our Concern & the Country for ever. this has long been his determination, tho' known only to few – as he could not put it in execution till his Engagements with our House & the NWCo. were at an End. He has realized a handsome Sum of Money & quits a very troublesome Business – but at the present Juncture we could wish he still retain'd his Situation as we cannot be too strong – this has oblig'd us to take my Brother Duncan from the NWest. he has resign'd his share & will go up to assist me yearly at the G.P. to manage the Business. –

Mr M.T. & Mr Gregory both have wrote you – . . .

SIMON MCTAVISH TO AENEAS CAMERON, MONTREAL, SEPTEMBER 2, 1799

McGillivray who has more time at present, has written you at Greater length – & given you a Dish of Grande Portage politicks which must surprise you a little

McDougal the bearer has been tampered with by Mr. Shaw by letter – which prevents his giving McGillivray his Power of Atty – I wish you wou'd convince him how very necessary it is to prevent any Misguided man of the N.W.Co. from having the power of counteracting our plan of carrying on the business – in which we not only hold – above one third of the whole Concern – but furnish £200,000. Capital – when all the others Concern'd are not worth £20M. – Mr. S. is a disappointed man, & will stick at nothing to gratify his pique – he has done much mischief this Summer at the Portage – & no doubt intends to play the same game next year – by his asking McDougal to send him his Vote.

If you can get Mr. McDougal to a proper understanding of what is best to promote the interest of the Company – get his power of atty. in favor of Wm. McGillivray or other representative of our House at the Grand Portage & send it along with your own by return of the Canoes – it will not require a regular Power – but a few lines by way of letter – Authorizing W.McG. to vote in your Name on any question that may be agitated at the Grande Portage – or here during your absence – respecting the business of the NW Compy. – . . .

JOHN GREGORY TO AENEAS CAMERON, BELLEVUE, SEPTEMBER 4, 1799

. . . Mr. McGillivray Has Wrote you Regarding Our NW. Matters, & as you Will See By the Agreement Every thing Regarding The Transacting of the Business at the CP. is to Be done By Vote it is Necessary that the Absent Partners Should Appoint Attorney's to Vote for Them. Mr. McDougal has been Spoke to upon that Head and I doubt Not but upon Talking the Matter over with you He Will Readily Agree in the Propriety of Sending it to our House who you are Convinced at the present Crisis must Be Particularly Interested for the Welfare of the Compy. . . .

WILLIAM MCGILLIVRAY TO AENEAS CAMERON, GRANDE CALUMET, MAY 8, 1800

Mr. A. McKenzie after a great deal of hivering & irresolution at last determin'd on going to England without coming to any settlement with our House - his pretensions were unreasonable & inadmissible, & I believe finding at last he had carried matters too far - he would have preferr'd things were otherwise, - tho' we parted not on the best terms, nothing has past to prevent an amicable settlement, which we all wish for, & I sincerely hope when he has convers'd with men of more Experience & cooler Heads than his own, he will find it equally desirable to terminate the matter amicably. - & I have reason to think this is the Case - hard indeed! would it be on us all, *on me particularly*, if after our long intimacy, we could only look on each other as Enemies in future - the consequences are not to be thought of - he was daily expected in Montreal, when I left it, but its not my opinion he will be out before the Fleet - Roderic goes back to Winter, for one year more - . . .

DUNCAN MCGILLIVRAY TO AENEAS CAMERON, A LEAGUE BELOW THE CHATS,  
MAY 13, 1800

Mr. McKenzie had arrived from England on the day on which we left Ml. - the time was too short to know his intentions & we could not possibly delay our departure longer, having remained a whole Week longer than we at first intended, in expectation of receiving News - It is certainly his interest as well as Ours to settle amicably - under the circumstances *he* must be very unreasonable indeed should a legal discussion become necessary. - His retiring from the Concern has been attended with some vexatious proceedings at G. Portage & very unwarrantable measures were adopted to retain him - but however much he may seem to be gratified with the mark of distinction - in reality he has no very great cause to feel flattered by them - Many circumstances concurred to favor his designs at GP. in addition to the artful means previously employed in the Country to raise his Character - great discontents were excited by the formidable appearance of the opposition which was partly directed against the House in Montreal & when he intimated his intention of quitting the business in Council - it was done in terms evidently calculated to inflame - These among many others are the real Causes of the Conduct adopted at GP. last Summer - But after all, the determinations in his favor were the effect of sudden resolves & not of mature consideration, for when People had time to reflect on the unpropriety of what they had done - most of them not only repented, but some of them *cancelled it all* by an article now in my possession. - In a concern so extensive, consisting of so many persons of different dispositions - it is impossible that all should be satisfied - Among the dissatisfied was Shaw, who tho' he hated McK - cordially in his heart became an useful instrument to him, by endeavouring to excite indignation against the House from motives of disappointment in ill-founded pretensions of becoming a partner in it himself. -<sup>14</sup> In short many causes concurred to produce violence & disagreement for a little time, - but afterwards the business went on as expeditiously as ever -

In the meantime my Brother was placed in quite a different predicament - ignorant of the intentions of McK until it was too late to oppose them - he had no faction to foment - No party to support, he could have no other view than the general weal of the Concern. And all his actions were directed to that purpose - it is not therefore so surprising that in times of anarchy & trouble his feelings should

<sup>14</sup>This statement is especially interesting in view of the fact that Morton referred to Shaw as Duncan McGillivray's "admir'd chief."

have been so little consulted – With regard to myself, I was yet an idle spectator, or rather no spectator at all, for I had not arrived at G.P. until unanimity began to be again restored – henceforward however I shall be more interested, & if my service should not recommend me to the attention of the concern I shall at any rate boast, that no person wishes it better, nor will go farther to serve it than myself.–

## HUDSON'S BAY ARCHIVES, F.3/2, FO. 103

Suppose 14 Shares in the N.W. after Sutherland is settled with worth

£ 600 pann .....	8400
Commissions on transacting the business &c .....	6000
	<hr/>
	14400
Compting House Charges .....	1000.
To allow Mr. Frobisher pann .....	2500
& 1/46th. in the NW. ....	600
1/46th. to Mr. McT .....	600
	<hr/>
	4700
& the business in England .....	<hr/>
	9700

in 3 shares between

Gregory McKenzie & McGilly.

Mr. Frobisher to withdraw only £ 5000. of his Capital the remainder to leave in the House at 5 pct. The Firm to remain the same – but Mr. Frobisher nor Mr. McT. to having nothing to do wt. the management of the business –<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup>It is ironic to compare this sentence with the clause in the Agreement of 1804 which united the North West companies, by which Mackenzie was "excluded from interference in the fur trade," a clause in which Dr. Wallace discerned "the dead hand of Simon McTavish" (Wallace, *Pedlars from Quebec*, 42).

### A Canadian Political Protestant

FRANK H. UNDERHILL

PROFESSOR Kenneth McNaught's new book, *A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J. S. Woodsworth*,<sup>1</sup> is an illuminating examination of the man Woodsworth and also one of the very best studies yet written of the politics of Canada between the two great wars. But I must begin with an apology for what is bound to be a somewhat one-sided discussion of it. For Professor McNaught is an old student of mine, and Mr. Woodsworth was both a personal friend and my chief hero back in the 1920's and 1930's when I found Canadian politics exciting and exhilarating.

It is interesting that a biography of J. S. Woodsworth should appear at this moment, so soon after the Dawson volume on Mackenzie King. Both King and Woodsworth were born in the same year, 1874, in families that had memories of the rebellion of 1837. The grandfather whom King remembered had been *the* rebel. Woodsworth's grandfather had served on the loyalist side and his grandson preserved his sword. The two men entered university as freshmen in the same year, 1891. Each was a leading student, both in his academic work and in his activities among his fellow students. King graduated as one of the leaders of the 1895 student strike at Toronto, and thus seemed headed in the direction of his rebel grandfather. Woodsworth graduated as senior stick at Wesley College, thus clearly starting off his adult life as a member of the Establishment. In his photograph as senior stick which Grace MacInnis reproduced in her life of her father, he looks like a fine-grained, sensitive intellectua<sup>l</sup> but not at all like a rebel or a crusader.

Both men also became interested in social questions while still students. Both were in England at the turn of the century when the Labour party was founded and the Boer War broke out—the two events that marked the end of the old solid Victorian politics in the mother country. Of all that generation of Canadians who came of age at the beginning of the twentieth century, young King and young Woodsworth would seem to have been the two young men who were most aware of the new ideas fermenting in the social and economic thought of the English-speaking world and who most definitely dedicated themselves in their early years to the new social gospel which was attracting the dynamic spirits in both the religious and the secular fields.

Each man also, after a long preparation, really began his career as a political leader in the same Parliament, that of 1921. But by this time it was King who

<sup>1</sup>Kenneth McNaught, *A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J. S. Woodsworth* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959, pp. viii, 339, \$5.95).

had attached himself to the Establishment and who had embarked on that long career of his which was to justify the rebellion of the grandfather by the success of the grandson in penetrating to the highest governing circles; while Woodsworth was now the rebel, the radical, the outcast. They were to clash on many issues over the next twenty years. Yet perhaps King had more instinctive sympathy with Woodsworth's ideals than with those of most of the hard-faced Liberals who sat behind him or beside him in the House of Commons. Certainly neither of them was a man with much appeal to the mean sensual Canadian.

They were both genuine liberals, but they had committed themselves to two very different conceptions of what liberalism (with a small "l") ought to mean in the Canada of their day. King in his experiences since 1911 had been shocked by the deep divisions within the Canadian community—divisions, incidentally, which kept him out of public life and thwarted his personal ambitions. His career was henceforth to be devoted to the work of conciliation, of smoothing over differences, of emphasizing what people had in common rather than what divided them, of persuading as many groups as possible to work together under his leadership; and this he believed to be the essential of liberalism. Woodsworth believed that the function of a man passionately liberal was to confront his fellows with the evils in their society, to awaken them from their smug, selfish, unimaginative complacency; and this kind of liberalism undoubtedly stirs up dissension. King's interpretation of the ideals of *Industry and Humanity* made him essentially a man of the centre, however much he may have liked to picture himself as on the left. Woodsworth, after he packed away his senior stick in the attic, was never anywhere but on the left.

Professor McNaught quotes some of their words in one little clash. Woodsworth was objecting to the national war memorial on Confederation Square in Ottawa. King replied that it was not erected to glorify militarism but to honour patriotism and sacrifice, and he recalled the saying that man does not live by bread alone. When Woodsworth countered that it was difficult to live without bread, the Prime Minister in his loftiest idealist style answered: "I think the majority of men would prefer the spirit of sacrifice to bread." Think of this successful politician, who never made any sacrifices that might endanger the success of his own career, preaching sanctimoniously about the spirit of sacrifice to J. S. Woodsworth!

Yet it was King who, more than any other man, defeated Woodsworth in his attempt to introduce into Canadian politics a genuine political party of the left and so to reconstruct Canadian politics on the British model. For the real significance of the C.C.F. was not that it was socialist according to the prevailing socialist doctrines of the 1930's, but that it was a British-type radical party challenging all the conservatives in the two old parties and attempting to bring about a realignment between left and right as the Labour party had succeeded in doing in Britain. Woodsworth and his followers were defeated not by the right-thinking Tories, Liberal or Conservative, who regarded any attack on the established two-party system as subversive of British institutions, but by the skilled opportunistic political broker who kept the Liberal party going as the one effective national party on the American model, collecting votes from all the groups across the country, and from time to time appropriating particular social-service planks from the C.C.F., so as to leave it seemingly as a cranky party of abstract doctrine such as North Americans do not like.

In a way Professor McNaught's new biography, which contains much more about the social and intellectual background of the politics of the time than did Grace MacInnis' biography which appeared in 1954, might be thought to appear at an unpropitious moment. How can this generation, prosperous, complacent,

conformist, conservative, appreciate the radical unrest of the twenties and thirties? How can it, finding its own image in "the other-directed organization man in the grey flannel suit," understand this stubborn individualist who was never finally happy in any organization to which he committed himself, in his church or in his political party? Woodsworth was always confronting his society with embarrassing questions, always challenging his contemporaries with the gap between their professed ideals and the realities of their society. Today, as Walter Lippmann remarked a while ago when discussing Khrushchev's challenge to America, "The critical weakness of our society is that for the time being our people do not have great purposes which they are united in wanting to achieve. The public mood of the country is defensive, to hold on and to conserve, not to push forward and to create. We talk about ourselves these days as if we were a completed society, one which has achieved its purposes, and has no further great business to transact. . . . The question is whether this country can recover what for the time being it does not have—a sense of great purpose and of high destiny."<sup>2</sup> Woodsworth lived in a generation which was more open to be stirred by the challenge facing it. He wanted to push forward and to create. Perhaps a book about him will find more understanding in the 1960's than in the 1950's. At any rate the great virtue of Professor McNaught's book is that it brings out so well what a man of the left in the twenties and thirties was really like and what were the issues that roused him to passion and to action.

Whether or not we now find these issues irrelevant and obsolete, Professor McNaught explains with great clarity the crisis that developed in the mind of the young Methodist minister about his faith and its relation to the needs of the day; the nature of the pacifism that led him to repudiate war both in 1914 and in 1939; the personal experiences through which he came to adopt a moderate pragmatic socialism of the British Labour party type as against both Sifton-Dafoe liberalism and revolutionary Marxism; the evolution from the Ginger Group of the 1920's to the C.C.F. of the 1930's; and the way in which Woodsworth faced the dilemma of the drift towards war in the late 1930's. The author is on the left himself, he is critical of the Methodist Church, he is frankly hostile to the members of the Establishment in Winnipeg and Ottawa. No doubt he will be damned for all this by those who believe that historians should never be passionate except for the causes of the past that have turned out to be successful, or that they should march from event to event swinging their "on the one hand" in steady rhythm with their "on the other hand."

But Professor McNaught does not try to make too much of a hero out of his subject. He keeps pointing out through the book that Woodsworth was always more comfortable as a leader than as a private in the ranks, and that he generally thought of his role as that of a leader. In this there is more than a little similarity with King, except that Woodsworth agonized over the causes that he was to lead while King went to bed every night with the comfortable reflection that he was leader. Woodsworth was one of those individualists who cannot sink themselves entirely in the institution they are serving. Such people are born to trouble. But at the same time he had an unusual selfless quality about him: he listened to criticism and opposition from friends and colleagues, he did not intrigue, he did not build up a personal machine to keep control of his party. In the crisis of 1916-17 when he resigned from the Methodist ministry, Professor McNaught asks: "Did he subconsciously seek martyrdom?" This is the hardest question that any radical who goes out from his society can have put to him or can put to himself. Professor McNaught answers "no" to this question—rightly, I think. I never

<sup>2</sup>Ottawa Journal, Sept. 18, 1959.



heard Mr. Woodsworth indulge in any of that whining self-pity which is so congenial to the radical minoritarian. The impressive thing about him was how cheerful he was, how frank, how tireless, how indomitable in the face of discouragements—especially how little he tried to deceive others or himself. He was the most honest man that I have ever known.

All the same, I think that Professor McNaught rather overstresses Woodsworth's abilities as a party leader. His persistence in forcing questions upon the attention of the House of Commons and of the public was beyond praise. But he was not enough interested in party organization or administration. And it did not seem to me that he was really the most effective speaker possible either in the House or at a big public meeting. He was too uniformly in earnest, too shrill when he became indignant. He was really a teacher rather than a preacher or an orator. He was happiest when he was analysing some problem and helping others to see it as he did. As Professor McNaught remarks early in his book, "he always wished to influence the thought and lives of other men, but the influence was to result from assisting them to discover and understand realities, not from telling them what was or was not so." I suppose this was what made him so attractive to so many university dons, and why he himself was always so at home in academic circles. A teacher seeks intellectual and moral influence, but this kind of power is inadequate for a party leader without an efficient machine under his control.

Also I do not think that Professor McNaught really makes his case that Woodsworth proved that a party can be strong even in North America if it sticks to principle. This was true of the C.C.F. only in the Woodsworth days, that is, before 1939. If it was to go beyond the point to which Woodsworth had brought it, that is if it was to become a party capable of government, it would have to develop the same skill in compromise and group diplomacy which all North American major parties have shown. The point is that during the Woodsworth régime the C.C.F. was still a minor party and could not aspire to national office. This saved it from the temptations of expediency to which major parties are exposed.

Professor McNaught is not impressed enough by a point which he brings out himself: the way in which a group of insiders guided the party through the crisis of September, 1939, into a compromise policy that was not ratified by a party convention and perhaps would not have been approved by a majority of the party membership. The party had just reached the point where "the iron law of oligarchy" was beginning to transform it from its original democratic innocence. Woodsworth was out of sympathy with this oligarchy. My recollection of that critical National Council meeting in Ottawa is that the division was mainly between the younger men, who were thinking of possible political power coming to the party out of the war, and the older men, who had been through World War I and knew more about the costs of war, moral as well as material.

Woodsworth's moral purism, however, did not make him an innocent in politics. I still cherish a sheaf of typewritten pages which he sent me sometime early in the 1930's. They consisted of extracts from F. S. Oliver's study of Walpole, *The Endless Adventure*, in which Oliver made some very cynical observations about the obligation that rests upon every statesman, if he wishes to be effective, to keep himself in office. "Many of the generalizations may seem, to those outside," wrote Mr. Woodsworth, "rather cynical if not machiavellian, yet anyone who has lived on the inside must recognise in them a large measure of truth." How shocked Mackenzie King must have been at the expression of Oliver's anti-romantic realism, if he read the Oliver volumes—they are in his library—even if he did succeed in clinging to office for a longer period than Walpole!

In a book that covers so much of recent Canadian politics there are many points about which one feels like commenting. The author rightly stresses that Woodsworth's political models were British rather than American. This is true about his conscious political thinking. But underneath this was the experience of growing up on the prairie, with its egalitarian ways of thought and life and its feeling that here was a society that could still be made by men. The social gospel took hold in North America because society was still in the making. One of the most effective quotations in the McNaught book is an extract from the Woodsworth pamphlet, *Following the Gleam*. It ends: "Haul out, cast off, shake out every sail . . . O farther, farther, farther sail!" Professor McNaught does not tell us, but this is from Walt Whitman, who was not a British poet.

I enjoyed the chapter on the Winnipeg strike. It gives a more clear-cut picture than we have yet had. But critics are bound to arise who will remark that in the McNaught narrative all the good men are marshalled on one side and all the villains on the other, which is not how historians usually see the critical issues of the past. Should we not agree now that in 1919 most Canadians were still living in the age of innocence in the matter of industrial relations? The definition which the employers and the Citizens' Committee gave to collective bargaining in 1919 seems now in the 1950's so preposterous that it is almost impossible to believe that they were honest. But if we deny innocence to them, we must be careful about crediting it to the labour side. A general strike is, after all, a challenge to society as a whole. As the British experience of 1926 was to show, it should not be embarked upon except as the prelude to revolution. And whether the workers conceive it as a prelude to revolution or not, it is bound to be treated as such by organized society.

The one place where Professor McNaught seems a little embarrassed in defending Woodsworth is in his account of the 1926 crisis at Ottawa. If you are beginning to find a bogeyman in "the Whig interpretation of history," as Professor McNaught has been doing of late, then Woodsworth and 1926 are bound to be embarrassing. All our historians tend to be a little too hard on the Progressives, because the Progressives did not believe in the two-party system upon which all Canadian historians and political scientists have been brought up. And Mr. Forsey's book about the right of dissolution has distorted our overall picture of 1926 by concentrating upon one particular item. The Progressives were certainly confused about what they should do, but confusion is not necessarily a political crime. (Only university professors are clear headed.) In the end they decided that they wanted a King government rather than a Meighen government, as Woodsworth decided. Surely this decision was in the interests of the farmers and industrial workers whom they represented, and surely they should be given credit for it. Both King and Meighen seem to have exploited the Crown for their own purposes, and when the issue reached the voters it looked to them as if the Crown had functioned so as to refuse a dissolution to one leader and grant it to his rival. In their simple-minded way, not having had the advantage of reading Mr. Forsey's book, they thought that this was unfair, and they were surely right. Also, whatever may have been King's constitutional iniquities, he was right when he told the Governor General that no leader could hold a majority in the existing House and that the best solution was to refer the question of which party should sit to the right of the Speaker to the electorate. There is a good deal to be said in this twentieth century for the proposition that, if the Prime Minister misbehaves himself, the best authority to pass judgement on him is the people rather than the Crown. The Crown could not survive having to pass many such judgements.

In his final pages Professor McNaught makes one remark about Woodsworth which seems to sum up the man and to conclude the book most perfectly. He says that Woodsworth was a protestant. Why couldn't the Canadian people be roused in the terrible depression of the 1930's by Woodsworth and his C.C.F. colleagues? Why did we fail to develop any of that enthusiasm for making over some of our institutions which marked the Rooseveltian United States? The ultimate reason was that we have no tradition in Canada of successful political protestantism. We had no Populist and Progressive movements at the turn of the century like those which brought Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson to the White House. It was out of Rooseveltian Bull-Moose and Wilsonian New-Freedom circles that most of F.D.R.'s lieutenants came. Canada had no Lincoln in her history compelling her to face up to a great moral issue, no Jackson leading a triumphant democracy against the rich, the wise, and the good (it was in the Jacksonian era that the Papineau and Mackenzie rebellions failed), no Jefferson leaving to his people the gospel of life liberty and the pursuit of happiness as the birthright of every citizen. We have no protestant archetypes in our collective Canadian sub-conscious. In Canada protestants may come and protestants may go, but the Establishment goes on forever.

Yet it may be that this is not the last word. Our present age of apathy and acquiescence will not endure indefinitely; underneath its smooth shiny surface there are too many anxieties and frustrations accumulating. However prosperous, a society that produces a superfluity of motor cars and detergents but cannot rouse itself to produce enough properly equipped houses, schools, and hospitals, that cannot either produce cities fit to live in or free itself from the danger of having them blown to pieces by hydrogen bombs, such a society has something morally rotten at its foundations. There must be a good many hitherto unnoticed citizens who are looking for a new idealism, a new sense of dedication. "Spiritual unemployment," said a distinguished American historian recently, "can be as powerful a motive for change as economic unemployment." And though our Bureau of Statistics does not publish these figures, the amount of spiritual unemployment in Canada during the 1950's has been appalling. The indictment of Woodsworth against the society of his day was fundamentally a moral one rather than an economic one, though he often phrased it, after he got into politics, in economic terms. We may be approaching an era in which the appeal of a Woodsworth will again be a strong one.

Perhaps this is mere Utopianism. Even so, even in this centenary year, 1959, in which we are failing to celebrate John Stuart Mill's essay on liberty, there must be quite a few people who believe with Mill that no society can be healthy which does not keep producing stubbornly independent individuals and that individuality is one of the essential elements of social well-being. Such people will enjoy reading the McNaught *Woodsworth*.

## European

*The Origin of Civilized Societies.* By RUSHTON COULBORN. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1959. Pp. xii, 200. \$4.60.

THE EDITOR and co-author of *Feudalism in History* has brought to bear his technique of comparative analysis on the origins of the seven "primary" societies: the Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Indian, Cretan, Chinese, Middle American, and

Andean. He concludes, in opposition to Wheeler and Heinze-Geldern, that all seven were of independent origin, and, against the late Gordon Childe's theory of surplus accumulation, that religion was the dominant influence which carried the societies into the civilized stage. In the author's definition, civilized society differed from primitive society in its rapidity of development, its domination over the physical environment, and its manifestation of a cyclical rise and fall movement.

The theories of independent genesis and of the crucial importance of a specific form of religion (the "water-cult") cannot be fully substantiated in the light of our present information. The evidence for the significance of the water-cult in early Cretan society (pp. 120 ff., and 153 ff.), is extremely slender, though the decipherment of Linear B by the late Michael Ventris in 1952 (apparently overlooked by the author on p. 155), may eventually bring further illumination. Similarly, the obscurity which hangs over the most primitive Indian and Chinese cults seriously complicates the task of establishing a firm basis of comparison with the later religious observances of the civilized period. Obviously the search for a historical First Cause of civilization leads the inquirer into ill-lighted and disputed terrain, and the oscillations of expert opinion on larger issues have not ceased. Thus the author's statement "that it is known how the primary civilized societies were formed" (p. 186) is not fully corroborated by the evidence produced. Within these inevitable limitations the author has written a learned, stimulating, and incisive study which preserves the atmosphere of excitement and adventure appropriate to a courageous and sweeping synthesis. The widely dispersed literature of the subject is utilized with skill and independence, and few bibliographical items of significance have escaped attention. The work of Johannes Meringer, *Vorgeschichtliche Religion* (Einsiedeln, 1956), might have enabled the author to establish firmer comparisons between pre-civilized and civilized religion; and the survey of early American societies might have benefited by reference to H. D. Disselhoff, *Geschichte der altamerikanischen Kulturen* (Munich, 1953), and to the briefer study of E. Wert, *Die erste Besiedlung Amerikas und die Herkunft der amerikanischen Urkulturen* (Augsburg, 1957).

C. C. BAYLEY

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*A Short History of Scientific Ideas to 1900.* By CHARLES SINGER. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1959. Pp. xviii, 525. \$5.25.

WITH THE GROWING interest and emphasis on the history of science in the college curriculum, the instructor is often at a loss to suggest a general survey of the field. There is an increasing output of monographic material, and there are general studies covering certain chronological spans of scientific development, but the non-specialist and beginner sometimes has a difficult time of it. Almost twenty years ago Dr. Singer published *A Short History of Science* which supplied this need, and he has now revised and rewritten this volume under the present title. This revision is most welcome, in particular since it now covers the nineteenth century. What distinguishes this work and makes for its general excellence in part is the fact that Dr. Singer approached the subject knowing that "it is necessary to have some knowledge of the Civilizations within which the science of the past has several times waxed and waned." His chief purpose in writing this book was "to give an elementary idea of how science came to occupy its distinctive position in the life of our own time."

Ideally, such a survey should reflect the wisdom of long study and reflection; of living historians of science Dr. Singer perhaps possesses this desired qualification better than any other. The historical profession has long been indebted to him for his studies in the field of the history of biology and medicine, and most recently his contribution in editing the five volume *History of Technology* leaves us further indebted. It is fitting that this revision should be published under a new title, for it is in many essentials a new work. There are many excellent diagrams and drawings which are of great aid in explaining the text. And most important is Dr. Singer's achievement in making the reader aware of the importance of the history of science. It is fitting to close by quoting from the concluding chapter of the book. "The generation of philosophers that could ignore the great scientific conclusions is now at rest and is not likely to be disturbed. It seems probable that Science itself is now reaching a stage in which an adequate scientific equipment will involve some regard to the world as an interconnected whole, in other words, in which Science and Philosophy will dwell less apart. . . . The frontiers of scientific abstractions may be rendered more fluid and philosophical methods may have some share in determining the nature of change."

GEORGE A. FOOTE

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*Le Jubilé de Saint Thomas Becket du XIII<sup>e</sup> au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle (1220-1470): Etude et documents.* By RAYMONDE FOREVILLE. Bibliothèque générale de l'école pratique des hautes-études, VI<sup>e</sup> section. Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N. 1958. Pp. xviii, 242, illus.

DEATHS ARE SELDOM so pregnant as Thomas Becket's was. His was the source of energy and inspiration for anti-tyrannical prelates in the thirteenth century, and for their lay cohorts and successors. It was also the source of a quick, potent, and persevering cult which took the fame of "the hooley blisful martir" to all Catholic Europe and brought pilgrims back to Canterbury. Professor Foreville's book deals with this cult at its local centre and at the peak of its formality, the celebration of fifty-year jubilees from the first, when Stephen Langton translated the saint's body in 1220, to the last dubious one in the year of the Field of the Cloth of Gold.

Professor Foreville (who has already published notable studies of the problems that produced Becket's martyrdom and of the early thirteenth-century canonization of an English saint, Gilbert of Sempringham), here centres her attention around the fifth jubilee of 1420. She places it within its various contexts: the by then developed orthodox theological view of penance and indulgence and the tradition of the jubilee as a time for plenary indulgences; the growth, as in the case of canonization, of papal control over the granting of indulgences and the particular reaction of Martin V against the wholesale grants of his predecessors; and the contemporary, pilgrimaging, English theological world threatened by the memory of Wyclif. She does this most effectively in editing and commenting upon a treatise on the fifth jubilee written, Professor Foreville thinks, by Richard Godmersham, a canonist Canterbury monk, in 1421. The ambiguous position of the treatise, which had to argue at the same time against papal doubts and Lollard heresies, and which is both learned and naïve, makes it, at least in Professor Foreville's hands, a very revealing piece of early fifteenth-century theological polemic (localized and made pragmatic). Professor Foreville's book, as a whole, is perhaps most important because, without a trace of polite embarrassment, it pushes its reader towards the understanding, and the sources that make under-

standing possible, of ideas about saints and indulgences that were central to centuries of thought.

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*The Reformation, 1520-59.* Edited by G. R. ELTON. The New Cambridge Modern History, II. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited]. 1958. Pp. xvi, 686. \$7.50.

THIS WAS THE third volume to be published of the New Cambridge Modern History (do the agents of the Cambridge Press woo North America with the slogan: "It's New"?). All possible comments on the general advisability of the project have already been made (for example, by A. C. Cooke and John C. Cairns in the *Canadian Historical Review*, September, 1958). This volume, like the others, is a collection of summaries of information on political, constitutional, and religious events; it is not really a textbook, and it is certainly not a history—it should be judged as an encyclopaedia. Nineteen authors contributed to the volume: only six of these teach outside England and Scotland and there are no North Americans—a Harvard professor was asked to write, but was finally unable to do so. There is little attempt at a general point of view. There is occasional talk of "collective forces," and a rather defensive note by the editor that "no space can naturally be found within the framework of a general history for a full discussion of economic and social changes." It is old-fashioned history then, the old Cambridge Modern History updated, but not tampered with in concept. The age of the Reformation, writes the editor, was "passionate, partisan, and narrow." This book is not. He continues: "the Reformation was conservative—even backward-looking—in thought: since it was avowedly intent on restoring a lost condition, it could hardly be anything else." Nor could this book. However, the "New" history is less formidable and more modest than its predecessor.

The main difficulty faced by the contributors must have been that of avoiding the breathless impression of too many facts hustled into too little space. The classic Cambridge example of that is the *Shorter Medieval History*—a sterile summary of a summary. "The death of Charles the Bald deepened the embarrassments of John VIII. After Carloman of Bavaria, crowned King of Italy, withdrew stricken by a mortal disease, the Pope went to West Francia to induce Louis the Stammerer to take up his father's role. The king refused, and so did Boso Duke of Lyons, the only child of Louis II. When Carloman died, Louis II the younger, of Saxony, took over Bavaria, giving to Carloman's illegitimate son Arnulf the border duchy of Carinthia." This is reminiscent of the programme synopsis to one of the obscurer Verdi operas. The present volume does not avoid touches of that sort of thing. There are some of those splendid capsule comments which teeter on the edge of parody. "Worn out by a life of dissipation and torn by remorse for the death of his son Ivan, whom in a fit of ungovernable rage he had struck dead two years previously, he died suddenly on 18 March 1584 while playing chess."

The aim is de-personalised history. Thus the occasional expression of vigorous opinion seems terribly vulgar, a belch at a Bach recital. Mr. Elton, in his own three lively (though not always grammatical) chapters, is at no pains to suppress his contempt for "the claptrap about invisible laws and similar conventions of no reality in life," and gives a general impression of being Cambridge's imported tribute to A. L. Rowse. The fact that his essays do not seem to fit the general tone of the volume is probably more a comment on the volume than on him. What, for instance, is the student in search of a basic opinion (to be copied out



for a term paper) to make of the editor's half-page dismissal of *Utopia* as "oppressive, narrow, puritanical and intolerant"?

But how difficult it must be for experts to write a short summary of their "field" which will be at once succinct, impartial, comprehensive, and readable! Which chapters are the most valuable, the best done? The answer to that will reflect, to a certain extent, the reader's own interests, although not entirely. For myself, I found the following especially good: Bindoff (London) on Antwerp; Rupp (Manchester) on Luther; Cantimori (Florence) on Italy; Evennett (Cambridge) on early Catholic reform; Koenigsberger (Manchester) on Charles V; and Hay (Edinburgh) on the printed book. For my money, they would be required reading.

H. C. PORTER

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*Sir Walter Raleigh*. By WILLARD M. WALLACE. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1959. Pp. xiv, 334, illus. \$6.90.

RARELY DOES it happen that the outlines of the classical view of the role of the fates with their *ate*, *hybris*, and *nemesis* seem so clearly delineated as in the life of Walter Raleigh. Nor does it often occur that the man whom the fates have chosen to live out tragedy should so embody the renaissance ideal of the completeness of nature and character. Raleigh, who was born shortly before the accession of Elizabeth I, came to maturity in the great years of her reign and was, therefore, unlike so many of his contemporaries who held high office and power, a true Elizabethan. Here is perhaps his tragedy for he was the last who embodied this spirit and he outlived his age. When the Queen died in 1603 the spirit of Elizabethanism was part of a heroic past. Raleigh was only fifty-one; too young to be pensioned off to retire quietly into the shadows and too much out of harmony with the new Jacobean age.

The basic outlines of Raleigh's life are well known, and nothing radically new is added in this book. He was born in Devonshire (the air of that county must have been most salubrious since it produced so many adventurers) as a member of the gentry class. He served as a young man in Ireland and was later presented at court where his wit, charm, and handsome figure made him a favourite of the Queen. He became interested in colonization and exploration and is best remembered for his experiment in Virginia. He was involved in all of the various excursions of the reign. His public life did not lessen his intellectual pursuits and as a good renaissance man he wrote excellent poetry and prose. With the death of Elizabeth, fortune withdrew her favour and he went into eclipse. He became a state prisoner, a living memorial to a heroic age. His end was determined to satisfy Spanish pride and royal policy.

Mr. Wallace the author of this admirable book illuminates the life of his hero with impeccable scholarship and an excellent style. His book is more than another biography for he has attempted to explain the tragedy—a man outliving his age—and the oddity—the influence of a man without great political office—of his hero. Further he has set before us the whole Elizabethan *mise en scene*: Leicester "grown gross in chest and belly," Essex "the very embodiment of chivalry," Cecil the "thin, little, sickly hunchback" whose treacherous role in Raleigh's life is all the more grim because it was unnecessary, King James "potbellied, drooling [and] pedantic" and the glory of the Queen herself.

Raleigh the man, the historian, the poet, the courtier, and the explorer are all better illuminated because of this book. Raleigh has often tended to escape his biographers since they have concentrated so exclusively on some one phase of his life that he has had no balance. Here no such thing occurs. Wallace has a penchant for his hero but it is the complete man not a distorted figure that is presented. Raleigh stands as he would have wished to stand, not without faults—and at times his arrogance must have made him a tiresome person—but with compensating virtues too. This is an excellent book and it should make many previous studies superfluous. Wallace has indeed demonstrated that Raleigh was "as a star at which the world hath gazed. . . ."

S. W. JACKMAN

Bates College

*Puritanism and Revolution: Studies in Interpretation of the English Revolution of the Seventeenth Century.* By CHRISTOPHER HILL. London: Secker & Warburg [Toronto: British Book Service (Canada) Limited]. 1958. Pp. x, 402. \$8.50.

CLEMENT WALKER, in his *History of Independency* (1660) asked a question which has never been answered satisfactorily. "What Historian can find a method in so universal a Chaos?" To find a "method," that is the question. Even now, in the spring of 1960, three centuries after the collapse of the English revolution, in the anniversary season of Charles II's joyful journey from Breda to Dover, Walker's question is still our main concern. Many have tried to find a pattern in the "universal Chaos." Clarendon made a brilliant effort. So did Harrington, the Utopian, and Hobbes, the rationalist. In succeeding generations there were other men who took other views—Hume, Carlyle, Marx, Gardiner, Firth, and Abbott. Today one need only mention the names of living historians, Tawney and Trevor-Roper, Pennington and Hill, or Stone and Hexter, to illustrate our intense interest in what the turbulent history of seventeenth-century England really meant. Was the revolution of 1640 the result of class conflict, or was it not? That is the question now.

During the past twenty years four men, Stone, Tawney, Trevor-Roper, and Christopher Hill, all of them dissatisfied with orthodox Whig views, have attempted to explain the revolution in terms of conflicts of interest between social and economic classes. Hill, however, is the one historian in this group who has functioned the most consistently within the framework of the Marxist system. In his many scattered articles, fourteen of which have now been reprinted in a single volume, his Marxist approach to early modern British history is nearly always apparent. Six of the essays in this collection, those on William Perkins, Hobbes, Harrington, and Clarendon, one on the Henrican Reformation, and one on the agrarian legislation of the civil wars, are all in one way or another concerned with the Marxist concept of the "bourgeois" revolution.

Perkins, the great Elizabethan divine who formulated Puritan ethics on the contemporary social problem of poverty, was, it turns out, "bourgeois" in his views. "For," as Hill puts it, "the fundamental concepts of Puritan thought *are* bourgeois." Hobbes' thought is also intrinsically "bourgeois," especially in view of his notion that justice is nothing more than the keeping of contracts. "Nowhere is the fundamentally 'bourgeois' nature of Hobbes's approach to the state and to morality more apparent than in this, the foundation of both." For both Harrington and Clarendon the essayist has a very special affection, since both of them interpreted the revolution in social terms. "Harrington was what Marxists call an economic determinist: he conceived of economic change as a blind impersonal

force which somehow produced political changes of its own accord, without the lever of mass political action." Clarendon, a defective politician, but a great historian, viewed the revolution as an attack of the men of new wealth on the established ruling class. Clarendon was a "feudalist" in the terms of Marxist analysis, but Hill considers his testimony on the social character of the civil wars to be indisputable. Hill is certain that there was a class of men of new wealth in Clarendon's sense, and he seeks the evidence for this proposition in his analysis of land transfers during the Henrician phase of the Reformation and in the parliamentary confiscations and sales during the civil wars and the interregnum.

Most of the remaining essays in this volume are concerned with social and economic explanations of various subjects which have interested Hill over the last decade or so. There is an excellent treatment of the idea of "The Norman Yoke" in English history, a very tenuous discussion of the effects of the 1640 revolution on European politics, and a concise analysis of certain of John Preston's political sermons. Two sympathetic and amusing essays deal with two little-known and curious characters of seventeenth-century religious history, Roger Crab, the Mad Hatter, a hermit herbalist and pacifist, and John Mason, the last of the Chiliasts, who expected Christ the King's second coming near Buckingham on Whitsun, 1694. Poor William Hackett in the 1590's was executed for similarly subversive notions. He made the additional mistake, however, of thinking that he was possessed by the soul of John the Baptist, and he ran through the streets of London with his followers, crying, "Repent, England, Repent." This too might have been overlooked had he not slashed the Queen's portrait and insisted that she must be unthroned. If Christ the King was soon to arrive it was necessary to remove any encumbrances which might impede His régime. A century later no one became excited about the poor millenarian lunatic, John Mason. He died in his own bed of quinsy. It was the post-revolutionary age of reason, after all, not the pre-revolutionary age of theological politics.

The remaining essay, "Recent Interpretations of the Civil War," originally published in *History* in 1956, possesses the greatest general interest. It should be read in conjunction with Hill's 1940 essay, *The English Revolution*, which unfortunately was not included in this collection, although one can understand why the author preferred to leave it out. Hill stated his "method" twenty years ago in his 1940 essay. Not for him the parliamentary view of the great Liberal historians, nor the royalist view of the Tory historians, and certainly not the heavy emphasis on religion in both those views. Not for him the rationalizations of the successful "bourgeoisie"—the sovereignty of Parliament and the common law, the abolition of the prerogative courts, arbitrary taxation, and monopolies, the emergence of systematic democratic thought, and the force of religious ideals as factors in the revolution.

Rather, for him, the revolution was a vast social movement in which the feudal order was violently destroyed and replaced by a capitalist order. The civil wars were class wars in which the despotism of Charles Stuart was defended by the reactionary "feudalists," the lay and ecclesiastical landlords, a gang of "aristocratic racketeers," parasitical courtiers and bankrupt nobles, the most of them. Against the "feudalists" were ranged the powerful "bourgeoisie" and the powerless "masses," who hoped to achieve political, economic, and ecclesiastical power. In this scheme episcopalianism was the religion of the "feudalists," presbyterianism of the "bourgeoisie," and congregationalism of the "masses." Each class, in other words, sought to establish political and religious systems suited to the defence of its own class interests. The Army grandees, that is, in Marxist terms, the progressive smaller gentry and the free traders, got control of the revolution, kept

control of it and suppressed the "masses" during the decisive Cromwellian period. It was then a small matter for the "bourgeoisie" to unite in behalf of the restored monarchy subject to their own control. It was all very systematic, tidy, and final. The vexatious problem of the nature and meaning of the revolution had seemingly been dealt with for once and for all.

In the twenty years since 1940 Hill has discovered that the revolution was vastly more complicated than he thought it was, and he has become a thorough-going revisionist, as his latest essay on the interpretation of the civil war testifies. He prefers the Stone-Tawney thesis of the "declining aristocracy" and the "rising gentry," despite Trevor-Roper's lively refutation of it by virtue of his counter-thesis of the "declining Independent and Roman Catholic mere gentry." Justifiably, Hill criticizes Trevor-Roper's method of inference by sampling, and insists that religion cannot be treated as cynically as Trevor-Roper treats it, as the mere "epiphenomena of economic decline." The idea that the revolution was a simple struggle between the "ins" and the "outs" at the trough does not leave much room for a Chillingworth or a Milton, for example. In any case, the revolutionary leaders of 1640, men like Pym and Hampden, were not mere backwoods Independent gentlemen, and they certainly were not backwoods Roman Catholic gentlemen.

Unfortunately, Hill's essay on the interpretation of the civil war was written prior to the publication of J. H. Hexter's devastating criticisms of both the Tawney and Trevor-Roper theses in the May, 1958, issue of *Encounter*. Hexter has shown that both Tawney and Trevor-Roper use the evidence of individual cases to prove their propositions, but that such evidence can only illustrate their propositions, and cannot in any way demonstrate their validity. Furthermore, Hexter so effectively questions Tawney's casual and systematic statistics, and so many of his fundamental assumptions about the "bourgeois" revolution, that not much seems to be left of the evidence for the notion of the "rising gentry." It is on these salient criticisms that it would have been interesting to have had Hill's reactions, and, for that matter, on Hexter's own neo-Whig political view of the civil war. As for the idea of a "declining gentry" as the explanation of the civil war, Hexter, like Hill, is of the opinion that all Trevor-Roper demonstrates is that some "mere" gentlemen had a hand in every *coup d'état* from the Essex affair to the New Model march on London.

It is a pity too that Hill's essay could not take into account Tawney's recent biography of Lionel Cranfield, James I's Lord Treasurer. In great detail Tawney has told the story of Cranfield's career and the break-up of early Stuart government. But in his treatment of the theme, politics seem to determine economics, not the other way around. Furthermore, Tawney does not attempt to relate the governmental break-down to the large social changes then presumably in progress. It appears that if the revolution was produced by vast social changes, those changes seemed to have no striking effects in government and in the City in Cranfield's day. It may be, and Tawney seems to allow as much by implication, that the cause of the revolution will not in the end be explained by the new position in society of the commercial-industrial-landed element. It may actually be that the cause of the revolution really was bad government, both in its personnel and in its decisions, bad over a long period of time, and an experience which England had not had since the fifteenth century, except for the short reigns of Edward VI and Mary I. This seems, at the least, to be a possible hypothesis.

Another threat to the theory of the "bourgeois" revolution has been posed by the work of Brunton and Pennington in *The Members of the Long Parliament*, and on this Hill has expressed his views in his 1956 essay. He does not entirely accept their evidence that the members of the Long Parliament were not divided by class. Hill admits that there were merchants on both sides, but he insists that they

were not equally divided, after all, and that in some areas they were almost entirely parliamentary. He also claims that it is possible to distinguish differences within the landed class, especially between the "economically-backward" royalist North and West and the "economically-advanced" parliamentary South and East, and that Brunton and Pennington dismiss these differences too casually. Even if Brunton and Pennington had established that there was no economic division between the royalist and parliamentary members of the Long Parliament, Hill holds that this would tell us nothing whatever about the division in the country. Parliament was a cross section of the ruling class, and it was divided, he insists, because the ruling class itself was divided. In brief, the civil war occurred, and Brunton and Pennington supply no explanation of that fact. This is true enough, but the point surely is that they did not aim to explain why the civil war occurred, but only to find out as accurately as possible what the differences of "interest" actually were between the members of the Long Parliament who became royalist and parliamentary adherents during the civil war. Brunton and Pennington arrived at negative conclusions in respect of this question, to be sure, but Hill is willing to venture the opinion that their negative conclusions may just possibly not be entirely irrefutable.

Gardiner's view of the revolution, despite many modifications in details, was in its broad outlines the nearly universal orthodoxy not very long ago. Tawney almost established a new orthodoxy, but his class view of the revolution has not entirely survived the attacks of his critics. No one has been as sensible of this as Tawney himself. He is a very great and venerable historian, as his latest full-scale work again decisively demonstrates. But then, what are we to do now? We cannot be content to remain unreformed Whigs. We found Marx, but he did not give us a foolproof "method" of sorting out the universal "Chaos." It would be easy enough to say to ourselves that the revolution was so complex that no interpretation at all is possible. No responsible historian can abdicate his function in that way, however. We will have to grapple with the enigma in some constructive way or other.

Christopher Hill for one has not the slightest intention of abdicating. He clings to his conviction that the theory of "The Puritan Revolution" was a nineteenth-century point of view, and that it is now dead. For him the importance of economic issues has been established beyond all doubt. But, if "The Puritan Revolution" has been interred as far as he is concerned, he now wholeheartedly recognizes Puritanism as a mighty religious and political force in the revolution. In this he has changed radically since 1940. Hill believes that if there is ever to be a satisfactory explanation of the revolution, it will have to integrate a number of profoundly important economic issues with the crucial questions of religion, ecclesiastical polity, and the social and political implications of theological heresy. His whole argument is "... that we should not think merely in economic terms. . . . Any event so complex as a revolution must be seen as a whole. . . . No explanation of the English Revolution will do which starts by assuming that the people who made it were knaves or fools, puppets or automata." To this we are happy to say, in the words of King James in a letter to Prince Charles in Madrid, "God graunt it, God graunt it, God graunt it. Amen. Amen. Amen." After all, whatever we may think about the inadequacies of the liberal historians, it never entered their heads to assume that anyone would think merely in economic terms, nor that the people who made the revolution were "knaves or fools, puppets or automata." By all means, let us emancipate ourselves from a too rigid adherence to the theory of the "bourgeois" revolution. It too was a nineteenth century point of view, but it certainly doesn't seem to be dead yet.

W. W. PIEPENBURG

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*The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman: Studies in the Transmission, Development and Circumstance of English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies.* By CAROLINE ROBBINS. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1959. Pp. viii, 462. \$13.00.

PERHAPS THE MOST difficult task facing the historian of politics is to establish with reasonable precision the causal connection between ideas and practice. The chain is at best intangible, and he must re-create the vital links in it by analysing the psychology and actions of two phenomena: the political thinker and the influential political group or party. Both must be considered. Without the first, the analysis becomes merely a sociological survey propounded largely in terms of human appetites and selfishness—the “structure of politics” at its worst; without the second, it becomes merely a study of the apostolic succession of thinkers in a social vacuum.

Dr. Robbins’ work is of this second variety. She sets out to show that “a gifted and active minority of the population of the British Isles” carried on the traditions of the supporters of the seventeenth-century Commonwealth and transmitted the salient ideas of the balanced constitution, rotation in office, religious toleration, and imperial devotion to the agitators of the 1770’s and 1780’s in Britain and to the makers of the American Revolution. But though she has assembled an enormous mass of very useful information about the Whiggish underground which will ensure the book a prominent place among reference works on the eighteenth century, Dr. Robbins has not written it into a unified, coherent thesis.

This is partly the fault of her method of analysis. She cannot decide how she will describe her group, using Commonwealthmen, Real Whigs, Whigs, liberals, and Honest Whigs rather indiscriminately (“radicals” is taboo because Halevy says it did not become current in England until about 1819, though “liberals,” with an even more recent origin, is apparently acceptable). But we need not be particular. Dr. Robbins intends to include almost everyone in the eighteenth century who wanted some sort of reform in the state, the church, or the economy. Sometimes her choice of reformers seems unduly specialized, as when she includes the Tory philosopher Hume, and excludes Mansfield, the reformer of the common law and the defender of the dissenters; and indeed her canons for attributing Commonwealth proclivities appear to resemble those of the late Senator McCarthy for attributing Communism. Friendships, relationships, casual acquaintanceships, reading habits, correspondence, and journeys to America are all marshalled to support the charge of “Commonwealthism by association.” She also assumes an immutability in the ideas transmitted which was far from being the case. The country squires in Parliament might harp for a century on the danger of standing armies and demand annual Parliaments and place bills, but the writings of Richard Price, for example, grew in the first instance out of the events of the American revolutionary era, not the memory of Sidney and Locke.

To a lesser extent the failure arises from the author’s determined partisanship of her heroes. She admits, frequently, that their influence on contemporary opinion was not great, but feels this is not due to any shortcoming on their part, but rather that it is the fault of the age. Yet in the light of the eighteenth-century studies which have appeared in recent years it is surely rather perverse to state that the conservatism of governments between 1688 and 1750 was due to complacency, rather than to apprehension of what would happen if the fine balance of the revolution settlement was disturbed; and are we still to be treated to the old legend that Chatham and Rockingham, or American sympathizers like Pownall could have prevented the American Revolution had they been in office?



It may be that in North America we have now reached a point where the requirements of good English style are no longer a desideratum of academic writing, but it must be remarked that Dr. Robbins' propositions lose a good deal of their effect when expressed in such sentences as: "The Scotch-Irish in the early eighteenth-century, before numbers emigrated to America, about half the Protestant population of Ireland, produced many talented men"; or "There is no doubt . . . that the radicalism of the reign of George III at Cambridge was not purely coincidental." A fellowship at a Cambridge college is not a degree, nor is the family of the Duke of Marlborough the "Spencer-Marlborough family"; moreover there is a simple English equivalent for the American slang expression "know-how," and the terms "mitigate" and "militate," and "opposite" and "apposite," are not interchangeable.

JOHN M. NORRIS

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*Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century.* By LUDWIG DEHIO. Translated by DIETER PEVSNER. London: Chatto & Windus [Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited]. 1959. Pp. 142. \$4.00.

THIS VOLUME brings together five essays which deal in the main with the period from the beginning of the present century to the outbreak of the Second World War. Originally published between 1950 and 1954, they have the advantage of perspective in their effort to discern certain determining factors in Germany's attitude toward world politics up to 1939, and to a somewhat lesser degree in the consideration of the shift in the balance of those factors that has taken place since 1945.

Although the essays nominally deal with separate themes, they hang together remarkably well. A discussion of Germany and the two World Wars is followed by a chapter whose title is "Ranke and German Imperialism" but which is in fact a dissertation on those successors of Ranke—Delbrück, Oncken and Meinecke among them—who had such an influence on the German outlook before and after the First World War; and Professor Dehio broadens this further with his "Thoughts on Germany's Mission 1900-1918." His chapter on "Versailles after Thirty-five Years" is less an examination of the treaty itself than a comment on certain aspects of the shifts in the power balance and their relation to German policy, and the further and more drastic shifts since 1945 form the theme of the concluding essay on "The Passing of the European System."

The underlying theme from which the author develops his main thesis is the extension of the struggle for hegemony from the European to the world stage. The two World Wars, in this view, are links in a chain that reaches back at least to the days of Charles V. By the twentieth century, however, hegemony could not be based simply on a European position, and Germany in her effort to attain supremacy had to "break out of the narrow confines of Europe and join the ranks of the world powers." And as in previous cases of this kind, this new challenge drew the other European states into a coalition against the aspirant, and in particular the outlying powers—the Anglo-Saxons and the Slavs—whose weight increased as the century advanced. With the complete crushing of Germany after her second bid for power, it was the powers on the wings that were left predominant, and the old pluralism of Europe was replaced by the dualism of the present balance of power.

This thesis, which I have summarized all too briefly, is developed with a breadth and penetration that will leave a deep impression on every thoughtful reader. It is particularly encouraging to find a German historian so fully aware

of the false premises on which German policy was based, both before 1914 and in the period between the wars. And if there is an element of pessimism in the final chapter, which sees a decline of the European idea after 1950 and a resurgence of the old obsolete nationalism, this must be modified in the light of at least some of the developments since the essay was written. And not only this, but all the other chapters are studded with perceptive and thought-provoking judgments on past events which have a valid bearing on the problems of the present. This is a book to be read carefully and to be reflected upon at leisure, for it illuminates matters that are of vital importance to the whole Western world.

EDGAR MCINNIS

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*Modern Russian Historiography.* By ANATOLE G. MAZOUR. Second edition. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company Inc. [Toronto: D. Van Nostrand Company (Canada) Limited]. 1958. Pp. xii, 260. \$7.75.

AT A TIME when university education is giving greater attention to the history of Russia, Anatole Mazour's survey of Russian historiography, recently revised, is welcome as an introductory handbook. Although this study treats only Russian historiography of Russia, it is valuable as an introduction to an important part of the intellectual and cultural history of Russia, which is too often passed over in general surveys. Such a study is especially needed because so much of the important historical literature on Russia is linguistically inaccessible to English-speaking readers and because so many of the works on Russian history in English are highly derivative, leaning heavily on such writers as Soloviev, Kliuchevsky, Platonov, and Miliukov. Readers of Russian who desire a guide to the chief works available, including many of the principal documentary collections, also will find this book worth their while, although its shortcomings will be more of a hindrance to such a reader.

The chapters treating Russian historiography before the nineteenth century are short but probably quite adequate for all but the specialist. Most of the important writers from the century preceding the Revolution receive enough critical attention, excepting a few important specialists such as Golubinsky, the authority on the history of the Orthodox Church. It is unfortunate that Mazour did not give similar attention to the deserving writers of the Soviet period, such as Grekov, who surely ranks with the better pre-revolutionary historians. Aside from a useful discussion of the works of Pokrovsky and Tarle, Mazour's treatment of the Soviet period emphasizes the development of the political line in historiography. This is undoubtedly important, but excessive concentration on the political environment of Soviet Russian historiography tends to overlook the really valuable work done by various Soviet historians, despite the rigors of the régime.

Sometimes Mazour's choice of words is puzzling. For example (p. 147): "With his characteristic wit [?], G. V. Plekhanov, in describing a debate between Shchapov and Chernyshevsky, referred to it as a verbal duel between a democrat and a social-democrat." At one point the organization of the study wants more care: a number of important writers, including Pavlov-Silvansky and Tugan-Baranovsky, are lumped in with the "federal" (that is, non-Great Russian) school of historiography despite the absence of any apparent connection.

In short, it is possible to imagine a considerably improved book on Russian historiography, preferably a study that would consider the relatively few important

works on Russian history by foreigners and the more valuable contributions of Soviet historians. In the absence of such a book, however, Mazour's survey remains a valuable introduction to Russian historiography.

ROBERT H. MCNEAL

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*King George VI: His Life and Reign.* By JOHN W. WHEELER-BENNETT. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited. 1958. Pp. xiv, 892. \$10.00.

WHILE NOT QUITE achieving the brilliance of Sir Harold Nicolson's *George V* this is a good book, interesting, informative, and authoritative. Sir Harold had the advantage of better perspective writing fifteen years after George V's death and was rather more fortunate in his sources than Mr. Wheeler-Bennett. George VI only kept a diary during the war years and did not follow his father's habit of recalling all important political conversations with his private secretary who duly recorded them for posterity. Nevertheless the Royal Archives still contain much valuable material for the reign of George VI which has enabled his biographer to write one of the few major historical works for the period to date. His reign was shorter and, as a reign, less significant than his father's but the biography of George VI is several hundred pages longer than that of George V because his biographer is less selective in dealing with his material.

The youth revealed in the frank early chapters of this biography held little promise of the King to be. However, despite an inauspicious start at the bottom of his class, his experience in the services brought out qualities that were to stand him in good stead when he later mounted the throne. Here and in his famous Boys' Camps which he organized as Duke of York after the First World War he developed that common touch that made him perhaps the most human King ever to sit on the British throne. The bond was strengthened by his determination to share the blitz with his fellow-Londoners and his wife undoubtedly voiced her husband's sentiments when she said: "I am glad we have been bombed. It makes me feel that we can look the East End in the face."

George VI shared his father's strong sense of duty, his natural loyalty to his ministers, his straightforward, common sense, non-intellectual approach to public affairs. He faced no great constitutional crises comparable to those of his father's reign, but took the duties of a constitutional monarch seriously and insisted on Bagehot's three rights—to be consulted, to encourage, and to warn. He was almost pathetically anxious to play his part, especially during the war when he fretted for a more active role, and it was characteristic of Churchill's warm and romantic nature that he was always ready to meet the King's frequent wish for consultation. We learn for instance of Churchill's acquiescence when early in 1944, alarmed by Smuts' gloomy prognostications about Overlord, the King phoned his Prime Minister and suggested that "we three" (Smuts, Churchill, and himself) should meet and have a word together about the plans for the operation. Churchill was less happy a little later when with very great reluctance he gave in to the King's strongly expressed opposition to his participation in the D-Day landings.

King George VI was also anxious whenever the occasion arose to address special communications to heads of other states in the tradition of his great-grandmother. Many of these letters are reproduced in this biography, but at times his ministers had to show tact in restraining him, as for instance on the eve of the Munich crisis when he wanted to address a personal appeal to Hitler as a fellow ex-serviceman! From the time of their meeting in 1939 he was on most friendly

terms with President Roosevelt with whom he kept up a personal correspondence during the war. "Why don't my ministers talk to me as the President did tonight?" he plaintively asked Mackenzie King after the three of them had spent an evening together chatting over world affairs in the drawing room at Hyde Park.

The royal visit of 1939 was primarily to Canada but 11 of the 14 pages allotted to it deal with the three days spent in the United States. Canadian readers will be interested to learn of Mackenzie King's determination to accompany George VI to Washington. According to Mr. Wheeler-Bennett: "... Mr. King had no intention, as he said, that 'the King should cast him aside at the frontier like an old boot.' He moved all heaven and earth in his determination to attend His Majesty to Washington. He harangued the Governor-General; he wrote with deep feeling to the King's Private Secretary; he telegraphed at length to Mr. Chamberlain. No stone was left unturned, no avenue unexplored." The King was informed that it lay within his prerogative to decide the question. The Canadian Prime Minister accompanied him to Washington.

We learn that George VI occasionally exerted important influence in the making of appointments, in a negative sense when he advised against sending Eden to India as Viceroy in 1943 on the grounds that he could not be spared—he had an unprecedented understanding with Churchill that in the event of the latter's death Eden should be called as his successor—and in a more positive sense in 1945 when he suggested Bevin for the Foreign Office *after* Attlee had proposed Dalton. Indeed by 1945 the King had acquired a wealth of experience greater than most of his ministers. He clearly felt that he had a responsibility to keep a tight rein on the Labour Government and he did not hesitate to warn his Labour Ministers when he thought they were going too fast. He shared his father's natural conservatism, combined with his innate sense of fair play, but his mind was instinctively more sympathetic to the case for social reform. His biographer emphasizes the strains of the years immediately following the war and the King's worries about the precarious financial and economic situation. After some initial shyness he appears to have gotten along well with his Labour Ministers, but he probably breathed more freely when his old favourite returned to office in 1951. By that time, however, his days were numbered and within a year the present reign had begun, allowing Churchill to add a final role to his long repertoire—that of another Lord Melbourne.

Later biographers will probably use more shading in their assessment of George VI's character and qualities, but within his imposed limitations Mr. Wheeler-Bennett has provided us with a most valuable and scholarly official biography of the late King that will long be an important historical source for his reign.

J. B. CONACHER

The University of Toronto

*On the Philosophy of History.* By JACQUES MARITAIN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1957. Pp. xii, 180. \$4.00.

*The Sense of History: Secular and Sacred.* By M. C. D'ARCY. London: Faber and Faber [Toronto: British Book Service (Canada) Limited]. 1959. Pp. 309. \$7.00.

NEITHER OF THESE books is concerned with history as the historian knows it. They deal with the philosophy of history which is speculation, more or less systematic,

about the meaning of human life. In this subject the word "history" refers to something more abstract than the materials, methods, and results of historians; and as Professor Maritain writes, "Good historians have a natural distrust for the philosophy of history." The reason for this, in his view, is that most such philosophies are spurious, being either historicist, like those of Spengler and Toynbee who have sought the meaning of history in the study of the subject itself, or else dogmatic like those of Hegel and Marx. He believes that the philosophy of history is a branch of moral philosophy and can never furnish a complete or final explanation; such partial insight as it offers must spring from the understanding conferred by the Christian faith.

Whereas Professor Maritain provides a sketch for a Thomist philosophy of history, Father D'Arcy makes a Catholic contribution to the controversies over historicism stimulated mainly by the works of Karl Popper. Less rigorous in his thinking but humane and truly catholic in scope (the book takes account of the views of scores of modern thinkers), Father D'Arcy argues against C. S. Lewis and others that the Christian may well study history for such meaning as he can find in it even though its final Meaning is to be revealed to him on the Last Day.

To many, it will be interesting to compare the attitudes of these two distinguished writers to the thought of Professor Toynbee (page 173 of Maritain's book conjures up the spectacle of himself and Toynbee each trying to contain the other within his own system while escaping inclusion within the system of the other). To many a non-Christian historian, however, both books will seem like a kind of poetry which has resulted from treating one particular set of documents not as historical evidence but as Divine testimony.

JOHN BOSHER

The University of British Columbia

## North American

*The Kensington Stone: A Mystery Solved.* By ERIK WAHLGREN. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1958. Pp. xiv, 228. \$5.00.

IN 1898 a farmer named Olof Ohman found—or pretended that he had found—a runic stone in Kensington, Minnesota. On the stone there was a Norse runic inscription, running as follows in modern English:

8 Swedes and 22 Norwegians on an exploration journey from Vinland westward. We had our camp by 2 rocky islets one day's journey north of this stone. We were out fishing one day. When we came home we found 10 men red with blood and dead. AVM save us from evil. We have 10 men by the sea to look after our ships, 14 days' journey from this island. Year 1362.

This stone was coldly received right from the beginning. The most competent Scandinavian authorities passed it off unanimously as "a crude fraud, perpetrated by a Swede with the aid of a chisel and a meagre knowledge of runic letters." This would probably have pushed the Kensington stone into oblivion altogether but for the energetic Norwegian-American writer, Hjalmar Holand, who in 1907 began to champion the view that the stone was genuine and has kept on supporting it ever since. The result has been that even a responsible author has referred to the stone as "probably the most important archaeological object yet found in North America," and in 1948-9 it was exhibited for a whole year in the distinguished Smithsonian Institute in New York.

All the fame that the stone has acquired, however, cannot hide the fact that most Scandinavian scholars and many others with knowledge of mediæval Norse, including runic experts, feel at the first glance that these runic inscriptions cannot possibly date from the Middle Ages and that the stone is bound to be a modern fake. Professor Erik Wahlgren, the author of a new book on the Kensington stone, in fact looks upon this as an established fact which hardly should require further discussion. The purpose of his book is much rather to bring everything in connection with the Kensington hoax to light, explore the soil from which it grew, discover the patterns on which the runes were based, and identify the man or the men most likely to have carried out the hoax. Further, Holand's role is dealt with and attempts made to explain his methods and his motives for keeping the faith in the Kensington stone alive at all costs.

All this matter is quite involved and has cost much research, but its conclusion is briefly as follows: Some Swedish (and Norwegian) countrymen in Minnesota, intelligent, humorous, fairly well read and with antiquarian and patriotic interests, took up the hobby of making runic letters, which they then carved on a stone, pretending that they had found it under the roots of an old tree. The letters were for the most part based on a Swedish book of encyclopaedic nature, *Den Kunskapsrike Skolmästaren*, but there is also distinct influence from contemporary debates on the old sagas and their accounts of discoveries of distant lands, and in particular from disputes regarding the Vinland sailings, associated with Gustav Storm, but these disputes took place in the last decade of the nineteenth century. The language of the inscriptions is for the most part modern Swedish that has been given an old appearance. The whole project was probably conceived as a harmless joke, and Wahlgren does not feel justified in condemning farmer Ohman and the other originators of the hoax. He quotes Sven B. F. Jansson's words: "It did not become a fraud in the true sense until . . . quantities of essays and articles were written in order to prove it genuine." This comment reflects on Hjalmar Holand above all others. The real blame is his, because whatever may be said in extenuation of his position it is not possible to clear him of the suspicion that he knows just as well as his opponents that the Kensington stone is nothing but a modern fake. Wahlgren does not say this in so many words, but he gives him a rough treatment all the same and shows him up again and again as an unsound scholar, to put it mildly.

Wahlgren's history of the Kensington stone makes very enjoyable reading. The style is lively and the matter is presented in all its aspects. We might expect this book with its point-blank thrust to destroy all faith in the Kensington stone, just as in the case of the famous English Piltdown man, which must be regarded as one of the most effective scientific forgeries of all times. But the Kensington stone lends itself more easily to deception. Its defenders will no doubt try and make a stand of some sort, and they will be supported by those who always reject reason when there is a far-fetched alternative. I predict that the exponents of the Kensington stone will make themselves heard once again.

KRISTJÁN ELDJÁRN

Reykjavík

*The Story of Canada.* By DONALD CREIGHTON. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada. 1959. Pp. 291. \$3.50.

THIS IS A valuable book, although it attempts to say nothing new and is an addition to an already long list. School texts aside, the last thirty years have seen about fifteen general, one-volume, surveys of Canadian history. None of them



has had a wider influence than Professor Creighton's *Dominion of the North*. First published in the United States, it has been read by Canadians ever since. Its freshness, like that of the other short histories that appeared in 1942-53, cannot now be fully restored for professional historians. Further revisions will hardly turn it into its own successor. But the book can retain its original impact for a wider, and particularly for a younger, public. For such a purpose it would be better cut in half. That is what the author has now done, to make *The Story of Canada*.

His publisher has provided a handsome jacket, a decent binding and a good format. The maps from the second edition of *Dominion of the North* have not been improved, and one has been omitted; on the other hand, the first ten of the sixteen illustrations are excellent.

In 266 pages of text, the author has very wisely aimed at history as Macaulay defined it: "a list of facts and an entertaining story." Very little explicit analysis remains. Explanatory digressions from the narrative have been avoided. The chapters have been divided and given catchier titles, but there is no "writing down." The essential synthesis of the older book emerges, undistorted if unqualified, from the new one. So, of course, does the author's position on contemporary issues. The title of the last chapter, "The First Elizabethan Age," is in itself a statement of that strain of Canadianism for which Professor Creighton is so notable a spokesman.

S. R. MEALING

Carleton University

*Histoire de la Chambre de Commerce de Québec, 1809-1959*. By FERNAND OUELLET. Québec: Centre de recherche de la Faculté de Commerce de l'Université Laval; *Histoire économique*, no. 1. 1959. Pp. 105.

THIS WELL-PRINTED booklet, issued by the Faculté de Commerce of the Université Laval, is a promising beginning of a projected series of studies in Canadian economic history. It is also itself a valuable addition to the historical literature of Canadian economic development, and of a somewhat neglected part of the Canadian economy, the port and region of Quebec.

The study is concerned, of course, with the origin and work of the Chamber itself as an agency of civic promotion, and as such has a special interest, for not a great deal is known of these ever present but little-studied bodies.

M. Ouellet sets his study, however, very firmly in the full setting of Canadian economic development. In consequence the brochure is in effect a commentary, from 1809 to 1879 in particular, and based on the records of the Quebec Chamber, on the Canadian economy and Canadian economic policy. This reviewer was struck by the resolution with which the Chamber faced the new world of free trade after 1846; by the sharpness of the economic decline of Quebec after 1874 with the rise of the port of Montreal and the decline of wooden ship-building; by the prolonged economic crises in the Quebec region from the 1920's to the last decade, when at length regional industry and the beginning of winter shipping promised to restore the city to something of its ancient prosperity.

If, as may be expected, the succeeding numbers are of equal interest, the Faculté de Commerce of Laval will have made a useful addition to the economic historiography of Quebec and Canada.

W. L. MORTON

The University of Manitoba

*Canadian Monetary, Banking and Fiscal Development.* By R. CRAIG MCIVOR. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited. 1958. Pp. xx, 263. \$4.75.

PROFESSOR MCIVOR's study covers the full sweep of Canadian monetary and banking history. It begins with the currency difficulties in the primitive economy of New France and ends with the "tight money" controversy which was an issue in the federal election of 1957. The description of the historical events and the analysis of the problems which arose over this long period are both presented with a commendable economy of words. Professor McIvor sticks closely to his subject and devotes a minimum of space to the surrounding industrial, political, or social circumstances. It is assumed that the reader is familiar with this background. This approach has enabled the author to present an unbroken picture of the development of the monetary and banking institutions of the country. In this respect Professor McIvor's study has distinct advantages over virtually all of the discursive literature which has been devoted to this subject in the past.

The study is focused mainly on the development of the Canadian chartered banks. This is to be expected because of the predominant role which these institutions have played in Canadian monetary affairs since the founding of the Bank of Montreal in 1817. The Bank of Montreal became the model for the banks which were later established in both Upper and Lower Canada. The Articles of Association of the Bank of Montreal are of particular historical interest because they contain many of the provisions which are characteristic of the present Canadian banking system. Professor McIvor states: "There is no doubt that the Articles were taken directly from the constitution of the First Bank of the United States, a document devised by Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury of the new republic."

From the outset the influences from the United States were significant. The Bank of Montreal and other pioneer banks established close relations with the New York money market. During the 1840's and 1850's a separate Canadian currency was brought into being based on the decimal system of the United States. The British government opposed this development because "... it was believed that the adoption of a decimal currency system similar to that of the United States would greatly increase the dangers of political annexation." However, a distinctively Canadian banking and monetary system did evolve in response to the needs of a widely scattered population and the circumstances which exist in an economy which is dependent on the production of staples for the export market. Professor McIvor's study presents a detailed analysis of this evolution as revealed in practical experience and the development of legislation. A noteworthy feature of the role of experience is the failure of the attempt to establish a "free banking" system under the Free Banking Act of 1850. Although the legislation remained on the books for thirty years the small local unit banks which were envisaged did not take root. Under Canadian conditions the advantages of branch banking were decisive.

Conservatism has been a feature of Canadian banking and monetary affairs. Professor McIvor ascribes this characteristic to the restraining influence of the Colonial Office in the pre-Confederation period and to exclusive federal jurisdiction in matters of money and banking after 1867. Under these circumstances it was more difficult to engage in "cheap money" experiments than in the United States, where the individual states had greater scope. In Canada, questionable monetary ventures have been indulged in only rarely and never on any large and protracted scale.

The Canadian banking system has always been highly centralized, and until 1914 it was also extremely simple in its structure and operations. After 1914 the Canadian monetary and banking system was transferred from a semi-automatic gold standard mechanism to the managed mechanism which it is today. The Finance Act of 1914 and the establishment of the Bank of Canada in 1934 were the means by which this change was brought about. Professor McIvor's discussion of the requirements of war finance in two World Wars and his analysis of the problems of depression and reconstruction, constitute a convenient summary of the circumstances which have shaped our present machinery for the control of monetary matters. Here, as in the earlier parts of the study, Professor McIvor does not attempt to present a careful appraisal of the policies which were adopted and applied. That is a pity. However, his analysis of events after 1945 includes a critical examination of the failure to apply monetary restriction soon enough during the post-war period of rapidly rising prices. His skilful use of hindsight in this respect has provided a very valuable background to our present difficulties regarding the problem of persistent inflation.

Professor McIvor's scholarly study is a timely contribution to the discussion of Canadian banking and monetary affairs, which in recent years have again come to the forefront of public attention.

J. J. DEUTSCH

Queen's University

*History as Romantic Art: Bancroft, Prescott, Motley, and Parkman.* By DAVID LEVIN. Stanford Studies in Language and Literature, XX. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1959. Pp. xii, 260. \$5.50.

IN THIS excellently documented book the author has demonstrated clearly that the four historians in question wrote history in terms of a common point of view. This outlook was related to their background and experience, including their Unitarian religion, and to the Romanticist code of the time. This led them all to see history as useful and "elevating" only when it was written to convey a great message, the message of progress, progress towards political and intellectual liberty, democracy, and humanity. This could best be accomplished if the historian saw and emphasized the poetic and dramatic aspects of human development: the parts played by great representative men embodying the spirit of a people, a nation, an age; the roles of the nations, each with its own distinctive place in the march of progress; the rise and fall of empires and societies as they fulfilled their functions on the stage of history and progress passed them by.

This view made history a grand drama in which heroes and heroic nations stand forth, and human development is seen as a vast struggle between good and evil in which the final triumph of right and reason is assured. To such a concept of history the literary conventions of Romanticism were admirably suited. If this assessment had its limitations, as the author indicates: making the historian select only subjects fit for such treatment; leading to oversimplification of pattern; to an underestimation of the complexity of personal character; and to an incapacity to enter into experiences such as total religious commitment, it nonetheless represents in the author's mind a more effective and perhaps not less truthful presentation of history than the "scientific monographs" of a later date.

Whether it is the effective influence of these historians and of others writing in the same vein or simply the persistence into our time of Romantic views may be a matter of debate, but one is strongly impressed with the extent to which the ideas expressed by these four historians have been incorporated into our traditional

historical teaching. They are to be found everywhere, in text, lecture, and thesis, not least of all in the minds of students.

It is to be regretted that the author did not do more than he did to show the relationship of this American historical writing to the wider intellectual world of the day. Despite limited allusions to Macaulay, Carlyle, Mably, Schiller, and other English and European historians, far too little is made of the fact that these New England historians were writing not only within the ambit of American thought but quite as much in that of a Romantic generation which was as fully represented in England, Germany, and France as in the United States.

Whatever he did not do, and although the study is conceived primarily as a literary evaluation, Mr. Levin has produced a work of first-rate importance to the historiographer. That a historian and a literary man should find so much in common is perhaps a demonstration of the book's main argument, that history is a literary art. However that may be, no historian, thoughtful about his task, could fail to find this a highly stimulating book.

RICHARD M. SAUNDERS

The University of Toronto

*Quest for Franklin.* By NOEL WRIGHT. London: Heinemann [Toronto: British Book Service (Canada) Limited]. 1959. Pp. xii, 258. \$5.75.

ADMIRAL WRIGHT justifies this revision of the orthodox 1859 version of the Franklin disaster by the naive plea that "in those days there had been no Conan Doyle to reveal how mysteries could be solved by correct processes of reasoning," and his readers will suspect that he has unwittingly been seduced by the thriller technique into first establishing his conclusion, and then making a judicious selection of only those data which support and adorn it. By fondling friendly witnesses and frowning on the rest, by lending serious ear to the "Bayne" story (which was too much for even the credulous Charles Francis Hall to swallow), he has modified McClintock's reconstruction of what happened at King William Island in the years 1847-8 in a manner that is more grandiose than it is significant. Sometimes the argument—in the instance, notably, of the frozen corpse on the derelict—borders on the grotesque. The circumstantial and puzzling report of the brig *Renovation* is the author's only valuable piece of evidence, but while asserting his own faith in its validity, he ought to have cautioned his readers that of the two most capable and original captains in the Franklin search, Inglefield expressed scepticism, while McClintock treated it with a silence more eloquent than any utterance of disbelief. The latter would hardly have appealed to his men to remain in the Arctic until the missing ships were traced had he deemed it possible that they had floated away into the Atlantic eight years before.

We must confess that we are sorry to see this heroic old saga done up with fanciful and flimsy embellishments which accord so ill with the massive simplicity of its central figure. The doubtful value of the argumentative parts of this book is the more to be regretted since its author has a real gift for presenting naval history in a popular and lively form. His reading is extensive; his judgements of those men who are not key witnesses, though lacking in dignity and restraint, are generally just and penetrating. The non-controversial parts of *Quest for Franklin* hardly add up to an adequate survey of the fascinating epoch in Arctic history embraced by the years 1819-59, but they prove what an excellent work Admiral Wright could produce if he made mere narrative his aim.

L. H. NEATBY

Acadia University

*Canada in World Affairs: From UN to NATO, 1946-1949.* By ROBERT A. SPENCER.  
Issued under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.  
Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. xii, 447. \$5.00.

DR. SPENCER'S VOLUME fills an important gap in a now well-established series and, be it said at once, fills it admirably. The book covers the period from the abortive Paris Peace Conference of 1946 to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and records *inter alia* the retreat of the Canadian government from cherished designs for a near-universal system of international security to active participation in the regional security agreement, which has constituted the foundation of Western cooperation for the last decade. The contraction in Canadian aims is self-evident, but only a careful reconstruction of the sequence of events makes clear how slowly and reluctantly it came to be accepted.

The assumption by the Canadian government of greater commitments to the United Nations in the form of membership of the Security Council—a body with a discouraging record as Mr. St. Laurent described it at the time—indicated a resolve to give the United Nations all possible opportunity of recovery before turning to less ambitious alternatives. One consequence was, as Dr. Spencer notes, that the period of Canada's greatest participation in the U.N. organization saw both a decline in its prestige and a search for an alternative means of collective security. And as the idea of a North Atlantic Treaty grew and was translated into action "the United Nations was relegated to a position of secondary importance." It says much both for the crudity of Soviet diplomacy and for the skill and patience of the Canadian administration that at the last Mr. Lester Pearson was left winding up the debate in the House of Commons on the North Atlantic Treaty, with a persuasive speech and no one to persuade!

The Canadian role in the major developments of these three years was a significant but not a decisive one. The principal achievement of this book is to place in perspective the Canadian contribution to policies of which Canada could not, by reason of her relative lack of power, be the principal architect. Moreover, Canadian policy, thoughtful and well-considered as it usually was, adhered to a well-established, unspectacular tradition. In deciding between right and wrong, notes Dr. Spencer, with nice understatement, the bolder course was not always taken—though he adds this could usually be explained by realistic political considerations. The consequent and necessary careful assessment of such considerations does not make for the easy narration of Canada's activities as a secondary power in the complex of post-war great power politics and here Dr. Spencer is careful not to oversimplify his story and to balance very considerable achievements in economic and social fields with the frustrations that accompanied the debate of almost all major international issues.

As a historian the author is conscious of the gaps in the evidence available to him, of the complete absence of private papers, and the limited accessibility of official correspondence. It would, for example, be essential to study the unpublished communications that passed between the Canadian and United Kingdom governments in early 1948 before attempting any final assessment of the influence of Canada on United Kingdom policy at this time—or, for that matter, of the United Kingdom upon Canadian policy. But if, as Dr. Spencer sensibly and modestly concedes, this is not the time or place for attempting final assessments, it is a time when a straightforward narrative based securely on the printed evidence available can profitably be made. Within these limitations, which will presumably remain for some forty years, Dr. Spencer's book is an authoritative contribution to the study of Canadian policy. It is enriched by a section on

Commonwealth developments and a concluding chapter on the planning and conduct of Canadian foreign policy. This last chapter contains material of interest to students of comparative politics. Dr. Spencer has properly noted the exceptional calibre of many of the higher officials in the Department of External Affairs at that time and explored some of the consequences that flowed from the reliance placed upon them. In Parliament ministerial statements were often followed by debate which dropped well below the level that had been set, in part, at least, because the Opposition parties had not the knowledge, let alone the information, adequate to match that available to the government. Further, in Dr. Spencer's view, the more coherent policy developed under Mr. St. Laurent's leadership led to such a high degree of professional competency when Mr. Lester Pearson succeeded him in September 1948 that "there developed a danger of assuming that a plausible, lucidly expounded policy must necessarily be the wisest one" (p. 406). One pays a price for everything!

NICHOLAS MANSERGH

St. John's College  
Cambridge

*Benjamin Harrison, Hoosier Statesman: From the Civil War to the White House, 1865-1888.* By HARRY J. SIEVERS. New York: University Publishers Inc. 1959. Pp. xxii, 502. \$6.00.

LIKE THE Victorians before them, the Americans are now turning, in their spacious years, to the preparation of monumental authorized biographies. One of these projects is Father Sievers's three-volume life of Benjamin Harrison, the second volume of which is under review. Three volumes to "Little Ben" Harrison, who but for the fact that he became twenty-third President of the United States, would have been indistinguishable from dozens of other Republican politicians in the years after the Civil War!

Harrison is the classic party regular, expressing the attitudes of his period and section so perfectly that his figure is almost lost in the political landscape of the Grant era. The man who could assert without embarrassment that "Republicanism represented the moral conscience of the people of America" is not likely to strike us with a particular impact today. With his celebrated surname and his Civil War reputation as a passport, Harrison rose to eminence through the process by which the Grand Army of the Republic transformed itself into the Republican party militant. No one could wave the "bloody shirt" more triumphantly, nor display a more fervent, and uncritical, enthusiasm for liberal pensions for the Union veterans. The virtues of tariff protection were self-evident to Harrison; civil service reform to him was encompassed in the proposition that "to remove the Democrats and put in Republicans . . . must improve the service."

It is small wonder, with attitudes such as these, that Harrison's undeviating obedience to the Republican party earned him the presidency in 1888. Yet even here, luck played its part. If Blaine had chosen to run, Harrison would never have received the nomination; if Cleveland had gained 14,000 more votes in New York State he would have secured a majority in the electoral college as he had already done in the popular vote.

Father Sievers gives no indication that he is conscious of the mediocrity of his subject. Supported by the Arthur Jordan Foundation of Indianapolis, and aware that Harrison has never had a modern biography, he seems convinced that because Harrison is the only resident of Indiana ever to have reached the White House, he deserves our respectful attention for three volumes. Thus in the present work



we have almost 500 pages devoted to Harrison's middle years, with another volume to come covering his four years as President. To a Hoosier of Republican sympathies this may appear a proper emphasis, but to an outsider it is a little like using a sledge-hammer to crack a nut. All the apparatus of scholarship is here in painstaking detail, but the significance of the personality it illuminates is lacking.

It is probably unfair to judge the larger biography by this middle volume, which portrays the sordid and unexciting way in which Republican presidential candidates were made in the post-Civil War era. Harrison, for all his orthodoxy, was an honest man at a time when honest men in public life were rare. Any man who later earned the enmity of bosses like Quay and Platt obviously deserves some commendation. Yet for the present we are dealing with a volume depicting Harrison's career within the Republican party, when the nomination was his supreme goal. In this context Harrison emerges as the safe candidate, not beholden to the party leaders. His stature in 1888, at the end of the volume, is indicated by the remark he made to Quay after the election: "Providence has given us the victory." Quay's reply was in keeping: Harrison "would never know how close a number of men were compelled to approach the penitentiary to make him President!" We shall look forward to some evidence of growth on the part of Harrison in the volume which will conclude this biography.

D. M. L. FARR

Carleton University

*Canada Made Me.* By NORMAN LEVINE. London: Putnam [Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Limited]. 1958. Pp. 277. \$5.00.

BOTH THE librarian and the historian will have trouble with this odyssey of a returning prodigal son in search of failure. It is not a travel book and certainly not a traveller's guide; yet Norman Levine describes a trans-Canadian journey. It is not an analysis of Canadian mores; although in every chapter Canadian stones are overturned to see what pathetic, self-centered, ugly little creatures are crawling underneath. There is historical reminiscence, reportage, autobiography, social comment, literary portraiture, down and out philosophy and, throughout, images of the furtive sexual delights of repressed adolescence. Perhaps a psychologist would be best fitted to decide the correct shelf on which to place this repulsively fascinating soul-baring of a professional odd man out fleeing through the mammon-choked sewers of Canada from his *bourgeois* tormentors.

Whatever the shelf, the historian of the Canadian cultural scene cannot ignore *Canada Made Me*. It is a social and literary document. For all its schoolboyish concentration upon cultural genitalia, it is a revealing, although distorted action-shot of a shapeless nation whose constantly changing pattern is to be seen in the cycle of immigrant arrival and tourist departure: the immigrant, unlovely and boorish, in search of a prosperous future; the tourist crazily chasing an unrecoverable, plumbingless past.

Nostalgically and vindictively, with love and with hate, Norman Levine scents out decadence, futility, hypocrisy, social pretentiousness, and human foibles wherever he can find them—on board ship, in fifth-rate hotels, in fashionable synagogues, in slaughter-houses, in strip-tease joints and brothels, and even in the private homes of his Canadian hosts. Bewailing a Canadian quality of "sameness," he contrasts the dullness and boredom of a small town nation with his rich, fertile, earthy, rural paradise in the English countryside where the inscriptions on public lavatories are more literate.

This self-portrait of a Canadian writer, who has half-turned his back even on those parts of Canada which appear to be dearest to him, is also significant as a mirror of certain aspects of the Canadian literary scene. This book was published in London, not in Toronto. Canada for such an author as Levine seems to contain nothing but fatted calves, and certainly no literary heroes. This emotional expatriation is seen even in his style which is a blending of Isherwood, Henry Miller, and Nathanael West. His not very probing vignettes of Montreal Babbity are imitative and reflective of the reigning literary lights of the twenties and thirties; whereas they could and should have been contemporary critiques of the culture of 1958. That Levine feels compelled to be an exile suggests that Canada in the 1950's, like the United States in the 1920's, is a hostile environment for home-grown prophets, especially those who clothe their criticisms in an essentially non-Canadian literary language.

HECTOR G. KINLOCH

Yale University

*Three Centuries and the Island: A Historical Geography of Settlement and Agriculture in Prince Edward Island, Canada.* By ANDREW HILL CLARK. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1959. Pp. xiv, 287, maps. \$10.00.

TWO CONTRASTING opinions about Prince Edward Island in its early years were expressed by Jacques Cartier and William Cobbett. "The whole," said Cartier, "is low and flat, the most beautiful that it is possible to see and full of fine trees and meadows." Cobbett, on the other hand, described "a rascally heap of sand, rock, and swamp, called Prince Edward Island, in the horrible Gulf of St. Lawrence . . . that lump of worthlessness . . . bears nothing but potatoes." Both opinions were founded on reasonable observation—the first on the abundance of natural advantages with which nature endowed the Island, the second on the results of men's misuse of those advantages.

A good study of the geography and agricultural history of Prince Edward Island has, therefore, an interesting story to tell. Such a book is A. H. Clark's. It will be welcomed not only by scholars for whom it describes a special area of colonial development, but also by any local farmer or politician who seeks a practical interpretation of methods and affairs in his province's basic industry. The text is well written in excellent style, not an easy achievement in a book crammed with valuable facts and statistics, and the author's judgments are frank and sensible. There are 155 good maps. The care that went into these is amply justified by the illustration and emphasis which they give the text.

The book begins with a study of Acadian attempts at settlement which were always frustrated by hardship, isolation, and the indifference of French administrators. Later, the same theme is played in a different key, because, after 1763, the British authorities were no more certain of what they should do with such a small colony than the French had been. Because she was a pawn in colonial politics, but not a vital one, history, as Leacock said, passed her by. The result, as Professor Clark points out, was many mistakes. The absentee landlord system was, of course, the worst, and, because it lasted a century, its effects are still felt in local affairs.

Despite early troubles and a late start, Island agriculture soon revealed what could be done. The author takes us through the early nineteenth century to what has been called the Island's golden age, the period 1850–70, when farming, fishing, ship building, and lumbering were at their best. At this point local politicians vied with their colonial predecessors in making blunders when they mishandled

responsible government and were unprepared for the economic and political adjustments made necessary by Confederation.

The later portions of the book describe each phase of agriculture and its place in the economy and conclude with an interesting discussion of the people themselves. Professor Clark concludes that "patterns of agricultural land use were much more closely associated with those reflecting the character of settlement than those of natural endowment." "The Island was a 'melting pot' or 'mixing pot' in the usual North American sense, but the ingredients were slow to blend." He is quite right and these observations are as valid of life on the Island today as they have always been. I might add that the turbulence of politics in a tiny area with a big system of government has continually upset agriculture. Put a bulldozer's engine in a light farm tractor and the work is bound to be complicated.

FRANK MACKINNON

Prince of Wales College  
Charlottetown

*The Canadian Army, 1855-1958: Regimental Histories and a Guide to the Regiments.* Compiled by C. E. DORNBUSCH. Cornwallville, N.Y.: Hope Farm Press, 1959. Pp. 216, illus. \$6.00.

ALTHOUGH THE Canadian Army—and the Militia has been to all intents and purposes the Canadian Army—may be looked upon as taking its origin in 1673, when Frontenac reported to Paris that he had appointed captains in the various *côtes* and instructed them to train the inhabitants in military exercises, Canadian regiments of the present day date only from 1855 when the first volunteer units were authorized under the Militia Act of 1855. Admittedly, there are some regiments which, in an effort to give themselves a regimental tradition, trace their ancestry to the Loyalist Corps which fought the Americans during the Revolutionary War. But claims such as these, based as they usually are only upon the fact that military bodies have existed from time to time within specified areas, or upon a continuity of personnel within several units, have never been regarded with favour by the Historical Section in Ottawa. In this Canadians appear to be rather more rigid than the British who are inclined to look with sympathy and understanding upon the dubious genealogical trees of some of their famous units. However that may be, Dr. Dornbusch has ample justification for selecting 1855 as the starting point for his guide to the regiments of Canada.

This book does several things. It provides a list of all the regiments presently comprising the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps and the Royal Canadian Infantry Corps; it gives brief sketches of their histories from date of authorization through successive reorganizations to the present; and it includes a Bibliography of regimental histories (books, articles, manuals, and unit publications), which is truly remarkable for its range. If only for this Bibliography all historians interested in Canadian military history must acknowledge a debt of gratitude to Dr. Dornbusch.

In view of what Dr. Dornbusch has accomplished it may seem a trifle ungrateful to introduce a critical note into this review. Unfortunately the book does contain a few errors. Most of these have been corrected in a mimeographed addenda which has since been distributed, but some still remain. The 96th District of Algoma Rifles referred to on page 17 is not subsequently mentioned on page 77 where it should appear under "infantry." Moreover, Militia Orders, upon which Dr. Dornbusch relied for so much of his information, are not infallible. Particularly is this true of the early days of the Department of Militia when clerks were

not always careful to list the regimental names correctly when publishing appointments and promotions. It is obviously a faulty entry of this nature which led to the confusion about the Princess of Wales' Own Rifles, on page 105.

In spite of these errors—and they are really quite insignificant—the fact remains that Dr. Dornbusch's guide is a reliable, useful, and complete compilation. No library and no Canadian military historian can afford to be without a copy.

GEORGE F. G. STANLEY

The Royal Military College of Canada

*Church and State in Canada West: Three Studies in the Relation of Denominationalism and Nationalism, 1841–1867.* By JOHN S. MOIR. Canadian Studies in History and Government, no. 1, edited by J. M. S. CARELESS. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1959. Pp. xvi, 223. \$4.75.

IN THIS BOOK the author sets forth, in the words of the sub-title, "Three Studies in the Relation of Denominationalism and Nationalism, 1841–1867." The studies with which he deals are the Clergy Reserves 1839–1857, the University Question 1840–1867, and Religion and Elementary Education 1841–1867. Approaching each of these topics dialectically he states his thesis in terms of "centrifugal denominationalism," the European idea of an established church with a claim to special privilege from the state. The antithesis he calls "centripetal nationalism," the force tried and tested in the United States which in Canada West "sought to equate all creeds by separating them completely from the world of politics." Elements of a synthesis he discovers in the compromises which emerged as solutions to these three problems. For example, the Reserves were indeed secularized and the rectory lands were eventually sold, but the churches which believed in state support received partial compensation from that source. King's College, Toronto, was secularized and the Anglican claim to privilege in university education was rejected, yet denominational colleges affiliated with the new University of Toronto came into being. A school system was adopted dissimilar from that of Canada East, and, it may be added, still more unlike that of Newfoundland where centrifugal denominationalism may be said to have triumphed. Yet the centripetal influence of a national educational system gained by no means a complete victory when it is recalled that Roman Catholics succeeded in developing separate schools with provincial support.

The author is definitely unsympathetic with the viewpoint of centrifugal denominationalism, and he makes no great effort to enter into the minds of those who held conservative opinions on church-state relations, yet he arrives at impartial and judicious conclusions. One must agree with his summing-up of the Clergy Reserves controversy when he states that disestablishment (or, more precisely, disendowment) "was a blessing to the Churches of England and Scotland and to the province as a whole."

Professor Moir has read widely in the newspapers of the period. He has also made himself master of the intricate political groupings of Canada West and the statutes by means of which the legislature of United Canada sought to resolve the religio-political tensions of the vital quarter century which preceded Confederation. He documents his work fully by including one thousand references to sources. His writing demands the reader's close attention but it yields rewards in terms of a deeper understanding of the political and religious convictions which swayed men's minds a century ago. His book is a useful contribution to the complex history of Canada West in the days when that province was associated politically with Canada East.

Occasional slips appear. "Diocese of Montreal" (p. 29) should read "Diocese of Quebec." G. J. Mountain administered the Anglican Diocese of Quebec under the title of Bishop of Montreal from 1837 to 1850, but the Diocese of Montreal was not set up nor a bishop appointed until the latter year. The *Church* newspaper was printed up to 1856 (p. 5). In 1852-3 it bore the name *Canadian Churchman* but it reverted to the earlier name for the remainder of its career. Another *Canadian Churchman* was published from 1862 to about 1870. The *Echo* was founded in 1851, not in 1852 (p. 5). Some twenty typographical errors have escaped the proof-reader's eye.

In an *obiter dictum* Professor Moir charges the Canadian churches with ignoring their pasts. In another he states flatly, and all too accurately, that "Church histories in Canada are few in number and generally inferior in scholarship." If the sound workmanship of *Church and State in Canada West* stimulates further intensive study of Canada's religious heritage and the production of more and better books about the place of the churches in our national story, the author will have done Canadian church history a good turn.

THOMAS R. MILLMAN

Wycliffe College

*Canada in World Affairs, 1953 to 1955.* By DONALD C. MASTERS. Issued under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. viii, 223. \$3.50.

APPOINTED Secretary of State in 1948, Mr. L. B. Pearson had by 1953 achieved a position of great prestige at home and abroad, which he would enhance by his actions in the ensuing years. It is not surprising, therefore, that in his survey of Canada's foreign policy between 1953 and 1955, Professor Masters should centre his attention on the role of Mr. Pearson in the formulation and implementation of our foreign policy. He sees Mr. Pearson as a forthright, honest, liberal humanist—suspicious of dogmatism in politics or religion, confident that the moral instinct of the people will make possible political and social progress. Viewing the world in this way, Mr. Pearson's natural inclination is towards conciliation and the search for small but steady advances in the resolution of international tensions.

The core of the manifold issues with which Mr. Pearson and his colleagues were constantly preoccupied in those years was the continuing and complex menace of the U.S.S.R. As a power too small to defend ourselves and yet too powerful to be ignored, we were obliged to seek outside assistance but were able, within limits, to influence those whose aid we sought, a situation which was clearly revealed in our relations with the United States, and with NATO. Then too, there were points at which we could bring our influence to bear directly, but only in so far as our internal circumstances would admit. In consequence, the Canadian government collaborated closely with the United States, but strove to act as a partner, not as a sycophant; it attempted to strengthen NATO as a counterweight to American influence and laboured vigorously but cautiously in the United Nations to resolve specific international crises.

Professor Masters' analysis of Mr. Pearson's manipulation of these basic themes in our external relations is both lucid and succinct. At the same time, it invites certain comments. Many Canadians like to think that we have now attained maturity and that we are no longer preoccupied with matters of status. Implicitly, however, much of what Dr. Masters has recorded is concerned with this very question—the only difference is that we now focus our attention on the United States and the United Nations, especially the former. One might well ask—and this is no criticism of Dr. Masters—is this a legitimate preoccupation in present

circumstances or if it is, is not our policy of intimate association with the United States the best way of defeating our own end?

In the second place, without being unkind, we may well wonder why the author has failed to challenge our customary picture of ourselves. We are depicted as sane, honest, objective, and conciliatory negotiators, anxious to effect compromise solutions abroad as at home. Again, one may ask—are we really a nation of “compromisers” or are we in fact a nation skilful at promoting this image of ourselves? Surely one must also question the wisdom of those who think conciliation and compromise the keys to the solution of international problems. How much time has been wasted in U.N. committees and at international conferences in a search for compromise solutions. We might begin by recognizing that compromise is only possible between those whose basic assumptions are similar.

Of course, it may be argued that, in a survey of this kind, questions such as these cannot readily be raised. But this simply raises the broader issue of the value of such a survey. If it does not appear almost immediately after the events described, can we not urge that a thorough, critical analysis be undertaken? Do not surveys of this type help to perpetuate the image of perfection which surrounds our Department of External Affairs? Even so, it should be added that Professor Masters’ description of our actions at a critical point in the past will be of value in the reappraisal of our policies which ought to be in progress at present. It is a matter of regret that the Oxford Press has joined the growing number of publishers which tolerate a sizable number of misprints.

G. S. FRENCH

McMaster University

*The Liberal Party in Alberta: A History of Politics in the Province of Alberta, 1905–1921.* By L. G. THOMAS. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1959. Pp. xii, 230. \$5.50.

LIKE THE Martins and McCoys, Alberta politicians have often seemed like reckless mountain boys. Rarely have they played politics by traditional rules; or perhaps just their team names have been unique. Still for sixteen years Alberta parties fought under orthodox banners. In the eighth volume of the “Social Credit in Alberta” series, Professor L. G. Thomas has examined this period. The work is best described by its sub-title since it deals with the activities of all parties, not just the continuous Liberal ascendancy. His conclusion is that the one party state, more evident now than ever in Alberta and elsewhere, was born with the province. In reality Alberta never rejected the non-partisan tradition of territorial days. Professor Thomas has not explained why this is so in an entirely satisfactory manner.

In 1905 the Rutherford Liberals were presented with office by the parent party in Ottawa, and once in control of the government they were virtually unchallenged for sixteen years. The Conservatives never threatened seriously, except perhaps momentarily in 1910 when they might have united with a group of rebel Liberals. But even in this crisis, which centred on charges of corruption connected with the Alberta and Great Waterways Railway, the reigning party was saved by the federal Liberals’ watch-dog, Lieutenant-Governor Bulyea. Showing superb finesse, he replaced Rutherford (perhaps more sinned against than sinning) with Chief Justice Arthur Sifton, and kept the insurgents at bay. The Alberta Liberal child, despite further growing pains which occasionally sapped its vitality, survived its parent by ten years, though senescence rapidly followed Sifton’s departure for Ottawa in 1917. By 1921 it was no match for the fire-eating farmers. That the U.F.A. rather than the Tories were the beneficiaries of the Liberal collapse was



apparently because the Conservatives had failed to build on rock. Their support came largely from voters who resented the introduction of party politics into the province and this sand was easily swept up in the U.F.A. tide.

In practice there was never any clear distinction between Liberals and Conservatives. Both stressed development and gradually espoused "progressive" causes. What the Government did, the Opposition claimed it could do better. This, at least, was in the orthodox Canadian tradition. The important struggles went on within the Liberal organization. Sectional jealousies, personal ambitions, and rivalry between federal and provincial leaders persistently threatened party unity. This internecine strife was accompanied by an acute sensitivity to outside pressures. In 1921 an M.L.A. evoked laughter by asking if a proposed measure had the "blessing of Mr. Wood and the U.F.A." Laugh they might, but many proposals did receive prior U.F.A. sanction. The U.F.A. and Social Credit governments continued rather than initiated this dubious practice, which by undermining the Opposition contributed to one-party rule.

By 1921 the Liberals seemed to be singing so well in tune with the agrarian chorus, that one wonders why the U.F.A. decided to follow a line of independence. The Government was old, tired, incompetent and "adrift in the economic blizzard." The latter suggests that the explanation is to be found beyond the borders of Alberta; provincial governments were impotent in the face of post-war economic recession. But even before 1921 federal political developments had weakened the Alberta Liberals. Surely the most important factor in the destruction of the "old" parties, at all levels, took place in 1917, that *annus mirabilis* of twentieth century Canadian politics. The Unionist movement was a non-partisan affair which undermined the old parties in the West: undermined the Liberals because they opposed conscription, and later undermined the Unionists, partly because they favoured it—for farmers' sons. But the Unionist enterprise was floated on watered stock, and for various reasons, rapidly collapsed. The chief weakness of this book lies in its failure to give adequate attention to the interaction of federal and provincial affairs. After all, the Liberal party in Alberta was part of the Liberal party in Canada. Perhaps, too, a more extensive consideration of the peculiar nature of Alberta progressivism would have helped to explain why Liberals and farmers failed to coalesce as they did in neighbouring Saskatchewan.

Another, though somewhat unfair, criticism arises from the limitations of the material used by the author. Since few private letters were available, newspapers were the main source of information. But newspapers do not always report the true inwardness of political manoeuvres. Thus many incidents are viewed from the outside, and conclusions can only be tentative. The smell of sulphur is often present, but its source remains obscure.

Though the author's reluctance to draw any general conclusions perhaps detracts from the book's interest, Professor Thomas has nevertheless provided much useful background to an understanding of Alberta's political heresy.

RAMSAY COOK

The University of Toronto

*The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War.* By JOHN W. SPANIER. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1959. Pp. xii, 311. \$8.50.

THE BELKNAP PRESS is a special branch of Harvard University Press which has funds for the publication, in the field of American history and culture, of "books of outstanding quality." It can be congratulated for having produced this well-

printed monograph by Professor Spanier of the University of Florida. Although the author describes fairly and fully the origin and development of the controversy between the "many-splendored general" as he calls him, and the President, his particular aim is "to analyze the problems of civil-military relations in a limited war." Such an analysis is justified, since, although the horror of an atomic war has reduced its likelihood, it may thereby have enhanced the possibility of limited or "brush-fire" wars. In such a war, as was demonstrated in 1950-1, the opposition party has less necessity to refrain from criticism, and bi-partisanship may quickly disappear, especially if the public appears baffled and frustrated by a conflict which is not of the all out variety. An executive-legislative struggle may develop, and, if the debate over strategy, in this case provoked by General MacArthur's dismissal, leads to a Senatorial committee, the Chiefs of Staff may be branded as politicians when their testimony differs from that of the soldier whom the opposition chose to support. It is not too much to hope that the United States will be unlikely to see in the near future a general like MacArthur who regarded himself as "a sovereign power in his own right," as James Reston observed, and who was congenitally incapable of admitting that he ever made a mistake. But caution would suggest that attempts be made to educate the American public to the facts of international politics and the American officer to the broader context in which his command must operate.

In his chapter "The Allies Seek Peace," the author might have noted the role of the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers which met early in 1951, and Earl Attlee's autobiography might have been included in his admirable, annotated Bibliography.

F. H. SOWARD

The University of British Columbia

## Noted

*The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan.* By THOMAS C. SMITH. Stanford Studies in the Civilization of Eastern Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1959. Pp. xiv, 250. \$5.00.

THIS IS A ground-breaking work in the Western literature on modern Japan. Professor Smith makes available for the first time in English the enormous amount of research that has appeared in post-World War II Japan on the agrarian background of the Meiji Restoration. Using the results of this work—and of his own research as well—he presents a detailed and intellectually exciting account of the evolution of Tokugawa peasant society. That he concludes with as much emphasis on the conservative role of the peasant village as on its revolutionary potential, is a refreshing contrast with the Marxist interpretation that is current in Japanese academic circles.

*Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt.* By DAVID S. LANDES. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1958. Pp. xvi, 354. \$7.95.

AN IMPORTANT study of European finance in the Egypt of Ismail Pasha, based to a large extent on the remarkable correspondence which, during the years 1858-68, passed between one Edouard Dervieu, an intimate of Ismail, and Alfred André, one of the leading private bankers in France. Landes' superb introductory chapters

on the nature of merchant banking open up the whole field of nineteenth-century finance to further investigation, while the body of the work is the best account of the fleecing of Egypt and the undoing of Ismail that has yet appeared.

*Sources of Indian Tradition.* Compiled by W. T. DE BARY, STEPHEN HAY, *et al.* Introduction to Oriental Civilizations, LVI, edited by W. T. DE BARY. New York: Columbia University Press. 1958. Pp. xxviii, 961. \$8.00.

THIS SUPERB collection of readings traces the development of Indian thought from the thirteen century B.C. to the present, and covers both Indian and Muslim civilizations. For the first time the student and the dabbling scholar have readily available a rich selection of documents which throw new light and stimulate new interest in Indian intellectual history. The value of the volume is substantially enhanced by excellent Introductions, not only to the sections but to the individual documents as well. For those whose interests are confined to the modern or British period there are 400 pages of well-chosen extracts which show quite clearly the Western impact on traditional currents of thought.

*Ghana: A Historical Interpretation.* By J. D. FAGE. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press. 1959. Pp. xiv, 122. \$3.00.

ONE COULD HARDLY wish for a better brief introduction to the history of Ghana than this lucid account by Professor Fage. Each of the three lectures—given at Wisconsin when the author was a Visiting Professor of Commonwealth history—discusses a distinct epoch in the history of Ghana, the Gold Coast, and West Africa generally. It is a welcome relief to find little on Commonwealth constitutional developments, and a good deal on the nature and consequences of economic and social change and re-orientation, particularly as Ghana moved into the Western money economy.

*Studies in Elizabethan Foreign Trade.* By T. S. WILLAN. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1959. Pp. x, 349. 35 s.

THIS IS A volume of five essays, of which the first three are preliminary surveys of neglected areas—the trading factor, interloping and the staple, and the foreign trade of the provincial ports. The last of the essays, "Sugar and the Elizabethans," discusses the part played in English life by sugar, a luxury commodity, and it is an amusing foray into the social history of the era. The major essay, "English Trade with Morocco," takes up two-thirds of the volume, and is an exhaustive study of every essential aspect of the question, based especially on the de Castries documents and the Christchurch manuscripts. The author's account of the Barbary Company and the role of Lord Leicester in the Morocco trade make new contributions to the subject.

*The Victor and the Spoils: A Life of William L. Marcy.* By IVOR DEBENHAM SPENCER. Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press. 1959. Pp. xii, 438. \$8.00.

THIS IS THE first major biography of William L. Marcy and it will be welcomed by those who are interested both in American history and Canadian-American relations. Marcy began his political career by securing a local office in the state of New York in 1815, but he rapidly advanced his fortunes. Before his retirement in 1857 he had served as a Senator in the United States Congress, as Governor

of New York, as Secretary of War, and as Secretary of State. It is his service in this last office which is of greatest interest to Canadians, for he played a leading role in the negotiations of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. Indeed, it is Professor Spencer's contention that it was Marcy and not Elgin who was the key figure in drawing up this treaty which Canada had sought for so long and so ardently. The case he makes is a persuasive one, but he pushes it too hard. The concessions which Marcy won were due not only to his skill as a negotiator, but also to the fact that Canada felt it needed reciprocity so badly that she was willing to go more than half way to get it. Generally, however, this is a most useful account of the life of a man whose contributions have been too long ignored in American history.

*A Yankee Jeffersonian: Selections from the Diary and Letters of William Lee of Massachusetts Written from 1796 to 1840.* Edited by MARY LEE MANN. Foreword by ALLAN NEVINS. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1958. Pp. xii, 312. \$7.50.

IT IS FORTUNATE for the historian interested in early nineteenth-century American history that so many leading figures of that era were such voluminous correspondents and ardent diarists. No one could, of course, compete with John Quincy Adams in this field. However, if Lee, who served both in the consular service and with the Treasury, could not match Adams' incredible energy and productivity, he did share with him a sharp eye and a shrewd ability to judge men and events. Lee was in Paris both before and during the War of 1812 and he saw and met there the great and the near great. When he returned to Washington he continued to associate with men in high office and he seldom failed to write frankly and speak sharply about the qualities and abilities of those around him. This is why this ably edited collection of letters and extracts from his diary is so useful, informative, and instructive.

*La Séparation des églises et de l'état: L'oeuvre de Louis Méjan.* By L. V. MÉJAN. Préface by GABRIEL LE BRAS. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1959. Pp. xvi, 571. 1950 f.

Mlle. MÉJAN has produced this massive doctoral thesis on the role of her father, a high ranking civil servant, in the post-Dreyfus anti-clerical campaign. While drawing on an impressive array of sources (methodically listed in the Bibliography), Mlle. Méjan leans heavily on the private papers of her father. Excerpts from them tend to predominate over original composition. Yet the new insight into the motivation of the agents of the separation of Church and State make this work a useful if unattractive guide for students of the Third Republic.

*France during the German Occupation 1940-1944: A Collection of 292 Statements on the Government of Maréchal Pétain and Pierre Laval.* Translated by PHILIP W. WHITCOMB. 3 vols. The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace; Documentary Series, no. 1. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1959. Pp. 1666. \$20.00 the set.

SOME OF THE information in the Hoover Institution's collection of documents on the Vichy period is new. Much of it has been revealed before during political

trials or in published memoirs. For the details here assembled (particularly for some of the technical details from bureaucrats), students of the five-year period between the parliamentary Republics will be grateful. But they will hardly feel the title chosen is fair. It might better have been prefaced by something such as, "Some Aspects of . . .," or "Various Vichy Views on. . ." But of course that would have been clumsy, and in any event, anyone perusing these three substantial volumes will quickly make up his own title. Collected for or by the Comte and Comtesse René de Chambrun, these documents add more evidence to the special case they wish to substantiate. And if it is difficult to see that the task is any less formidable now than it was before they set to work, still one may admire the filial piety and fierce sense of injustice done that spurred this couple on. Fate, if you happen to be the daughter and son-in-law of Pierre Laval, has not dealt you the likeliest cards. There is nonetheless something admirable in refusing to throw the hand down and in insisting upon playing at a table where most of the others think you haven't a chance.

*I Was No Lady.* By JEAN W. GODSELL. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1959. Pp. xvi, 212, illus. \$4.95.

THIS BOOK certainly brings out the loneliness and hardships of life at the northern fur trade posts in pre-radio, pre-aircraft, pre-highway days: the long, dark, cold winters; the absence of foods, furnishings, and amenities that were an ordinary part of everyday life "outside"; the perils from epidemics, fires, and husky dogs running at large. It is also a remarkable catalogue of the nasty and petty bickerings of the handful of white residents, particularly the wives from "outside," revealing the deplorably low standards of conduct of the professedly superior newcomers—crude practical jokes of the "chamber pot" variety, slander, drunkenness, vulgar women's brawls, and little-veiled contempt for the half-breed or Indian inhabitants. *I Was No Lady* certainly is not a pleasant book, but it is an eyewitness account—for what it is worth—of social evolution along Canada's northern frontier.

*Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War.* By DOUGLAS EDWARD LEACH. New York: The Macmillan Company [Galt: Brett-Macmillan Ltd.]. 1958. Pp. xiv, 304, illus. \$6.00.

THIS IS AN interesting, and at times quite vivid account of the first major trial of strength between the Indians and the early settlers of New England, 1675–6. According to Samuel Eliot Morison, who wrote an Introduction to it, Dr. Leach's book is "the first comprehensive history of King Philip's War to appear since the seventeenth century." Here is the story of how and why the war began, its strategy and its battles, and its disastrous conclusion as far as the Indians were concerned. Here we see that inevitable lack of unity which marred Indian efforts to achieve a concentration of their energies and strength against the whites throughout the whole history of the United States—and, for that matter, of Canada as well. The book will be of interest to those concerned with the tactical side of Indian warfare. At the same time, however, it is only fair to point out that this is more than a military history; it is also a political and social history of New England. In particular it emphasizes the nature of the Puritan ethic—the concern with worldly prosperity and eternal salvation—and its relation to the problem of the clash of cultures.

*Airborne from Edmonton*. By EUGENE LOUISE MYLES. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1959. Pp. xii, 280. \$5.00.

HISTORIANS WILL FIND *Airborne from Edmonton* particularly useful as a catalogue of early flights but are likely to be repelled by the large amount of apocryphal (or at any rate, undocumented) dialogue. Since the historian usually seeks more than a collection of notable "firsts" he may be disappointed at the failure to assess the significance of Edmonton-based aviation upon the industrial development of north-western Canada and its impact upon the everyday life of its people, upon the city's business and social life, its metropolitan ambitions, its rivalries with other centres. Many readers may also conclude that a whole book written in paragraphs rarely exceeding five lines in length is almost foredoomed to be monotonous and tedious in the extreme from this cause alone.

*King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America*. By FRANK LAWRENCE OWSLEY. Second edition, revised by HARRIET CHAPPELL OWSLEY. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. 1959. Pp. xxiv, 614. \$10.00.

THE STANDARD WORK on Confederate foreign policy, originally published in 1931, has been revised by the author's widow, with additions to the Bibliography and some relatively minor changes in the text, based on later research. The book remains the fullest and most penetrating discussion of the subject.

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## Recent Publications Relating to Canada

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NOTICE in this bibliography does not preclude a later and more extended review.

The following abbreviations are used: *B.R.H.*—*Bulletin des recherches historiques*; *C.H.R.*—*Canadian Historical Review*; *C.J.E.P.S.*—*Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*; *R.H.A.F.*—*Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française*.

See also *Canadiana*, a monthly list of Canadian publications prepared by the National Library, Ottawa; *External Affairs*, published monthly by the Department of External Affairs; *Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth*, issued quarterly by the General Council of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association; and, in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, "Letters in Canada," published in the July issue.

Sections of the bibliography omitted from this issue for reasons of space will be included in later issues.

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- PETERSON, A. D. C. Educational Co-operation in the Commonwealth (*Journal of the Royal Commonwealth Society*, II (5), Sept.-Oct., 1959, 183-8, 190).

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